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Rudolf Eucken and the 
Spiritual Life 



By 

MADAME MARGARET M. Mac SWINEY 

RELIGIOUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 



A DISSERTATION 

Submitted to the Catholic University of America 

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 

for the Degres Doctor of Philosophy 



Washington, D. C. 
1915 



Rudolf Eucken and the 
Spiritual Life 



By 

MADAME MARGARET M. Mac SWINEY 

RELIGIOUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION 



A DISSERTATION 

Submitted to the Catholic University of America 

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 

for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy 

( 



Washington, D. C. 
1915 



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PREFACE 

The reaction against the materialism of the last half century 
has found an energetic supporter in the Professor of Philosophy of 
Jena University, Rudolf Eucken, who is proclaiming over 
three continents — directly or through his students — that the 
corner-stone of all philosophical thought and the axiom of axioms 
is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life. "So ist der Angel- 
punkt aller philosophischen Betrachtung und das Axiom der 
Axiome die Tatsache eines weltumspannenden Geisteslebens." 1 

Eucken will not accept any spiritualistic system already pro- 
pounded. He rejects Scholasticism on many grounds, the most 
oft repeated being that of naivete, and challenges its advocates, 
if they still hold it to be the "one permanent foundation of the 
search after truth," to prove their position. He has brought 
forward a new theory, which he has named Activism, proposing 
therein new conceptions of the spiritual and of truth and a new 
method of reaching both. 

A close study of Eucken's philosophy has convinced us that it 
does not offer a rational interpretation of the universe. Eucken 
insists on the practical and moral sides of philosophy, laying 
special stress on the necessity for action, but, claiming that his 
aim is pedagogical, not speculative, he has left us with irreconcil- 
able contradictions. On the one hand the advocate of Activism 
rises to a sublime height of moral eloquence, on the other he 
gives an exposition of the Supreme Spiritual Being which destroys 
the basis of morality. He asserts emphatically the unchange- 
ableness of truth, yet states that he is "at one with the main 
atmosphere of Pragmatism." Hence his system contains elements 
which are essentially incompatible. His antagonism to Catholic 
philosophy, and in particular to the Scholastic theory, seems to be 
the main cause of this result. He has, in fact, been caught on the 
horns of his own "Entweder-Oder." Either, acknowledging the 
truth of the spiritual life, Eucken must acknowledge the grounds on 
which it rests, Or, denying the grounds, he must, thereby, deny 
the possibility of a philosophy of the spiritual — and even of the 
existence of a spiritual reality. 



Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, 4te Aufl., Leipzig, 1913, p. 97. 



iv Preface 

The main purpose of this dissertation is to show the inconsistency 
of Eucken's position and to answer his challenge to Scholasticism. 
We have examined his philosophy chiefly from the standpoint of 
Epistemology, since the theory of knowledge is the core of his 
system. Activism stands or falls with the validity and objective 
value of an "immediacy" of higher knowledge. We have, how- 
ever, followed out to some extent the implications of his conception 
of the Geistesleben and have thus touched on other aspects. In the 
Final Note we have directed attention to certain points that call 
for further criticism, in particular Eucken's failure to draw a 
sufficiently sharp distinction between conscience and other mani- 
festations of spiritual activity, e.g., art; and his inconsistent 
attitude towards the Person of Christ. 

Throughout our treatment we have endeavored to make the 
citations sufficiently numerous and extensive to enable one other- 
wise unfamiliar with Eucken's work to test the appreciation here 
set forth by direct reference to the sources. Moreover, we have 
refrained, in most instances, from all criticism of individual 
passages in the course of the exposition. Our aim has been to 
judge the central conceptions — the Geistesleben and the Gemiit — 
as wholes, and for this reason some side issues have been passed 
over. In dealing with Scholasticism we have not unfolded the 
theory in all its details, but merely so far as was necessary to repel 
Eucken's attack. We have sought to show that the system which 
he rejects is intelligible in its concepts, consistent in its exposition 
and in harmony with the universally recognized signification of 
the term "spiritual." An examination of the philosophy of the 
spiritual seemed to demand a preliminary inquiry into the concept : 
this has been made in Part I. The plan of the entire dissertation 
follows. 



PLAN 

This dissertation is divided into three distinct though related 
parts: 

Part I treats of the Concept of the Spiritual. We have considered, 

1 its profound influence on human life; 

2 the earliest sources of our knowledge of it; 

3 its implication; 

4 the method of attaining it. 

A word of apology may be needed for the brief historical 
survey made in Chapter II: its purpose is to show that the 
concept of the spiritual has had a definite kernel of meaning 
for over two thousand years; that the sources through which 
it entered the philosophy of the West, and which are today 
as reachable as in the time of Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle, 
hinder us from arbitrarily changing its signification, from 
trying to affix "new" meanings to a time-honored word. 

In this connection we have pointed out in Chapter III that 
Eucken is unphilosophical in using the term "spiritual life" 
to include "incomparably more than is represented by the 
customary conception of that life." (Life's Basis and Life's 
Ideal, p. 240.) 

In Chapter IV we have called attention to the difference 
between the intellectualistic and the anti-intellectualistic 
theories of knowledge. 

Part II, the Main Thesis, deals with Eucken's Philosophy of the 
Spiritual Life. We have examined, 

1 the "new" method of Activism and found it untrust- 
worthy; 

2 the "new" conception of the spiritual life and found it a 
self-contradiction ; 

3 the "new" idea of truth and found it an irrational belief: 
we have further considered 

4 the problem of nature — a vital point in a philosophy of 
the spiritual. We have found Eucken's treatment of 
it to be confused, pessimistic and inconsistent, consti- 
tuting an insuperable obstacle to any real philosophy 
of the spiritual. 



vi Plan 

We therefore reject the system which Eucken has put 
forward to supplant Scholasticism. 

Part III deals with the "Permanent Foundation" of a Philosophy 
of the Spiritual. 

We have sought, by a fair and careful exposition of the 
Scholastic teaching with regard to the method of knowledge, 
the idea of truth and the nature of the First Cause, to re-estab- 
lish firmly the foundations of the spiritual life and of knowl- 
edge which Eucken's theory would completely shatter. We 
have examined in 

1 the question of truth-"imrnediacies:" we have sought 
to show that only in an intellectualistic theory is an 
"immediacy" trustworthy; in 

2 the nature of truth is unfolded; in 

3 the nature of the Absolute Spiritual Life; in 

4 Eucken's challenge is investigated and the answer 
pointed out. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Preface iii 

Plan of Dissertation v 



PART I 
THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 

CHAPTER I 

Importance of the Concept of the Spiritual 8 

CHAPTER II 

Source of the Spiritual in Greek Thought 6 

CHAPTER III 

Implication of the Concept 13 

CHAPTER IV 

Method of Attaining It 17 

PART II 
EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 

Introduction 25 

CHAPTER I 

Anti-Intellectualism 34 

Key to Eucken's philosophy, Einheit des Geisleslebens, 34 — Evidences 
of Anti-Intellectualism, 35 — Eucken's critics, 39 — Hermann, 39 — 
Tudor Jones, 39 — Boyce Gibson, 40 — Eucken and Revealed Truth, 
40 — Hermann, 41 — Dr. A. Jones, 41 — Action versus Thought, 41 — 
Booth, 42 — Eucken and Bergson, 42 — Eucken and "the historical 
Mystics," 45 — H. C. Sheldon, 46 — Eucken and Boyce Gibson, 47 — 
Eucken's misapprehension of Intellectualism, 47 — Eucken and Shake- 
speare, 48 — Further development of Eucken's system along irrational- 
istic lines, 48 — Conclusion, 48. 

CHAPTER II 

The Life-Process 50 

Activism, 50 — Two questions: Nature of the Life-Process, Manner of 
our knowledge of it, 51 — Exposition of the Life- Process, 51 — Analysis 
and Criticism, 57 — Conclusion, 62. 



viii Table of Contents 

CHAPTER III page 

The "Immediacy" of the Spiritual Life 63 

What the inquiry involves, 63 — The "Immediacy," 63 — Two stages 
of knowledge of the Spiritual, 64 — Psychological method, 64 — 
Scholastic influence, 67 — Points of difference, 68 — Noology, 70 — 
Three aspects of Activism revealed, 71 — Subjectivism, 71 — Pessim- 
ism, 74 — Materialism, 79 — Further consequences, 81 — Conclusion, 
83. 

CHAPTER IV 

The Problem of Nature 84 

Eucken's attitude, 84 — Hostility to Nature, 84 — Identification of 
nature and human nature, 86 — Consequences, 88 — Dr. Caldecott's 
criticism, 88 — Eucken's goal, Monism, 89 — "Human spiritual" a 
"concentration point" of Absolute Spiritual, 92 — Absolute Spiritual 
logically responsible for evil, 92 — Evidences of Pantheism, 92 — 
Conclusion, 94. 

Conclusion 96 

PART III 

THE PERMANENT FOUNDATION OF A PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE SPIRITUAL 

Introductory Note 103 

CHAPTER I 

Inquiry into the Conditions of Human Knowledge 105 

General survey, 105 — Discussion of the "immediacy," 106 — Schol- 
astic Theory of reason-' 'immediacies," 108 — Pragmatic theory of 
feeling-"immediacies," 110 — Conclusion drawn, 113 — Nature and 
basis of certainty, 115 — Means of perceiving truth. 121 — Conditions 
of infallibility of common-sense criterion, 124 — Objectivity of ideas, 
124 — Primary and secondary qualities of matter, 126 — Distinction 
between natural and supernatural knowledge, 128 — Necessity of 
Divine Revelation, 131 — Summary, 133. 

CHAPTER II 

Nature of Truth 134 

Eucken's definitions, 134 — His affinity with Pragmatic doctrine, 184 
— Necessary rejection of his standard, 135 — Scholastic conception of 
truth, 135— Immutability of truth, 138 — Conclusion, 139. 

CHAPTER III 

The Absolute Spiritual Life in Se 140 

Nature of the Absolute Spiritual Life, 140 — St. Thomas' proofs of tin- 
Divine Immutability, 140 — Elucidation and commentary, 141 — 
Relation of Absolute Spiritual to human spiritual. 144 — Problem of 
immanence and transcendence, 146 — Final criticism of Monism. 150. 

CHAPTER IV 

Conclusion 1 58 

Eucken's attack on Scholasticism, l">2 — Challenge answered, 1 8 I 
Concluding summary, 156. 

Final Note 157 

Bibliography 161 



PART I 

THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 

In which the importance, source and implication of this concept are 
considered, and the method of attaining it is discussed. 



CHAPTER I 

IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 

History seems to justify the statement that no other idea in 
the range of philosophic thought has been the cause of such fierce 
and bitter contest as the concept of the Spiritual; and no other 
tenet has been the ground of such unrelenting persecution in the 
sphere of religion. Martyrs of the Old and the New Law have 
died for the Spiritual, but so also did the philosopher of the 
Spiritual, Socrates, as he himself reveals to us. 

"Quid ergo aiunt accusatores mei? . . . Socrates iniuste agit 
. . . ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans" 2 . . . etc. 

"Si me nunc absolvatis ... si, inquam, ad haec vos ita 
dicatis: 0, Socrates, Any to non credimus, teque sententiis nostris 
absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam posthac in hac 
inquisitione philosophiaque verseris : ac si id facere [deprehendare, 
mortem obeas] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus demittere 
me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: Viri Athenienses, diligo 
vos equidem atque amo; Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis et 
quamdiu spirabo viresque suppetent, philosophari non desinam, 
exhortans et docens quemcunque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc 
in modum: Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, 
civitatis amplissimae, ac sapientia ac potentia praestantissimae, 
non erubescis in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum 
et gloriae et honoris quam plurimum sit? Ut autem prudentia et 
Veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque 
curas? . . . O Viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis 
Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, 
profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, nee si mihi sit pluries 
moriendum" 3 

The prominent place which this idea holds is thus due to the 
tremendous issues bound up with it. Every normal man whether 
Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian, Deist or Theist, whether 
unlettered or learned, has, at least once in his life, turned philos- 
opher. We can give no direct proof of this statement, but intro- 
spection will, it seems to us, establish it beyond doubt for the 



2 Im. Bek. Platonis Dialogi; Apol. Socrates 19 and 24, Berolini, 1816, Pars I, 
Vol. II. 

8 29, 30, loc. cit. The italics are our own. 



4 Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 

individual. The poet-philosopher, of all men and all time, has 
voiced this universal speculation: 

"For in that sleep of death what dreams may come 
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil, 
Must give us pause. 



. . . the dread of something after death, 
The undiscover'd country from whose bourn 
No traveller returns, puzzles the will," . . . 4 

"But here, upon this bank and shoal of time, 
We'd jump the life to come." 5 

What we wish to bring out is the fact that philosophy and 
religion meet and cross on the territory of the Spiritual. No 
consistent upholder of Monotheism will accept a system of philoso- 
phy in which there is no place for the Spiritual; and no philosopher 
who upholds a spiritualistic system will accept a religion which 
offers him only anthropomorphic gods. 6 

The latest German exponent of the Spiritual says, in connection 
with this problem: "The issue at stake is the destiny of man, the 
reasonableness or otherwise of his existence, the gaining or losing 
of a soul." 7 

But, though philosophy and religion deal here with the same 
reality, they do so from different standpoints, and the line of 
demarcation between the two fields is, in the main, clear, if narrow. 
An investigation into the Spiritual in philosophy will involve two 
distinct lines of inquiry: (1) an examination into the nature of the 
soul and its higher faculties of thinking and willing; (2) an examina- 
tion into the nature of the First Cause. Furthermore, Ethics and 
Art, in so far as the one treats of the will, and the other deals with 
the objective expression of the intellectual love of the beautiful, 
fall, in large measure, under the philosophy of the spiritual. The 



4 Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act III, Sc. I. 

6 Ibid., Macbeth, Act I, Sc. VII. 

5 We need hardly point out the radical difference between a religion of 
anthropomorphic gods and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation in time 
of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. The infinite dissimilarity 
between the Divine and the human nature in ne is pointed out by St. Paul 
when he describes the Incarnation thus: 

"But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the 
likeness of men." — Philippians, Chap. II, Verse 7. 

We make the reference, however, according to Catholic interpretation — 
not in the literal meaning which Kenoticists attribute to the words. 

7 Rudolf Eucken, Main Currents of Modern Thought, trans. by Booth. 
New York, \'Mi, p. ll.'S. Ceistige Stromungcn der (iegenwart, op. (St., p. 81. 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 5 

task is therefore clearly defined as soon as philosophy and the 
sciences exist, but previous to this it is mainly tentative. To 
confine oneself to the concept in philosophy, when searching for 
the origin of the idea of the spiritual in any country, would be as 
absurd as to insist on deciding the conditions of the earliest self- 
conscious states of the child by the mere observation of adult 
mental life. In both cases we must get back to the antecedents 
of the phenomena we are seeking to explain. 

An examination of religious beliefs and of literature, or — in 
default of this latter — folklore, is imperative, in order to ascertain 
whether they offer any faint suggestions of elements of the spiritual. 
The conservative method of science has, here, to be abandoned, 
and the investigator must be willing to go from the alpha to the 
omega of the then existent knowledge — whether it be alleged to be 
of human or Divine origin — for the purpose of discovering the 
influences through which, in the course of ages, the idea appeared. 

We cannot hold with Eucken that the origin of any form of the 
spiritual consisted in "little half -animal beginnings." 8 This 
would be to negative the concept in toto. That such is not Eucken's 
intention, however, may be gathered from the following: 

"Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the ques- 
tion as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned." 9 

and again: 

"If . . . spiritual life is a mere by-product of nature, there 
remains no possibility of providing a counter-poise for change and 
wresting a content from life; but humanity and the whole world 
with it are in headlong flight towards the nothingness which is 
their sole destination. Thus ... it is our attitude towards 
spiritual life — more particularly the recognition or rejection of an 
independence on the part of spiritual life — which decides the 
direction in which our thought must move." 10 

We cannot agree with the statement that any real beginning of 
any form of the spiritual came from matter, but we do hold that, 
in order to find the beginning in the ideal order, we must dig in the 
debris of old superstitions and pagan rites, and search out any 
particle of truth that may have been buried therein. If the 
quest should prove a complete failure as regards our special pursuit 
we have reason to suspect the existence of foreign influence. 



8 Ibid., p. 262; Geistige Strbinungen, p. 212. 

9 Eucken, ibid., p. 274; Geistige Stromungen, p. 228. 

10 Eucken, ibid., p. 278. The italics are Booth's. Geistige Stromungen, 
p. 227. 



CHAPTER II 
SOURCE OF THE SPIRITUAL IN GREEK THOUGHT 

From the preceding section it is evident that the implication 
of the concept of the spiritual is of the highest importance: it 
matters much to man what the spiritual does and does not mean. 
Before dealing, therefore, with a modern exposition of spiritual 
life it has seemed prudent to go back to the source of our first 
knowledge of the concept in philosophy, and inquire into its origin 
in Greek thought — the medium through which it has entered the 
modern world. 11 

This will enable us to test more accurately and fairly the worth 
of new theories. 

Ueberweg justly says that the extent to which the genesis of 
Greek philosophy was affected by Oriental influences is a problem 
the solution of which depends on the further progress of Oriental, 
and, especially, of Egyptological investigation. 12 

The discussion of the question does not fall here, but it is con- 
venient to bring forward some views of it. Clement 13 and Euse- 
bius 14 are vigorous advocates of a preponderating Jewish influence. 

Clement writes: 

"Tempora autem eorum, qui fuerunt principes et auctores 
ipsorum philosophiae, sunt dicenda consequenter ut, facta com- 
paratione, ostendamus Hebraeorum philosophiam fuisse geuera- 
tionibus multis antiquiorem;" 15 

and again: 

"Philosophia ergo, res quaedam valide utilis, olim quidem 
floruit apud Barbaros, per gentes resplendens: postea autem 
venit etiam ad Graecos." 16 

The most forceful of Clement's arguments to the modern mind 
are his references to admissions by Greek philosophers of barbarian 



11 We have not to consider here the first trace of the concept in philosophy: 
\\ e confine our investigation to Greek thought because this is the channel 
through which it lias been directly communicated to us. 

' Geschichte der Phil., Berlin, 7te Autl. lSOii, p. :?-»; Bte Anil.. 1894. 

'■• Opera, Vol. 1. Stromatum, Lib. I. Cap. XV, pp. 7(i7 sqq. Bfigne ed. l it*! 

"Praep. Evang., especially Lib. VIII, p. 587; Lib. XII. Cap. 1. X. XVI, 
pp. 95 1 sqq. 

16 Op. Cit., Cap. XIV, p. 766. 

"Op. cit., Lib. I. Cap. XV, p. "s. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 7 

wisdom; e. g., to Plato, when, speaking through Socrates in the 
Phaedo, he says: "Magna quidem est . . . Graecia, o Cebes, 
ait ille, in qua sunt viri omni ex parte boni, multa sunt autem 
etiam genera barbarorum." 17 

Ueberweg, while maintaining that the Greeks met with no fully 
developed and completed philosophical systems among the 
Orientals, considers Oriental influence on early Greek thinkers 
to be not only possible, but, in some cases, most probable. He 
suggests that Anaxagoras possibly came in contact with Jews. 1S 

Zeller reduces foreign influence to a minimum, and attributes 
Greek Philosophy, almost exclusively, to the peculiar character- 
istics of Greek genius. 19 

Burnet 20 treats the subject with a touch of scorn, and suggests 
that the first question to be settled is whether any pre-Hellenic 
philosophy existed. He thinks not. On the remark of Noumenios, 
"What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic?" he says that Nou- 
menios was probably "thinking of certain marked resemblances 
between Plato's Laws and the Levitical Code when he said this — 
resemblances due to the fact that certain primitive legal ideas 
are similarly modified in both." 21 

This is a summary dismissal of a weighty question. Why are 
the primitive legal ideas similarly modified by Moses and Plato, 
and what would Burnet suggest as the primitive form of the 
similarly modified legal ideas? These two points call for explana- 
tion. 

Burnet grants, however, in conclusion, that Greek Philosophy 
did not originate quite independently of Egyptian and Babylonian 
influences. 

Gomperz 22 in his introduction to "Griechische Denker" gives a 
very picturesque account of the influences at work in the Hellenic 
World centuries before the appearance of the "Philosophers of 
Nature." The description of certain details, e. g., the endless 
line of pilgrims coming to the Delphic Oracle, and the crowds of 
strangers thronging to the Olympic Games, is, perhaps, highly 
colored, but the main outline seems accurate, and impresses the 



17 Platonis Dialogi. Im. Bek. Berolini. Pars II, Vol. Ill, Phaedo. 

18 Geschichte der Phil., op. cit., 8te Auflage, pp. 41, 42. 

19 Phil, der Griechen, Leipzig, 1892. 5te Aufl., pp. 19 sqq„ 41 sqq. 

20 Early Greek Phil., 2nd ed., London, 1908, pp. 17 sqq. 

21 Ibid., p. 19. 

22 Griechische Denker, Leipzig, 1896, Vol. I, Einleitung. 



8 Ktjdolf Etjcken and the Spiritual Life 

reader with the incalculable effects which the East had on Greek 
thought. Erdmann and Fouillee do not deal with the problem 
at any length. 23 The opening lines of Erdmann's introduction 
to his Philosophy of the Ancients are most significant. "Dazu, 
sein eigenes Wesen denkend zu erfassen, kann der Menschengeist 
erst dort versucht und fahig seyn, wo er sich seiner specifischen 
Wurde bewusst ist;" 24 and he adds that man does not attain, in the 
East, to this consciousness of his specific worth except among the 
Jews (ausgenommen bei den Juden) 25 . 

The statement of Fouillee, — in Section V of the first book of his 
Philosophy — "Les Anciens Peuples" — concerning les "Doctrines 
Philosophiques des Hebreux," is no less suggestive: "La Judee 
n'offre pas non plus de la philosophic proprement dite: elle est 
tout entiere absorbee par l'idee religieuse. Neanmoins, on peut 
degager de ses livres sacres les grandes doctrines philosophiques 
qui devaient plus tard entrer comme elements dans la philosophic 
chretienne et moderne." 26 Fouillee does not seem to notice the 
import these remarks have for the inquiry into the genesis of 
Greek philosophy. 

It is not necessary to multiply references: enough has been 
brought forward to show the general attitude of modern thought 
on this subject: Zeller is its most extreme exponent. Those who 
take different views are in the minority. Nevertheless two 
undeniable facts are generally conceded, or, at least, not disputed. 

1. The Hebrews had something worth communicating, whether 
it be called philosophy or not. 

2. Greeks and Jews came into contact at an early date. 

We are confining our investigation here to one point — the 
spiritual — and in searching out its origin in Greek thought we 
cannot ignore the historic fact that a civilized people with a high 
ethical code and a spiritualistic religion existed for centuries before 
Heraclitus used the term X670S, 27 or Anaxagoras spoke of the 
voos (wOs). 28 

In Greece we find the earliest attempts at system in the poems 
of Homer and Hesiod, which serve the Greeks alike as cosmogeny 



23 See Erdmann. Geschiehte der Phil., Vol. I, Berlin 1878. par. 17, p. 13; 
par. 19, p. 14, 3rd ed., 1878. 

24 Op. cit., Einleitung, p. 11. 
" Loc. cit. 

s » Hist de la Phil., 5e ed., Paris, 1887, p. *5. 
"See Mullach, Frag., Heracliti, (1)1. 
28 Ibid., Anax., (5) 1. 



EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 9 

and theogeny. From Homer and Hesiod to Anaxagoras the dis- 
tance is spanned by the cosmogenic systems — of which Pherecydes 
is representative — by the scientific beginnings of the Ionians, and 
the more abstract speculations of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans. 

The poems of Homer, in the aspect of theogeny, are fatal to a 
system of spiritualistic philosophy. If a steady succession of 
writers had transmitted progressive ideas in an unbroken current 
from Homer to Thales, so as to create a continuous development 
of thought, the presence of the spiritual, at such a comparatively 
early date, in Greek philosophy would be very difficult to under- 
stand, apart from foreign influence. With the data which ancient 
Greece offers, the hypothesis that the idea of the spiritual is the 
spontaneous outcome of the fertile Greek intellect 29 seems to us 
untenable. It is as inconceivable, from a psychological view- 
point, that a highly developed abstraction, such as the concept 
of the spiritual, should appear in philosophy from the above data, 
as it would be, from an evolutionist viewpoint, that man appeared 
in the middle of the phylogenic series instead of at the end. 

We cannot agree with Gomperz that the system of Pherecydes is 
suggestive of the spiritual. His account runs thus: "Pherekydes 
. . . kannte drei Urwesen, die von Ewigkeit her da waren: 
Chronos oder das Zeit-Prinzip, Zeus, von ihm Zas genannt (wohl 
nicht ohne Riicksicht auf jene Namensdeutung, die uns schon 
einmal bei Heraklit begegnet ist und die den obersten Gott als 
das hochste Lebens-prinzip auffassen wollte) ; endlich die Erdgbttin 
Chthonie. Aus dem Lamen des Chronos sei 'das Feuer, der 
Lufthauch und das Wasser' entsprungen, aus diesen auch 'man- 
nigfache Geschlechter der Gotter.' " 30 

And in his criticism he writes: 4 'Zas und Chronos erscheinen 
als mehr geistige Wesen." 31 

Such a novel view of the spiritual would surprise us if Gomperz 
had not thrown some light on his attitude in an earlier chapter. 
Treating of Heraclitus he writes: "Die grosse Originalitat 
Heraklits besteht . . . darin, dass er zum erstenmal zwischen 
dem Natur- und dem Geistesleben Faden spann, die seitdem nicht 
wieder abgerissen sind, und dass er allumfassende Verallgemeine- 
rungen gewonnen hat, welche die beiden Bereiche menschlicher 



29 See Zeller, op. cit., p. 45. 

3(1 Griechische Denker, Leipzig, 189C, Vol. 1, p. 70. 

81 Ibid., p. 72. 



10 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Erkenntnis wie mit einem ungeheueren Bogen iiberwolbten." 32 
If Heraclitus, whose eternal World-Fire Tvp adfaov 33 is iden- 
tical with the \6yos, is an excellent exponent of the spiritual, 
according to Gomperz, we may disregard Gomperz's views on the 
subject in our search, since by "spiritual" we understand some- 
thing essentially different. 

In this connection we may call attention to the misleading 
statement of Gomperz with regard to the primitive meaning of 
the words used to signify "spirit." He says: "In der Regel 
bleibt jedoch dem Hauch, dem Atem, dem warmen Dampf , welcher 
aus dem Innern des lebenden Organismus hervorquillt, diese Rolle 
vorbehalten, wie denn der ungeheuren Mehrzahl von Worten, 
welche in den verschiedensten Sprachen 'Seele' und 'Geist' 
bezeichnen, diese Grundbedeutung eignet." 34 

As we are treating of Greece we shall test the statement by 
reference to the Greek and Latin tongues. 

1. ^X 1 ? signified primarily "breath," and was applied 
figuratively — perhaps even literally at an early date — to "soul" 
or "living principle." It was not used to signify "spirit." Aris- 
totle has the word in reference to the living principle, or souls of 
plants and animals, and though he uses the popular word for living 
principle when treating of the human soul — which he holds to be 
immaterial — he employs the term "NoOs" to signify its spiritual 
activity. 

2. "Anima" in Latin signifies "breath," and "soul" in popular 
language; it is found in the Poets applied to the "shades" of the 
departed. It is never used in philosophy to signify the spiritual 
— as far as we can discover. The "intellectus," or "mens," is 
employed as a correct rendering of the Greek vovs- 

The Greeks were not slow to perceive the distinction between 
the two terms as is seen from Aristotle: 

"At Anaxagoras videtur quidem aliud animam, aliud intellectum 
dicere, quemadmodumet anteadiximus; . . . verum intellectum 
principium maxime omnium ponit: solum namque rerum omnium 
ipsum simplicem et non mistum et sincerum esse dicit." The 
terms used by Aristotle in the original are \pvxn v an( l voov 
rendered in Latin by "animam" and "intellectum." 35 



32 Ibid., p. 52. 

,3 Loc. cit.. Heracliti (27). 

M Ibid., p. 17. 

"See Arist.. Vol. S. De. An.. Lib. I. Chap. II (IS). 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 11 

We conclude our investigation with the statement of our 
conviction that the concept of the spiritual in Greek Philosophy- 
has been taken, at least "in germ," from the Hebrews. The 
following points resume our arguments briefly : 

1. It is contrary to all psychological experience (using the term 
in the widest sense to include both the individual and the race) 
that an abstract science, such as Metaphysics, should spring up 
spontaneously and reach a perfect development in the short 
space of two centuries, without any antecedents, and independently 
of foreign influence. 

2. (a) Among ancient peoples the spiritual, in the strict 
sense, was known to the Hebrews alone. 

(b) It was quite possible for the idea to be communicated in a 
general way. 

(c) It is, in the highest degree, improbable that the Greeks 
could be totally ignorant of the central doctrine in the Jewish 
Religion. The Hebrew nation was too individualistic to escape 
the quick-witted curiosity of the Greek. 

To these may be added two other points: 

1. The Spiritual of the Hebrews and the Spiritual of Aristotle 
are practically identical in all essential features. 

2. Aristotle accuses Anaxagoras of using the Spiritual as a 
"Deus ex machina;" his words are: "Nam et Anaxagoras tanquam 
machina utitur Intellectu ad mundi generationem; et quum 
dubitat propter quam causam necessario sit, tunc eum attrahit; 
in ceteris vero, magis cetera omnia, quam intellectum, causam 
eorum quae fiunt, ponit. 36 The fact that Anaxagoras is unable 
to do anything, so to say, with the spiritual principle which he is 
the first to propound, is a strong argument against its being really 
a portion of his own system. If he had discovered the principle 
by the abstractive process of his own thought we believe that it 
would have been worked in as the vital power in an organic whole. 
To sum up: 

We do not hold that the concept of the spiritual entered Greek 
thought clothed in philosophical language, but we believe that the 
germinal thought was cast in at a very early date, that the germ 
of truth was more fully communicated to Anaxagoras, and that 
the later philosophers were familiar, in a greater or less degree, 
with the contents of the Hebrew Sacred Books. 



16 Met., Lib. 1, Chap. IV (5). 



12 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

That this leaves much originality to the Greeks, nevertheless, 
is evident from a comparison of the results obtained in philosophy 
by the Greeks and Hebrews respectively. The clear scientific 
exposition of Aristotle, contrasted with the mystic system of Philo, 
shows, perhaps, better than any other evidence, the wonderful 
grasp and power of synthesis of the Greek intellect. 



CHAPTER III 
IMPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL 

The investigation into the source of this concept has led to its 
definition: Spirit is that which is not made up of constituent 
parts nor, in itself, dependent on matter. It is thus opposed to 
the corporeal, the material, as the supersensible. Such is the 
widest signification of the term "spiritual" — signification univer- 
sally recognized in the ancient, the mediaeval and the modern 
world. Anaxagoras gives, practically, a definition in the following : 
voos be kffTL aweipov /cat avroxpaTes /cat ^ue/zt/crat ovSevl XP^M 07 "'. aXXct 
ixovvos avros hp euvrov eari. 37 And Aristotle emphasizes the fact 
that the earlier philosopher had correctly understood the meaning 
of the voos. 3 * 

Today we find the "spiritual" defined as that which "consists of 
spirit, as a spiritual substance; the incorporeal, the non-material." 

Thus, for over two thousand years the content of this concept 
has remained unchanged. There were men in the days of Anaxa- 
goras who denied the reality of the vovs, and their type has 
probably never failed since: sceptics, sincere and otherwise, prolong 
the echo in every age. What was questioned, however, was the 
existence of the vovs, not its meaning. Violent discussions have 
raged concerning the nature of the First Principle of all things: 
verdicts have been given for or against the spiritual, but nowhere 
do we find a discussion as to what the spiritual stands for. Materi- 
alists do not argue about the implication of the term : they deny the 
reality of what it implies. Even the Monists, who sought to unite 
matter and mind in some wn-definable third have not offered us 
a new view of the spiritual, though their attempt might have been 
at least more intelligible if they had. It is therefore something 
novel, and well-nigh startling, to find one who earnestly advocates 
a philosophy of the spiritual coming forward and clearly announc- 
ing that he has changed the meaning of the word. In our last chapter 
we indicated that Burnet's references to the concept were tainted 
by materialism, but this to us seems only to suggest that physical 
and psychical alike were looked on by him as products of the forces 
of matter. 



,7 Fragraenta, Anaxagoras, op. cit., 6. 
18 Arist., De. An., loc. cit. 



IS 



14 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

With Eucken the case is different: he has proclaimed that the 
Super-sensible exists in its own right; that an Independent Spiritual 
Life forms the ultimate basis of all reality. There have been many 
disputes as to what matter is, none as to what spirit is, but rather 
as to whether it is. Eucken has affirmed the last position and we 
have the right to demand from him a system in accordance with 
his standpoint. In the main thesis of this dissertation an inquiry 
will be made into the new philosophy of the spiritual; here we have 
but to remark that its exponent is unphilosophical in the following 
statements. 

"Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, 
of which that other than nature may in agreement with established 
usage be called spiritual, however little may be implied by this 
expression; however mysterious, indeed, the conception may for 
the present be." 39 The original text is "Innerhalb der Seele 
selbst scheiden sich damit zwei Stufen, von denen die jenseits 
der Natur gelegene nach alter Uebung als die geistige bezeichnet 
werden mag, so wenig mit diesem Ausdrvck gesagt ist, ja so 
rdtselhaft einshveilen dieser Begriff bleibt." 40 

"The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is repre- 
sented by the customary conception of that life." 41 

The nature of the "more" must be inferred after the theory 
has been examined. We may notice the words of S. H. Mellone 
in this connection: "Another characteristic is that he uses certain 
terms of fundamental import, — such as 'spiritual,' 'natural,' 
'real,' 'ideal,' 'eternal,' — in meanings which, though uniform and 
consistent, have to be discovered by the reader." 42 Surely a 
philosopher, or teacher, is hardly justified in using "terms of 
fundamental import" and of definite content — we may perhaps 
except the term "ideal" owing to the now many different inter- 
pretations of the word — in meanings which have to be discovered 
by the reader. Our exposition of the "Geistesleben" will show 
that we do not consider the meaning of the term to be either 
"uniform" or "consistent." We maintain that Eucken ought to 
have called new conceptions by new names; we disclaim the 
charge of bias because we insist on the recognized meaning of 

19 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, translated by Alban G. Widgerv, Loudon, 
1912, pp. 131, 132. 

w Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 2te Aurl., Leipzig, 1913. 
Italics ours. 

41 Life's Basis, op. cit., p. 240. See also Grundlinien, <>p. fit., p. 104. 

A ' 2 S. H. Mellone, Edinburgh. International Journal of Ethics, Ocl . 1910, 
"Idealism of Rudolph Eucken," p. IS. 



EUDOLF ErCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 15 

words. What would become of Logic if we were to play fast and 
loose with their connotation? And what would become of Phil- 
osophy if Logic were made a ringing of changes upon "terms of 
fundamental import?" 

We have given the definition of the spiritual in its widest 
signification : we shall point out briefly the more specialized senses 
in which it is employed. 

In the Hebrew Sacred Books, in the metaphysics of Aristotle, 43 
in Scholasticism and Christian philosophy in general, and in 
theology, the First and Final Cause of all things is held to be a 
spiritual being — an Infinite Spirit — omniscient, omnipotent, 
omnipresent, i.e., wholly present throughout the entire universe 
and in every part thereof, though not occupying space after the 
manner of bodies. Possessing the plentitude of all being, He is 
infinitely perfect and, therefore, changeless. 

Man's soul is an individual spiritual substance. It comes direct 
from the First Cause by a creative act, and being like It in nature 
it seeks It as its last end. 44 

Inasmuch as the human soul is the animating principle of 
the body during life, it is capable of sensuous activity; in contra- 
distinction, spiritual activity, or intellect, denotes the higher 
power of the soul — that through which it thinks, knows, and wills; 
in this connection are also contrasted the terms "spiritual life," 
"sensuous life." The epithet "human," in that it connotes man's 
rational nature, always implies the spiritual. 

Spiritual life, in the sphere of theology, signifies the life of the 
soul in its personal relations with the Creator. As this is mainly 
dealt with in ascetic theology, we pass rapidly from natural to 
revealed truth, and thereby go beyond the domain of philosophy. 
A "spiritual man" is, thus, one who makes this supernatural life 
of the soul his main study and aim. 

In German, "geistige" (spiritual) is sometimes used, in a com- 
prehensive sense, to include all the artistic and literary activities 
and strivings of the soul, which go to form the Kultur of the age. 
This employment of the term is philosophical in itself, since art 
and literature are chiefly products of the spiritual activity, although 
the aesthetic imagination plays a large part; nevertheless a careful 

43 Metaph., Book XI. 

44 In the Monadology of Leibniz the soul is a simple, indivisible, immaterial, 
substantial unit, its "representative" power being likened to the spiritual 
principle, or form, of Scholasticism; thus, except for his curious terminology, 
be is practically at one with other Christian philosophers as to the spiritual 
nature of the soul. 



16 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

distinction must be made here; neither art nor literature is phil- 
osophy. The study of the underlying principles of art, as of all 
other fundamental principles, belongs to philosophy, but the 
interpretations of life and reality offered by artists and poets may 
be the very antithesis of philosophical. 

It is because Eucken has failed to make this distinction that we 
find Goethe and Schiller figuring in Lebensanschauung der Grossen 
Denker, a work which is supposed, in the main, to be a history of 
Philosophy. It is significant that more space is allotted in it to 
Goethe than to either Descartes or Locke. For a similar reason, 
viz, the author's failure to distinguish between natural and revealed 
truth, we find the second part of this volume devoted to an exami- 
nation of Christianity. It is interesting to note that at least three 
times as many pages are given to Luther as to St. Thomas Aquinas. 

"Spirituel" in French, when used as a personal adjective, has the 
signification of "witty." The noun "spiritualite" renders the 
English "spiritual" when this is employed personally, e. g., "a 
very spiritual man" corresponds in French to "un homme d'une 
haute spiritualite." Apart from this peculiar use "spirituel" is 
the equivalent of "spiritual" in its various shades of meaning, e. g., 
the soul is "un principe spirituel;" "spiritual life," "la vie spiri- 
tuelle;" matters pertaining to the relations between God and the 
soul are termed in general "les choses spirituelles ;" "spiritual life" 
in contradistinction to "sensuous life" is often termed "la vie 
intellectuelle," but its operations are described as "inorganiques et 
spirituels." 

It is evident that each of the above meanings of the spiritual 
is in perfect harmony with the original definition of the term 
although some of them belong to it only in its religious, others 
only in its artistic aspect. 

We may remark that although spirit is the recognized English 
translation of the vovs, mens or intellectus, it is less suited 
etymologically than either mind or intellect. St. Thomas uses 
the adjective "spiritualis," but more often the terms immaterialis, 
incorporeus, intellectualis. 45 

In concluding this examination of the implication of the 
spiritual we would point out that the subject matter or context, 
usually prevents any ambiguity as to the particular signification 
in which the term is being employed. 



vide Sum.. I, q. L. LI. LXXV. 



CHAPTER IV 

METHOD OF ATTAINING THE CONCEPT OF THE 
SPIRITUAL 

The philosophy of the Spiritual in the modern world is inex- 
tricably bound up with the treatment of the problem in the ancient 
world. It is incontestable that the Spiritual — in the one case in 
its religious, in the other in its philosophical aspect — was known 
and appreciated in the Hebrew and classic Greek worlds. The 
concept of the spiritual, knowledge of the spiritual, are not, there- 
fore, products of modern thought; they have been transmitted 
from antiquity. However divergent the theories may be concern- 
ing the nature of psychic activity, however arbitrarily writers 
may impose a new content on the concept of the Spiritual, the fact 
remains that the origin of the conception does not coincide with 
the discoveries of modern science. 

Again, since modern science has not, in fact, changed man's 
nature, though it has suggested new interpretations of it, the 
human mind works and must work in the modern world as it 
did in the ancient. Fresh and abundant material is offered its 
activity in modern life; much that was unknown or misinterpreted, 
has been discovered or elucidated, but man does not, psychologi- 
cally speaking, think in a different manner. He may consider the 
universe under a new aspect, but there has been no alteration of 
the laws that govern the working of his own mind. For the 
philosopher and scientist of today, as for Plato and Aristotle, the 
law of Contradiction is the fundamental principle of his thought 
which he cannot really violate — whatever conflicting statements 
he may make — for the reason that the mind will never accept an 
evident contradiction. 

Eucken well says, "Nothing is more characteristic of the dis- 
tinctive nature of thought than the fact and power of the logical 
contradiction." 46 

No normal mind can assent to the statement that black is white, 
provided it be made in clear and unmistakable terms: if the 
thought is obscured by a mist of confused expressions, the mind 



46 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. cit., p. 183. Geistige Stromungen 
der Gegenwart, p. 143. 

17 



18 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

may assent through ignorance of the nature of the data presented 
to it. The will has much to do with such assents on insufficient 
grounds. As Doctor Dubray points out: "That man would be 
laboring under an illusion who would think that to him could never 
be applied the words of Henry IV: 'Thy wish was father, Harry, 
to that thought.' Who, knowing himself as he is and as others 
perhaps know him, can boast that he never saw things as he wished 
them to be?" 47 

It is well to insist on this point when examining modern theories 
of knowledge. 

The genesis of knowledge is a central problem in philosophy, 
but the attempt to transfer the seat of knowledge from what is 
highest in man to what he shares with the brutes — from what 
raises him above the animals to what allies him with them — seems 
to belong exclusively to contemporary systems. The Stoics and 
Epicureans did not hold that man possessed an intellectual faculty 
since they conceived the soul as a form of subtle matter; hence it 
would suggest something of an anachronism to consider them the 
historical forbears of anti-intellectualists. The term anti-intellec- 
tualism implies intellectualism, and anti-intellectualists are, in 
general, prompt to acknowledge intellectual activity, but they 
maintain that the intellect is not the true instrument of knowledge 
— above all of the higher kind. Not through the intellect but 
through some other channel — instinct, feeling, action — does man 
learn the meaning of his life and come to realize his responsibility. 
Eucken is emphatic on the importance — in fact the necessity — of 
adopting the new method which he advocates as being "Coperni- 
can" in contrast to the intellectualistic or "old mode of thought" 
which is truly "Ptolemaic." We have just cited Eucken's words 
as to the fact and power of the logical contradiction. Is he free 
from contradiction in seeking to reject his intellect? Anti- 
intellectualism, in fact, is a sheer impossibility: it has no more 
reality than a round square. 

Theorists may style themselves what they will, but they camiot 
change their nature since they are not the authors of their being. 
All men are intellectualists, since intellect or reason is an essential 
mark of man. They think, judge, decide by intellect and can do 
so in no other way; they reject intellect by intellect and select 



47 "Intellectualism in Practical Life," Catholic University Bulletin, Vol. 
XX, p. <H, Feb., 1914. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 19 

feeling, or instinct, or whatever they choose as new guide of life, 
only through the intellect they have rejected. Indeed anti- 
intellectualists move perpetually in a rather narrow circle. 

There is one method, and only one, of attaining knowledge of 
the spiritual, as well as all other knowledge: it is the Intellectual- 
istic. This method presupposes the activities of the lower faculties, 
especially the cognitive powers. As the Scholastics so often 
repeat, nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu. Intel- 
lect and sense work concomitantly and harmoniously. Withdraw 
intellect and we have perception but never knowledge : to remember 
is one phenomenon — due to association — to recognize in the true 
sense of the word, is another — due to intellect. Dogs have good 
memory power, it is man's prerogative to recognize. To feel is 
one thing, to know that one feels and what one feels is quite 
another, belonging to a different order of mental life. Perception 
and feeling are common to all animals : the "crashing of machinery" 
theory 48 is no longer held even by vivisectists. Intellect is, 
solely, the prerogative of man. The experiments of recent years 
have gone to prove that there is no trace of thought or reflection 
in the phenomena ascribed to monkeys. Instinct and association 
amply account for their feats of dexterity. Hence an anti- 
intellectualistic mode of thought, if such a nonentity could be 
conceived, so far from being "Copernican" would be decidedly 
the reverse, since it would imply not a retrogression, but a down- 
ward plunge to the brute world. No analogy exists between the 
Copernican theory and anti-intellectualism. Copernicus did not 
suggest a change in the planetary system : he brought forward no 
theory to disturb the laws of nature; but this is, in fact, what 
Eucken advocates, since the laws of mental life are the laws of 
man's rational nature. Copernicus was an Intellectualist of a 
high order; this, alone, enabled him to offer a more correct inter- 
pretation of the material universe; and only Intellectualists can 
offer correct interpretations, whether it be of the solar system, the 
data of consciousness or the invisible Reality which is the "Founda- 
tion of all the rest." 

A comparison of Eucken's statement regarding the fact and 
power of the logical contradiction with the following: "Even 

<8 The Cartesian theory that .-mi ma Is were automata: some went so far as to 
maintain that the apparent cry of pain on the dissecting table was due to the 
crashing of the machinery— in fact, was this crashing! Such a view did not 
prevail very widely. 



20 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

when gauging the external world the imaginative flight of thought, 
piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of sense-percep- 
tion," 49 leads one to infer that the philosopher did not compare 
one portion of his system with another; else how could he, after 
having written the above, advocate an anti-intellectualistic 
method? 

Thought, which is the activity of the intellect, can indeed speed 
across the oceans, soar above the highest mountain tops, pierce 
the clouds and make man prostrate himself in spirit before the 
Uncreated Source of all being. In the phrase "pierce the clouds" 
we are using an expression which helps the imagination. We 
know that God is, in fact, everywhere and can make His presence 
felt to the soul anywhere. The elans of the soul do not imply a 
spatial, but a moral uplift to what is higher and holier. All 
this is done, however, by or through the intellect, and cannot be 
done in any other way. Even the more immediate knowledge of 
God, to which we have just referred, and which Eucken seeks to 
make the only means of knowledge, 50 is communicated through 
the intellect. 

We shall cite in conclusion the words of the scientist, St. George 
Mivart: 

"Self-conscious, reflective thought, ... is our ultimate and 
absolute criterion. . . . Our ultimate court of appeal and 
supreme criterion is the intellect, and not sense, and that act of 
intellectual perception which is thus ultimate, we may call 'intellec- 
tual intuition.' " 51 

The results of our inquiry into the concept of the spiritual may 
now be summed up: 

1. The concept of the spiritual is the most important in the 
range of thought; it belongs both to Philosophy and Religion, but 
to each under a different aspect. If we pass from natural to 
supernatural truth, from natural Religion to Revelation, the 
highest that we can know of is Spirit: such knowledge does not 
belong to philosophy. 

2. The religious concept of the Hebrews hastened the appear- 
ance and influenced the development of the philosophical concept 
of the Greeks. Historical data point to the Hebrews as the first 



49 Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 7. (Hauptprobleme der Religions 
philosophie der Gegenwart, Berlin, 1912, p. 9.) 

50 This matter will be treated in Part II, Chap. III. 
61 On Truth. London, 1889, p. 113. 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 21 

to possess knowledge of the Spiritual : the origin and earliest source 
of the concept would then be religious. 

3. The Spiritual is that which is in se essentially, forever and 
in every way, distinct from and opposed to matter. 

4. Whether in the natural, or supernatural order, man can 
only attain to a knowledge of the spiritual through his rational 
activity, or faculty, Intellect. 



PART II 

EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 

In Which the Theory of Activism is Examined Mainly under Its 
Epistemological Aspect 



INTRODUCTION 

Activism, its name, gives a key to Eucken's philosophy, or, 
rather, to his own idea about his philosophy. The new system 
insists upon action, spiritually inspired action, as the only instru- 
ment of genuine knowledge and the only path to truth and noble 
living. Here, at the outset, we are met by something like a 
dilemma. Eucken has differentiated in action — he distinguishes 
between soulless work and spiritual deed (Volltat). 52 What is 
the principle of differentiation unless thought, and if thought 
be introduced where is the special claim of Activism? 53 

Tudor Jones, interpreting Eucken, writes: 

"Something had to be done before the whole nature of what it 
was could become known. Thus, man gains a special kind of 
existence long before he is able to interpret such an existence. 
He lives a reality for which he has often blindly striven, although 
he may be far from being able to account for it." 54 

It may be questioned whether this is an accurate description of 
human activity, but it is a fair explanation of Eucken's view. 
According to him mankind advances from a mere psychic state of 
existence, from the "narrowly human" to the full possession of 
spiritual life: "Kurz, der Mensch ist in seiner ersten empirischen 
Lage nicht nur den Zusammenhangen der Geisteswelt entfremdet, 
sondern auch unfahig, aus eigenem unmittelbaren Vermogen sie 
wieder zu erreichen." 55 

In his earlier works he states clearly that the transition can be 
accomplished only with the help of thought: "Die Ueberzeugung, 
dass die That mehr enthalten mag, als das Bewusstsein, gab 
Recht und Pflicht, auf die Gesamtheit des Thuns zuriickzugreifen 
und zu priifen, ob nicht in ihr eine Ganzheit angelegt sei, deren 



62 See Erkennen und Leben, Leipzig, 1912, p. 65; Prolegomena zu Fors- 
chungen iiber die Einheit des Geisteslebens, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 26-39, 46 (top 
of page), 112 (top of page); Einheit des Geisteslebens, Leipzig, 1888. pp. 363 
(end of page) sqq., 374, 384 sqq., 421—431,484 sqq.; Der Kainpf urn einen 
geistigen Lebensinhalt, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1907, pp. 160-107; Geistige Striim- 
ungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., pp. 74-83; Grundlinien einer neuen Leben- 
sanschauung, op. cit., pp. 99 sqq.; Einfiihrung in eine Philosophic des Geistes- 
lebens, Leipzig, 1908, p. 122. 

63 "Der Aktivismus." See Grundlinien, pp. 143 sqq.; G. Stromungen, 
pp. 51 sqq. 

M The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, London, 1914, p. 12. 
H Einheit des Geisteslebens, op. cit., p. 449. 

25 



26 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Gegenwart das Leben zu seiner Vollendung bedarf, die es aber 
ohne Gedankenarbeit nimmer finden Jcann." 56 

"Diese neue Wirklichkeit ist nicht aus seelischer Unniittel- 
barkeit zu entwickeln; ihre Unmittelbarkeit kann keine andere 
sein als die geistiger Arbeit; dahin aber muss der Mensch aus 
seiner Lage den Weg erst mit Hulfe des Denkens snche?i." 57 

If thought appears as prime factor and guide, then the special 
feature indicated by its name is not peculiar to this system. 
"Activism" may give a key to Eucken's position as a moral 
philosopher, but we do not consider that it opens up any path 
to the real comprehension of his philosophy. Eucken practically 
asserts that he offers a metaphysical theory; he declares that 
"without metaphysics, there is no independent inner world, no 
true greatness of life," 58 and the major portion of his work is spent 
not in inquiring into lines of conduct or springs of action, but in 
developing, elaborating and striving to systematize his theory of 
Spiritual Life (Geistesleben) . This is his central conception — 
in fact it constitutes his whole philosophy; we cannot get away 
from the Geistesleben; everything either is, or is on the road to 
Spiritual Life. It is therefore, essential to know, in the beginning 
of our examination, the sense in which he employs the term. 

In Eucken's system the concept of the spiritual life embraces 
all the accepted meanings of the word spiritual 59 (except the French 
"spirituel," in its special signification — there is no wit in Activism) 
plus the "more" which Eucken has announced 60 and which will 
be examined in Chapter II of this section. It is not that the 
term is used in its various shades of meaning according to the 
context, they all belong simultaneously to the content of the 
Geistesleben which is at one and the same time the "L T rsprlinghche 
Quelle" of all goodness and truth, and the direct source of all 
artistic production; which finds fitting expression alike in the 
mystic contemplation of a Saint Augustine or a Saint Catherine, 
and in the poetry of a Goethe. Eucken maintains that although 
we need metaphysics in order to interpret the universe we must 
have "a new metaphysics," "not of the Schools, but of life:" 
its subject-matter will be the Geistesleben as above set forth. 



68 Prolegomena, op. cit., p. 97. Italics ours. 

67 Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 309. Italics ours. 

68 Main Currents, p. 373. (Geistige Striiniungen, op. cit., p. 311.) 

69 See Part I, Chap. III. 
80 See Part I, loc. cit. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 27 

We would point out: (l) that raetaphysics,as the name implies, 
is something essentially abstract and therefore "of the Schools." 
It must be based, as is all natural knowledge, on facts, on the data 
presented by life and the universe; but metaphysics embraces a 
great deal more than life, and cannot, in any way, be made a rule 
of life or code of morals : it is necessary to be clear in the employ- 
ment of terms. Metaphysics inquires into the fundamental 
principles not only of life, but of all existence, of all being. Since 
physics and chemistry account for much in the animal organism, 
while biology and psychology study life itself, there is only left 
for metaphysics the explanation of ultimate problems arising from 
life, e. g., the origin and destiny of man's spiritual soul. Eucken's 
severe criticism of what he calls metaphysics "of the Schools" 61 is 
just if applied to the absolutist systems of the Hegelian School, 
but bears no weight against the x\ristotelio-Scholastic theory, as 
Dr. Wunderle remarks. 62 

(2) We are examining a system proposed to us as Philosophy. 
We shall therefore eliminate from our inquiry whatever does not 
fall under this head. Art, Literature, Natural and Revealed 
Religion, Morality, Psychology and Philosophy proper plus a 
"more" have been united in one concept by the power of the 
imagination. We do not intend to consider here what may be 
called the artistic aspect of the Geistesleben any more than we would 
a new theory of music or the latest poem. Natural religion, which 
is a special department under philosophy, Eucken has made co-ex- 
tensive with the whole field. Supernatural Revelation, whether 
historical or individual, he includes in this field. We are still 
confronted, therefore, with ordinary knowledge, with revealed 
truths, with natural and supernatural mysticism. Revealed 
truths, except in so far as they may be reached by unaided reason, 



61 See Geistige Stromungen, op. cit., pp. 109 sqq.; Grundlinien, pp. 70 sqq.; 
Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, pp. 46, 403; Hauptproblenie, p. 24, pp. 157 
sqq. For "Metaphysik des Lebens," see also Erkennen und Leben, p. 83; 
Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 137 sqq.; Einfiihrung in eine Phil, des Geistes- 
lebens, pp. 155 sqq. 

82 "Eucken wirft hier die rationalistische Metaphysik des 18 Jahrhunderts mit 
der schon liingst vorher bestehenden aristotelisch-scholastischen zusammen. 
Fur die abstrakten Theoricn des Rationalismus ist sein oft wiederholter 
Ausdruck 'freischwebende' Begriffe u.a. wohl am Platze. Die Metaphysik 
des Aristoteles und der ihm folgenden Scholastiker ist aber keineswegs eine 
mit 'freischwebenden' Begriffen aufgebaute Konstruktion, sondern hat die 
sinnliche, konkrete Wirklichkeit zur sicheren Grundlage." 

Georg Wunderle, Die Religionsphilosophie Rudolf Euckens, Paderborn, 
1912, p. 31, footnote. 



28 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

or in the degree to which reason shows that they are in harmony 
with natural truth, do not belong to the scope of philosophy. 
In so far as they are otherwise introduced the system in which they 
figure ceases to be strictly philosophical. 

Mysticism, the study of the intimate, personal relations and 
communications of the soul with God, the Author of its being 
and only Source of all its happiness and perfection, is not within 
the domain of philosophy. What we have termed natural mysti- 
cism, e. g., the system of a Plotinus, may be dealt with to some 
extent: philosophy can examine its grounds, acknowledge its 
possibility, test its principles and conclusions by known truth, 
and reject them where contrary to such truth. Supernatural 
mysticism is never opposed to philosophy, but it is wholly beyond 
its sphere. Where doubt of its genuineness arises, physical con- 
ditions are inquired into, or tests of a moral nature settle the 
question, but philosophy is in no way investigator or judge. 
Eucken in several of his works asserts the necessity of mysticism, 
but as he desires "a new metaphysics," so he insists on a new 
mysticism. 63 Whether the life of "pure inwardness" (reine 
Innerlichkeit) of which he frequently speaks, would be reached 
by his principles and method can be best decided by the perusal 
of the exposition of his theory. As Mysticism is not philosophy 
it is not incumbent on us to inquire into any possible mystic 
aspects of the Geistesleben. Eucken is surely right in maintaining 
the reality and importance of the Interior Life. The supernatural 
union of the soul with God is the unum necessarium, it is that which 
gives to all the rest the proper light and shade. Its study is at 
once the most practical and the most sublime to which the human 
mind can be devoted, but knowledge of it must be sought where it 
is to be found, i. e., in Revealed Religion. The Saints and Doctors 
of the Church have contribued a vast wealth of writings on the 
subject; they constitute a treasury, unacknowledged source upon 
which many modern writers have freely drawn. Is it only a 
coincidence that Eucken's oft repeated description of the Geistes- 
leben "Ursprtingliche Quelle," is almost a literal translation of the 
words "Living Spring" addressed to the Holy Spirit by the Church 
in the hymn Veni Creator? In any case Eucken's works show 
that he is acquainted with Catholic Ascetics — in fact he often 



•' Grundlinien, p. 104. 



KUDOLF EuCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 29 

speaks their language, although the context in which it is used 
points to an imoerfect apprehension of its meaning. 

Both Eucken himself and many of his interpreters look upon 
his philosophy as a beneficial innovation. Tudor Jones says : "No, 
there is nothing new in it as Eucken is so fond of pointing out. 
But perhaps it is new to preach it from a University chair as part 
and parcel of the deeper implications of philosophy." 64 That de- 
pends on the University. Surely no educated man, in the light of 
history, can hold that the mediaeval universities neglected the 
"claims" "of the spirit of man." 65 Wherever Catholic philosophy 
is taught "the spirit of man" finds, and has always found "some- 
one to come forward to present its claims." 66 The "deeper 
implications of philosophy" are pointed out and developed in so 
far as they fall within the philosophical field, but the philosopher 
who goes outside it, misses his special aim by trying to hit a higher 
target. If "Order" is heaven's first law, it is also one of the first 
essentials of correct human reasoning. St. Thomas did not turn 
philosophy into either theology or religion, but he did what was 
better — he showed that it was the "handmaid" of both, and thus 
insured that its "deeper implications" were preached from the 
particular chair best fitted to deal with them. 67 

Having further narrowed our inquiry by the elimination of 
Revelation and Mysticism, the ethical, psychological and meta- 
physical aspects of the Geistesleben plus the "More," which leads 
to cosmology, remain as our subject matter. For the reason stated 
in the preface we have dealt with Eucken's theory mainly from the 
standpoint of epistemology but the issues in the other spheres 
have been shown. Before concluding this Introduction we shall 
give a brief, general outline of Eucken's teaching, followed by a 
brief criticism, in order to facilitate the more detailed examination 
to those who may be unfamiliar with his thought. 

Outline of Eucken's Teaching 

A spiritual life is the fundamental basis of all reality. It is 
independent and supertemporal : in dealing with it we have to do 



64 Op. cit., p. 34. 

86 Ibid., p. 35. 

66 Loc. cit. It is true that in Germany, the home of Haeckel, as well as of 
Eucken, "the champions of this life of the spirit" in philosophy belonged in 
the last decades to a small minority. 

87 Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University would be interesting reading 
in this connection. 



30 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

"with something essentially different from any process following 
natural laws." 

Nature is a "sub-spiritual," a lower kind of inner life. The 
spiritual is ever trying to draw this to itself, to conquer it, to assim- 
ilate it, to spiritualize it. The spiritual develops itself by this 
process, and finds self-expression in spiritualizing reality. Each 
age reveals some new phase of the spiritual which speaks "through 
all the mutations of the ages." 

Man is the only part of reality that can directly participate in 
the Spiritual; hence he alone can grasp "the content of the age." 
This content is not revealed to him without his own effort. He 
must — by resistance to the "merely human" — struggle upward 
to the "vision which sees life as a whole and measures it accord- 
ingly." His instrument in the search for truth is Philosophy, 
which enables him to make creative syntheses; in these he en- 
deavors to unfold "the content of the age." "The whole that" 
Philosophy "seeks never comes to meet it from outside, but must 
be shaped from within;" 68 thus, for the construction of the syn- 
thesis, there must be an energetic turning inwards on the part of 
man, in order to penetrate to the spiritual which lies hidden, at 
least as a possibility, at the core of his being: "a whole world" comes 
"into effective activity within man himself." 69 

A distinction must be made between spiritual life as a whole, or 
the "Absolute Spiritual," and the spiritual as it manifests itself 
in man, or "the human spiritual form of existence." The former 
is the absolute truth, in the latter the spiritual is bound down and 
fettered by human limitations; hence man attains to truth in 
proportion to the success with which he arises above the "mere ego" 
and finds a soul, a self, a personality in the "soul of souls," the 
"self -life," the "world-embracing personality." Yet the spiritual 
in man is not in itself distinct from the absolute spiritual. 

"It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him 
through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated 
from itself) ; it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole 
in all its infinity." 70 

The spiritual thus present within him helps in the upward 
struggle by imparting to him a "cosmic force." "A cosmic force 



68 Main Currents, p. 133. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 97.) 

69 Op. cit., p. 54. (G. Stromungen, p. 27.) 

70 Op. cit., p. 60. (G. Stromungen, p. 33.) 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 31 

must be operative in man from the very outset; there must be a 
receptivity corresponding to man's activity, a hand from above to 
draw the climber up; yea, in freedom itself there must shine out 
some revelation of grace." 71 

Morality is "a self active appropriation" of spirituality. It is 
"a penetration of life to truthfulness and essential being, a winning 
of a new, infinite self, a 'becoming infinite' from within." 72 "The 
idea of duty which originates here springs from" man's "own being 
and is not imposed from without." 73 Morality is dependent on 
Art because Art is indispensable in the creation of synthesis. 

General Criticism 

1. (a) The descriptions of spiritual fife and natural phenomena 
are incompatible. If spiritual life is independent, super-temporal 
and essentially different from nature we may not speak of nature 
as a "lower kind" of inner life, since the "lower kind" of life is 
"lower" from the fact that it depends directly on matter: hence the 
assertion that nature is a lower kind of inner life is self -contradic- 
tory. 

(b) In the above description of spiritual life Eucken upholds 
dualism: in his reduction of nature to "inner life" he makes for 
monism: the combination is self -destructive. 

2. (a) The conception of the fundamental basis of all things 
as developing itself is irreconcilable with the idea of the First 
Cause, Which must be perfect and changeless. 

(b) By describing the spiritual life as finding self-expression in 
spiritualizing reality, Eucken negatives his own concepts. 

3. (a) The antithesis between the "mere ego," the mere 
human, on the one hand, and the "spiritual," on the other, is 
unphilosophical, and arises from an erroneous conception of man's 
soul. The spiritual in man is not distinct from his soul; the soul 
is the spirit. The term "ego," since it signifies the permanent 
subject of psychic life is synonymous with soul. 74 



71 Op. cit., p. 392. (G. Stromungen, p. 328.) 

72 Op. cit., p. 390. (G. Stromungen, pp. 326 sqq.) 

73 Op. cit., p. 391. (G. Stromungen, p. 327.) 

74 Mills Alden in the North American comments on this point as follows: 
"He seems ... to make spiritual personality supra-human, superior to 
what in common parlance we call the human soul. Perhaps he would not be 
so insistent on this division between soul and spirit if he belonged to any other 
country than that of Haeckel, to whom the soul is but an epiphenomenon, or 
by-product of the brain. In Germany more than anywhere else his heroic 
agonism finds the incentives which convert it to antagonism." 

Eucken Agonistes, North American, 201, Jan., 1915, pp. 57-63. 



32 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

"Human" is to be contrasted with "Divine," or with "animal" 
rather than with "spiritual." The manner in which the soul is to 
be withdrawn from a too great application to the "merely human" 
interests, in order to become more absorbed in the Divine, is 
treated of in Sacred Theology rather than in Philosophy, though 
the question enters partially into the sphere of Ethics. 

(b) Eucken's exposition of the relations between man's soul 
and the spiritual lead inevitably to Pantheism, in spite of the fact 
that he rejects the system. "This submersion in the bottomless 
ocean of eternity, can satisfy only those who do not recognise 
new and independent reality in spiritual life." 75 The above 
statement is true, but does not, on that account, save Eucken from 
inconsistency. 

(c) The conception of the soul finding a personality in the 
"world-embracing personality" is an impossibility, since incom- 
municability, individuality are essential attributes of "person." 

(d) The exposition of the relations between the soul and nature, 
alternating, as it does, between Hypothetical Dualism and Monism, 
is wholly illogical. 

4. (a) Unless Eucken intends to speak metaphorically, his 
idea of the scope of morality is a false one. Morality is directly 
concerned hie et nunc, with man's actual self; it has not to aid him 
in the search for a "new" self, since, if the words are taken literally, 
the idea is inconceivable. 

(b) Moral truth is perceived directly by reason, as is all self- 
evident truth, and the obligation to morality springs from the 
fact that man is a rational being; but this fact, so far from proving 
that the idea of duty has not objective validity is the strongest 
argument for it. Obligation implies law, and law, a law giver. 

It is true that Eucken considers moral truth to be universal 
and absolute truth, but, in so doing, he is once more inconsistent. 

(c) Morality is independent of Art, though this latter can aid 
it both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form and by 
raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual or 
the religious. 

Further, there is no place in his system for an individual, im- 
mortal soul; but a philosophy of the spiritual which fails in this 
point is a more enigmatical and inconsistent interpretation of 
human life than the materialism which denies spirit. 



75 Main Currents, p. 417. (G. Strotnungen, p. 351.) 



Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Lifh 33 

In treating of Eucken's philosophy of the spiritual life we shall 
be dealing at the same time with his philosophy of History — 
the viewpoint from which his work has seemed attractive to a 
majority — since History is defined by him as a "coming-to-itself 
of Spiritual Life." 



CHAPTER I 
ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM 

The right key to Eucken's philosophy is given, we consider, in 
the title of one of his most important constructive works — Die 
Einheit des Geisteslebens im Bewusstsein und That der Menscheit, 
the Unity, the Oneness, of Spiritual Life in Human Knowledge 
and Action. When we have grasped the fact that, according to 
Eucken, the spiritual life is one and the same in all men, and that 
the foundation of the universe is this same spiritual life, which 
has found but imperfect self-expression in man, then a guiding light 
is found through many difficult passages. If barriers cannot be 
crossed at least we can account for their presence. 

One of the chief characteristics of Activism is a very decided 
anti-intellectualistic tendency which frequently develops into 
absolute irrationalism. Anti-intellectualism is always a self- 
contradiction as has before been pointed out, 76 but the elements 
of incompatibility are intensified to the highest degree when anti- 
intellectualistic methods are put forward in a spiritualistic system. 
As soon as we know Eucken's first assumption, however, we 
perceive that this feature of his work arises from his special view 
of spiritual life. Two attributes of the Geistesleben on which he 
lays great stress are, 

1. Oneness, Einheit. 

2. Super-temporality, eternity. 

The first points directly to Hegelian absolutism, but from this 
position he recoils with an energy worthy of a dualist. That 
man's thought should be the ultimate ground of all truth and 
reality is a proposition which Eucken, in company with the Scholas- 
tics, rejects. The Ultimate Ground of truth and reality with 
them is a Supreme, Independent, Eternal, Spiritual Life. Dualists 
hold that the spiritual soul of man, which is substantially distinct 
from the Supreme Spiritual Life, knows the Supreme Spiritual 
through intellectual activity and seeks good of a spiritual order 
through the rational will. Eucken's Einheit des Geisteslebens does 
not lead him to any such satisfactory solution of the relations 
between the "Absolute" and the "human" spiritual. The point 



76 Part I, Chapter IV. 
34 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 35 

will be considered in the course of this dissertation. It will suffice 
to remark here that the exponent of the new theory, convinced 
on the one hand of human limitations and imperfections and keenly 
sensible of man's frailty, holding, on the other, that spiritual life 
is both one and eternal, seeks no escape from the dilemma, but 
disparages the natural power of the intellect in his effort to shun 
even the suspicion of intellectualistic absolutism. 

We have selected the following citations as indicative of the 
Activistic position: if they be compared with Eucken's earlier 
statements regarding the necessity of thought as first guide to the 
spiritual 77 and, still more, with his assertion as to "the fact and 
power of the logical contradiction," 78 his halting attitude towards 
this important problem will be evident. 

Evidences of Anti-Intellectualism 

"No clear demonstration of the excellency of this world will 
allow us to infer a transcendent Reason as the cause of it." 79 

"When the whole matter is surveyed, there appears no possi- 
bility for any single aspect of life to arrive at religion. . . . The 
experiments made in such direction are in sharp conflict with one 
another: on the one side, the attention is directed to the outward 
character of religion and to the building up of a scientific province 
of thought, whilst on the other side the standpoint is that of 
immanence and of the immediate energy of movement which 
arises out of this. The one is as necessary as the other, but on 
this path the two aspects refuse to coalesce: the general character 
of religion, mirrored in the intellect alone, endangers the inward 
immediacy and spiritual warmth, whilst through the individual 
results of feeling and will alone the immediacy endangers the 
spiritual width and validity which extend beyond the individual. 
So that a new path must be sought which will unite the discordant 
elements. It is certainly clear that through such discord between 
the two opposites, an immediate united push and a joyous co-opera- 
tion are impossible. The experience of history testifies to the 
particular naivete of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will. 
It remains here to seek a new path which is not, from the very 
outset, under the power of the opposites." 80 

"In addition, there springs up a painful doubt which no merely 
intellectual form of religion is ever able to overcome. Is thought 



77 See Introduction, pp. 25 sqq. 

78 See Part I, Chapter IV, p. 17. 

79 Christianity and The New Idealism, p. 2. New York, 1909. (Haupt- 
probleme der Religionsphilosophie, p. 4.) 

80 Truth of Religion, translated by W. Tudor Jones, New York, 1911, pp. 83 
sqq. First italics are ours, second Eucken's. For original text see Wahrheits- 
gehalt der Religion, 3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1912, p. 50. 



36 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

able to reach the kernel of things through its own energy, . . .? 
Are our conceptions in reality more than mere human conceptions? 
Is it not a mere world of phantoms which arises in them?" 81 

". . . the old-rooted intellectualism turns the greatness of 
religion into a hybrid of many colours." 82 

"Our investigation sought ... to show that not only did 
particular contents develop side by side, but also that they con- 
nected themselves together into a Whole of an entity and produced 
an essentially new being, which we aspired after by means of our 
'ever-becoming' personality." 83 

"If the union of nature and intelligence produces so much confusion, 
we are inevitably led to ask whether man does not possess in him- 
self more than thought; whether thought is not rooted in a deeper 
and more comprehensive life, from which it derives its power." 84 

"Representations of the whole are attempted at the highest 
points of creative activity by philosophy, religion, and art; these 
representations accompany, indeed govern, the work in these 
spheres of life through history. But the limitations of our capac- 
ity, through which we are unable to give a suitable form to 
necessary contents, and through which we attribute and must 
attribute human traits to that which should lead us beyond the 
human, are of particular force in this matter of forming a repre- 
sentation of the whole; . . . These representations of the 
whole are, therefore, inadequate; their content of truth is clothed 
in a wrapping of myth, and humanity lies under the danger of 
taking the myth for the chief thing and thus of obscuring the 
truth, and this must produce an incalculable amount of error and 
strife. Still, it is impossible to give up all claim to these repre- 
sentations of the whole; for they alone make the fact of our 
belonging to the whole and of the presence of the whole in our life 
quite clear and enable it to exert a far-reaching influence . . . ; 
only with their help can a movement from whole to whole begin. 
Thus it is a matter not so much of abandoning these representa- 
tions of the whole as of referring them continually to their essence; 
to those unfoldings of life which are experienced by us; to test 
them by these and to renew them from these. It was the error 
of the earlier position — much too indulgent to Intellectualism — 
that it did not sufficiently maintain the relation with these living 
sources, and so fell into the danger of having no definite tendency, 
or even of failing to recognise the relativity of the myth. If a 

81 Ibid., pp. 74 sqq. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., op. cit., p. 50.) 

82 Ibid., p. 232. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 158.) 

83 Ibid., pp. 572 sqq. Italics are ours. The words and arrangement are 
somewhat altered here in the 3rd German edition, op. cit., pp. 365, 366. 

84 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, translated by Alban G. Widgery, London, 
1912, p. 118. Italics are ours. There are many changes in wording and 
arrangement in 2nd ed., Leipzig, August, 1913. See Grundlinien einer neuen 
Lebensanschauung: Hinauswachsen des Menschen iiber die Natur, p. 55. See 
esp. Der innere Widerspruch des neuen Lebens beim Menschen, pp. 65-71. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 37 

more energetic direction of life upon its own content and experi- 
ences teaches us to preserve these connections better and to develop 
them more forcefully, a new type of representation of the whole 
is yielded in contrast to the old, and far more different from it 
than may appear at the first glance. We may hope that with 
its development the truth will be seen more clearly through the 
myth, and that the striving, which we cannot give up, to win a 
universal life may not lead us astray into a world of dreams." 85 

"... the modern strengthening of the subject and the cease- 
less growth of reflection have so fundamentally overthrown the 
immediate relation of man to the world that only a far-reaching 
transformation of life can prepare for a reunion." 86 

"We seem to overstrain our faculty when we think to prove 
that life, with all its apparent confusions, has still a meaning and 
value, and can be confidently declared to be worth the living." 87 

"But one thing we must, above all, bear in mind — that if the 
invisible world is to have the requisite stability and breadth, it 
cannot be the mere object of our finite longing or any inference 
laboriously drawn from the conditions of our finite experience; 
it must be completely independent, and exist in its own right." 88 

It seems imperative to call attention to the extraordinary 
antithesis in the passage just cited between the reasoning process 
and the independent invisible reality which it discloses to us. 

" . . .on the plane of our ordinary existence we see humanity 
split up into mere isolated units." Hence "there can never be 
one common world," on this plane, "and therefore never one truth 
common to all men and valid for every sphere." 89 

Treating of the difficulties which his own peculiar conception 
of the spiritual encounters, he says: 

"Thus, as we view the puzzle from our own philosophical stand- 
point, it grows more baffling than before: far from having solved 
the mystery, we have but wrapped it in deeper gloom." 90 

His attempt to redeem his position is as follows: 

"Now, a closer scrutiny into the essentials of this life-process 
has revealed immanent within it a movement of a unique kind, 



86 Ibid., pp. 232 sqq. Refer to last note. See Grundlinicn: Grundlegender 
Teil, C, Der Umriss einer Lebensordnung selbststandiger Geistigkeit esp., 
pp. 115-122. 

86 Ibid., p. 259. 

87 Meaning and Value of Life, translated by L. and 13. Gibson, London. 
1909, p. 2. See Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens, 3rd cd.. Leipzig, 1913. Kin- 
leitung, p. 1. The wording is slightly altered but the eontent is the same. 

88 Ibid., p. 75. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 63 sqq.; p. 80. 

89 Ibid., p. 81. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 77-79. 

90 Ibid., p. 118. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens: Die scheinbare Ohnmacht 
des Geisteslebens im All, pp. 113-132, esp. 115. 



38 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

through whose activity a new life is brought in, different in kind 
from the life that is ordered by the succession of natural events. 
Nor did we apprehend this movement as a series of detached occur- 
rences, but as a main tendency set steadily in one direction, 
gathering the manifoldness of things into a single characteristic 
whole. . . . : the work of self-realization which we witnessed 
was the reality itself; and it was in and through this work of self- 
discovery that reality established its own foundations of belief. Life 
did not here depend upon knowledge. . . . This fundamental 
fact — the fact that an Independent Spiritual Life springs up thus 
within us — cannot be controverted by citing the ways of a refrac- 
tory world, however terrible these ways may be." 91 

"This deepening of the life-problem sets our conviction of the 
unity of the universe upon a broader and firmer foundation than 
the ordinary intellectualistic outlook can possibly supply." 92 

"The dangers of an intellectualistic ordering of life are plainly 
visible to us at the present day, and there is no lack of vigorous 
opposition. But this opposition will hardly attain to complete 
victory without a return to the roots of science." 93 ". . . he is 
no longer certain even of the Deity; in any case his relation 
to the Deity no longer controls the whole of life. In this situa- 
tion where can he now turn to find truth, and what meaning can 
this conception still retain? In accordance with the experiences 
which we have described man can seek truth nowhere else but in 
himself; his own life must possess a depth which even for himself 
at first lies in a dim and distant background; with the full appro- 
priation of this depth, however, he may hope to discover a world 
in himself, or rather he may himself grow into a world. The 
object then to be aimed at is a transference of life, not into some- 
thing which exists outside us or above us, but into something 
which belongs to us, but which can become completely our own 
life only by a vigorous transformation, and indeed revolution. 
Reality is not here found already existing, but it has to be built 
up from within: truth is thus a striving of life towards itself, a 
seeking for its own being. Hence it cannot be the agreement 



91 Ibid., pp. 119 sqq. Italics ours. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 80, 
top; pp. 132-147, 163-165. 

92 Ibid., Appendix, p. 155. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 77, "Je mehr 
das Leben" to "nicht weiter." 

93 Life of the Spirit, translated by Pogson, New York, 1909, p. 268. Italics 
are ours. We venture to say here that this book is most disappointing and 
unconvincing. Much of it is devoted to what Eucken terms in his Introduction 
"an historical survey," but the historical data are strongly, and often strangely, 
colored by the author's views; e.g., p. 225, where he tells us, in treating of the 
Sacraments, that "a man's own disposition in the matter may easily become 
a secondary consideration." We can find in it no satisfying proof of God's 
existence, of the value of the soul, of immortality — at least in any true sense 
of the word. To us it seems that the contents are unworthy of the noble 
title Eucken has affixed to them. See Einfiihrung in eine Philosophie des 
Geisteslebens: "Das Wahrheitsproblem," pp. 131-159. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 39 

with a given reality: it becomes an agreement with itself, a self- 
co-ordination of a life which becomes independent and raises itself 
to a higher level, instead of remaining disintegrated and constrained. 
Its verification can only lie in the fact that, by embracing it, the 
whole of existence is transformed into spontaneous life, raised to 
an essentially higher level, and at the same time united into a 
whole of creative effort which moulds reality. Here the main 
problem is to find the point where a spontaneous and creative life 
springs up in man as the deepest thing in his own nature. Accord- 
ing to the form which this life takes, different forms will be assumed by 
reality and truth; but that such a life is attainable in some way or 
other is the common presupposition of that faith in reason which 
pervades the creative efforts of the modern period and is enunciated 
with particular clearness in the works of its leading thinkers. The 
reason which is immanent in the human race must now take the 
place of the universe and the Deity. This, too, is common to all 
attempts, viz., that the movement does not proceed from a pre- 
existing world towards man, but from man towards a world which 
has first to be constructed." 95 

We have cited the concluding passage at length because it is 
typical of Eucken's irrational position. The words "faith in 
reason," and "reason immanent in the human race," do not 
redeem the situation. "Faith in reason" is a rather contradictory 
expression. And what faith can man put in apparent revelations 
of reason if he is no longer certain either of the Deity or of an 
external reality? 

Eucken's Critics 

This characteristic feature of Eucken's system 96 has been 
pointed out by most of his critics. Hermann says of him: "With 
Fichte his affinities are deeper. In his anti-individualism, anti- 
intellectualism, and theological convictions, they go deep indeed." 97 
Tudor Jones calls attention to the fact, but he considers it a neces- 
sary qualification for dealing with the highest problems. We 
give the passage which he quotes and his comment on it : 

"The Infinite Power and Love that has grounded a new spon- 
taneous nature in man over against a dark and hostile world, will 
conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus, and shelter 
it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of Life 
Eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time." 98 



95 Problem of Truth, ibid., pp. 303 sqq. Italics ours. 

06 The point will be dealt with more fully in the third chapter of this 
section. 

97 Eucken and Bergson, London, 1912, p. 49. 

98 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 435. (Wharheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 303.) 



40 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Tudor Jones comments thus : 

"We are here in a region farthest removed from sense and under- 
standing; but the remarkable thing is that the conviction of 
immortality does not dawn on any lower level; it is not on the 
lower levels a portion of spiritual experience." 99 

Boyce Gibson — whose work preceded that of Tudor Jones — 
holds an opinion somewhat similar to that expressed in the second 
part of the above citation. Gibson maintains that a higher reality 
is utterly beyond the reach of a lower form of knowledge. Spiritual 
life, e.g., is "inexplicable in terms of scientific categories." 100 

In contrast to Tudor Jones, however, he condemns Eucken for 
his irrationalism. He says: 

"Our spiritual freedom and union with God cannot be illumined 
and developed by any reasoned inquiry which is not inspired by 
these spiritual experiences. . . . But that such a reasoned 
inquiry cannot be forthcoming in the case of what is most funda- 
mental in our spiritual experience, Eucken has certainly not 
proved." 101 

Waiving the question of categories we take exception to the 
distinction between "spiritual" and "scientific" knowledge as 
"higher" and "lower" forms. All spiritual knowledge, apart from 
Revelation, must be scientific; that is, it can only be obtained 
by exercising our rational power of observation on the manifold 
data of experience — under which head must be included our own 
conscious states. Again "revelation, salvation, grace," are not 
mere "regulative concepts," requiring "categories commensurate 
with the spiritual experience within which they are conceived," 102 
they are facts of a supernatural order; 103 they belong to the class 
of truths to which Our Divine Lord referred when He said: 
"Blessed art thou, Simon-Bar- Jona : because flesh and blood hath 
not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven." 104 

As Eucken denies the central truth to which our Saviour directly 
alluded in the above verse, viz., His Own Divinity, 105 and thereby 



09 An Interpretation of R. Eucken's Philosophy, New York, 1912, p. 162. 

100 R. Eucken's Phil, of Life, 2d ed., London, 1907, p. 111. 

101 Ibid. For entire treatment of the point refer to Chapter VII, pp. 100 sqq. 
> 02 Ibid., p. 112. 

103 yj e employ "supernatural" in the Christian signification of the word, 
not in the loose sense in which Eucken often uses it. 

104 Matthew, XVI, 17. 

106 See Konnen wir noch Christen sein? Leipzig, 1911, pp. 31-37. (Can 
we still be Christians?, New York 1914, pp. 29-35.) Wahrheitsgehalt der 
Rel., pp. 392-398. (Truth of Ret, pp. 582-591.) Lebensanschauung der 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 41 

forfeits the right to introduce into his system the essential truths 
of "revelation, salvation, grace," some of his interpreters have 
sought to justify the presence of the borrowed elements by at- 
tempting an explanation, even when, as with Tudor Jones, the 
solution is found only in irrationalism. 

Hermann is more accurate on this point. He tells us that 
Eucken's "great and inspiring vloume" — The Truth of Religion — 
"leaves a cloud of misgiving upon the spirit;" that, "while Eucken 
impresses us with the reality of this new world, ... he leaves 
the greater question of its authority, its right to exact our choice 
and obedience, untouched." 106 

Dr. Alexander makes a similar statement: 

"While he insists upon the possibility, nay, the necessity of a 
new beginning, he fails to reveal the power by which the great 
decision is made." 107 

Dr. Abel Jones, while granting that Eucken gives "little atten- 
tion to the psychological implications of his theories," and that 
there is "serious incompleteness," therefore, in his exposition, 
defends him from the charge of irrationalism in the following 
words: "In actual fact . . . the charge is more apparent than 
real, for Eucken does . . . reason and argue closely ... he 
feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than 
thought — and that is action." 108 

It is difficult to reconcile Abel Jones' own criticism with his 
defense. If Eucken gives "little attention to the psychological 
implications of his theories" — as Dr. A. Jones maintains — and 
if there is "a serious incompleteness" about his system, then the 
charge of irrationalism is not only real, it is also grave. Again, 
the relative valuations of thought and action made here — and 
which are the inverse of the decision of the Great Teacher 109 



grossen Denker, 5th Auflage, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 171 sqq. (Problem of 
Human Life, New York, 1910, pp. 170 sqq.) 

It is beyond the scope of our work to criticize the superficial arguments and 
assertions put forward in the passages to which the reader is referred. It may, 
however, be stated that confidence in Eucken is profoundly shaken by his 
ignorance of what "modern research" has and has not "shown." (See Prob- 
lem of Human Life, p. 171.) 

106 Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99. 

107 "Christianity and Ethics," as cited in An Evangelical Warning against 
"The False Note" in Eucken, Current Opinion, 57, Nov., 1914, pp. 339 sqq. 

108 R. Eucken, A Philosophy of Life, New York, pp. 87 sqq. 

109 "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from 
her." See Luke X (39-42). 



42 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

Whose life, according to Eucken himself, "had a standard which 
has transformed human existence to its very root," and which 
"exercises evermore a tribunal over the world" 110 — are calculated 
to lead to blind fanaticism. Thought, with action following on 
it, holds the secret of the perseverance which gains the crown: 
action, with thought following on it, is the prolific source of poig- 
nant, lifelong regret. 

Meyrick Booth perceives in Eucken's attitude towards Intellec- 
tualism "an analogy with Bergson and with the great historical 
mystics." 111 

Comparison of Eucken and Bergson 

That Eucken has close affinity with Bergson on this point seems 
evident from a comparison of their respective conceptions as to the 
method of reaching truth. Each rejects the scholastic standard 
of conformity between thought and thing: "per conformitatem 
intellectus et rei Veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam 
cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem." 112 

Eucken says: "our conception decidedly rejects the widely 
held view of truth as a correspondence of our thought with an 
external reality." 113 

Though Bergson holds the traditional view of the immediacy of 
sense-perception and of the objectivity of the external sensations, 114 
he maintains that the intellect cannot put us in immediate touch 



110 Truth of Religion, p. 360. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 249.) 

111 R. Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence, New York, p. 81. 

112 St. Thomas, Summa, I, Q. XVI, a. 2. 

113 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 216. 

114 See Matiere et Memoire and L'Evolution Creatrice. On p. 225 of "Matiere 
et Memoire" he writes: 

"On se plait a mettre les qualites, sous forme de sensations, dans la con- 
science, tandis que les mouvements s'executent independamment de nous 
dans l'espace. Ces mouvements, se composant entre eux, ne donneraient 
jamais que des mouvements; par un processus mysterieux, notre conscience, 
incapable de les toucher, les traduirait en sensations qui se projetteraient 
ensuite dans l'espace et viendraient recouvrir, on ne sait comment, les mouve- 
ments qu'elles traduisent. De la deux mondes differents, incapables de com- 
muniquer autrement que par un miracle: d'un c6te celui des mouvements 
dans l'espace, de l'autre la conscience avec les sensations. Et, certes, la 
difference reste irreductible, comme nous l'avons montre nous-m&mes autrefois, 
entre la qualite, d'une part, et la quantite pure, de l'autre. Mais la question 
est justement de savoir si les mouvements reels ne presentent entre eux que 
des differences de quantite, ou s'ils ne seraient pas la qualite meme, vibrant 
pour ainsi dire interieurement et scandant sa propre existence en un nombre 
souvent incalculable de moments." 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 43 

with reality, for reality, according to him, is movement, and the 
intellect can only grasp the stable and fixed. 115 

It is intuition, i.e., disinterested instinct (l'instinct devenu 
desinteresse, conscient de lui-meme, capable de reflechir sur son 
objet et de l'elargir indefiniment"), 116 which enables us to appre- 
hend movement, and therefore to know life, i.e., reality. 117 

It is just here, that the analogy between the "Elan Vital" and 
the "Geistesleben" occurs. The conception of each author 
embraces all reality — past, present, and, in a sense, future; for 
both "L'Elan Vital" and "Das Geistesleben" are "in the making." 
Some of the passages already cited from Eucken may be referred 
to in this connection, 118 but the following throw further light on 
their respective methods. 

Bergson writes: ". . .La theorie de la connaissance devient 
une entreprise infiniment difficile, et qui passe les forces de la pure 
intelligence. II ne suffit plus, en effet, de determiner, par une 
analyse conduite avec prudence, les categories de la pensee, il s'agit 
de les engendrer. En ce qui concerne l'espace, il faudrait, par un 
effort sui generis de l'esprit, suivre la progression on plutot la 
regression de l'extra-spatial se degradant en spatialite." 119 

Eucken writes: "Wenn die Philosophic vom Ganzen des 
Geisteslebens zum Ganzen der Wirklichkeit strebt, so liegt ihre 
Arbeit nicht innerhalb eines gegebenen Raumes, sondern sie hat 



116 See L'Evolution Creatrice, Paris, 1914. 15 ed., p. 1G9. "Bornons- 
nous a dire que le stable et l'immuable sont ce a quoi notre intelligence s'attache 
en vertu de sa disposition naturelle. Notre intelligence ne se represente claire- 
ment que rimmoblite." Also p. 179. "L 'intelligence est caracterisee par une 
incomprehension naturelle de la vie." The italics in each case are Bergson's. 

116 Ibid., p. 192. 

117 See ibid., p. 179: "C'est sur la forme meme de la vie. au contraire, qu'est 
moule l'instinct. . . . il ne fait que continuer le travail par lequel la vie 
organise la matiere." 

118 See also L'Evolution Creatrice, p. 217 sq. "Un processus identique a du 
tailler en meme temps matiere et intelligence dans une etoffe qui les contenait 
toutes deux. Dans cette realite nous nous replacerons de plus en plus com- 
pletement, a mesure que nous nous efforcerons davantage de transcender 
l'intelligence pure;" and compare with Geistige Strbmungen, op. cit., p. 31. 
"Zu cinem solchen Ganzen gehbrt eine wie aller Mannigfaltigkeit so auch dera 
Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt uberlegene Einheit. Dies Ganz entwickelt 
sich mittels des Gegensatzes von Subjekt und Objekt, von Kraft und Gegen- 
stand, aber es bleibt ihm iiberlegen und halt beide Seiten auch in der Scheidung 
zusammen, auf geistigem Boden kann jedc cinzelne sich nur zusammen mit 
der anderen entfalten und ihre eigene Ilblic findcn. So sind hicr nicht sowohl 
die beiden Seiten einander entgegengesetzt, als veilmehr der Stand ihrer 
Einigung, der Stand der Volltiitigkeit dem der Spaltung, dem des halbseitigen 
und zugleich leeren Lebens . . ., nicht die Beziehung der einen Seite auf 
die andere, sondern nur die schopferische Synthcse erzeugt eine Innerliohkeit 
und zugleich eine voile, bei sich selbst befindliche Wirklichkeit; eine solche 
kann nie von draussen dargeboten werdern." 

119 L'Evolution Creatrice, p. 226. Italics ours. 



44 BuDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

diesen Raum erst herzustellen, sie findet nicht ihre Welt, sondern 
sie hat sie erst zu bilden; das Ganze, das sie sucht, tritt ihr nie von 
aussen her entgegen, es will von innen her entworfen sein, es 
verlangt eine Synthese schopferischer Art. Zur Sebstandigkeit 
wird dieses Weltbild der Philosophie namentlich dadurch getrieben, 
dass das von ihrer Synthese umspannte Dasein ohne Umwandlung 
nicht in sie einzugehen vermag. Denn was es bietet, ist viel zu 
verschiedenartig, um sich ohne weiteres zusammenzufiigen. 
Namentlich das Zusammentreffen von Natur und Innenwelt in 
Einer Wirklichkeit treibt zwingend zur Umwandlung des ersten 
Anblichs. Schon dadurch ist namentlich der modernen Gedanken- 
arbeit ein Trieb zur Metaphysik unzerstorbar eingepflanzt, dass 
die Neuzeit den Gegensatz von Natur und Seele zur vollen Klarheit 
gebracht hat, . . . Die Hilfe intellektueller Phantasie ist 
dabei unentbehrlich; was aber diese Phantasie anGestalten entwirft, 
das wird sie dem Menschen nicht eindringlich machen Jconnen, ohne 
eben der Erfahrungswelt Bilder zu entlehnen, iiber ivelche die Phil- 
osophie hinausfuhrt." 120 

It seems to us that the analogy approaches a positive similarity, 
at least of function, in the conception of the Creative Synthesis 
in the one system, and the Engendered Thought-Categories in the 
other. This may be made clearer by quoting again from a passage 
already cited. In the Meaning and Value of Life Eucken says: 
". . . the work of self-realization which we witnessed was the 
reality itself; and it was in and through this work of self -disco very 
that reality established its own foundations of belief." 121 

Nevertheless the systems, as wholes, offer, perhaps, more points 
of difference than agreement in fundamentals. 122 



120 Geistige Stromungen, pp. 97, 98. The italics are ours. A further point 
of analogy may be noticed in the Concentration Points of the Spiritual Life, 
or human foci, as one may term them, and the Bergsonian conception of 
personality as revealed in the following: 

"Plus nous prenons conscience de notre progres dans la pure duree, plus 
nous sentons les diverses parties de notre etre entrer les unes dans les autres 
et notre personnalite tout entiere se concentrer en un point, ou niieux en une 
pointe, qui s'insere dans l'avenir en l'entamant sans cesse. En cela consistent 
la vie et Taction libres. Laissons-nous aller, au contraire; au lieu d'agir, 
revons. Du meme coup notre moi s'eparpille; notre passe, qui jusque-la se 
ramassait sur lui-meme dans l'impulsion indivisible qu'il nous communiquait, 
se decompose en mille et mille souvenirs qui s'exteriorisent les uns par rapport 
aux autres." L'Evolution Creatrice, pp. 219, 220. 

121 Meaning and Value of Life, p. 120, op. cit. 

122 E.G., all Eucken's works tend to a rejection of the objectivity of the 
universe: in Main Currents of Modern Thought (Geistige Stromungen) he 
tells us that nature is a lower form of inner life; and in Meaning and Value of 
Life, that "the sense-life sinks in importance, becomes insubstantial and prob- 
lematic, and is reduced to the status of a mere phenomenon the truth of which 
has first to be discovered." See Meaning and Value of Life, pp. 33 sqq. 

Bergson, on the other hand, argues forcibly for the objective value of 



Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 45 

Eucken and the " Historical Mystics" 

The second analogy that Booth seems to perceive, viz., "with the 
historical mystics," we claim to be non-existent if by "historical 
mystics" Booth refers to the recognized mystics of the Catholic 
Church. These were not anti-intellectualistic either in theory or 
practice. That they had infused knowledge and a more direct 
apprehension of God than is possible to ordinary human means, 
Catholics believe; but, that those who were thus favored ever 
sought of themselves to acquire knowledge thus, is disproved by 
their own writings. St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, the 
two great mystics of the sixteenth century, warn the faithful 
against seeking or desiring such extraordinary manifestations, lest 
they become the dupes of their own imagination. 123 

St. Teresa's Letters reveal to us a woman of excellent judgment, 
and "sound common-sense." Anything more unlike the works of 
anti-intellectualistics it would be hard to imagine. 

The attitude of the Church is unmistakable on this point. She 
exhibits the utmost reserve in dealing with particular cases, and 
only after a prolonged and laboriously minute scrutiny will she 
give the sanction of her approval. 124 

She values the "princely gift of Reason," with which man is 
endowed, too highly to advocate its abdication. 

Again, the human faculty of reason is the sine qua non of all 
supernatural manifestations in man or to him. The descriptions 
which the saints have given of their mystic states point to the 
fact that their understanding was flooded with new light — to use a 
metaphor — and enlarged so as to apprehend what before, or under 
normal conditions, was "beyond its ken." Even in an ecstasy of 
love the saints knew something of the Beauty and Goodness that 
attracted them; otherwise how could they love? Men cannot love 
that of which they are absolutely ignorant, still less could they leave 
descriptions of the effects it produced in them. 

Reason and reasoning are not synonymous terms, and this is 
what the anti-intellectualistics fail to grasp: they either deny the 



sensation. References have been given on preceding pages. Again, Eucken 
rejects a vast body of truths on the ground that they are anthropomorphic, 
while Bergson errs by an exaggerated anthropomorphism. 

123 See La Vie de St. Therese, ecrite par elle-meme; also, St. John of the 
Cross — "La montee du Carmel." 

124 An examination of the process of canonization of any saint may prove an 
instructive study for those who 6nd analogies between Ant.i-Intellectualists 
and Catholic mystics. 



46 EUDOLP EtJCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

intuitive power of the mind or ascribe intuition to blind instinct, 
as with Bergson; or to a "mysterious" communication which is 
at the same time an "axiomatic certainty," as with Eucken. 

It is not our purpose here to criticize Eucken's own view of 
Mysticism. It will suffice to say that his treatment, in our opinion, 
is weak and superficial, and that he allots to mysticism — to some 
extent — a role which would be better fulfilled by Prayer: prayer 
is one of the missing quantities in Eucken's religious system. We 
may add that his inability to recognize the infinite distance separ- 
ating the misty philosophical speculations of Plotinus from Chris- 
tian Mysticism is an unfavorable index of his trustworthiness as 
an authority on the subject. 125 

Further Criticism 

Henry C. Sheldon gives a clear and decisive criticism of Eucken's 
unwarrantable rejection of our rational cognitions. His words 
are: "A subordinate occasion for questioning the teaching of our 
philosopher is found in his treatment of the usual arguments for 
the divine existence — the cosmological, the teleological, and that 
from human nature taken as a basis of scientific induction. He 
rates them as incompetent to fulfil their purpose, and the ground 
of so rating them he expresses in these terms : 'We must not forget 
that no province can prove anything outside its own reach, and 
that an attempt to do this leads into anthropomorphism.' In so 
far as this proposition is meant to emphasize the truth that religion 
has evidences of peculiar efficacy in its own worthful content, and 
is not in any complete sense dependent upon the data of scientific 
study, it is to be cordially approved. But it is possible to make 
too emphatic an antithesis between the scientific and the religious. 
. . . Indeed, we do not see how the assumption of such disparate 
spheres between the two as is contained in the cited proposition 
and in its application in the context can be maintained without 

125 See Problem of Human Life, p. 122. "Plotinus . . . supplied Chris- 
tianity with liberating forces, and preserved throughout the Middle Ages, 
in opposition to the externalising influence of the prevailing organisation, an 
undercurrent of pure emotional life." See also pp. 104-116. For references 
to other mystics see index, p. 579. (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker, 
op. cit., pp. 128, 129, 107-123; index, 520.) Consult also, "Life of Spirit," 
pp. 351 sqq., index, p. 406; Life's Basis, pp. 246, 247. (Einfiihrung in eine 
Phil, des Geisteslebens, pp. 168 sqq, index, p. 196; Grundlinen, p. 104.) 
Compare also with passage p. 95 in Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensin- 
halt, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1907; Truth of Rel., index, p. 620. (Wahrheitsgehalt 
der Rel., op. cit., p. 421.) 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 47 

prejudicial results. . . . The supposition of the rationality of 
the world system — a supposition absolutely necessary to any 
security in intellectual procedure — implies a degree of corre- 
spondence bewteen part and part. From any different point of 
view we are left inclosed by the limitations of the human province; 
and nothing can help us out. Not even the function of a supreme 
spiritual life can afford us an outlet, for we have no immediate 
knowledge of this transcendent reality. What we know imme- 
diately is certain effects in us which serve as a ground of rational 
inference — an inference none the less actual because possibly 
very swift and confident. . . . We take the sane and warrant- 
able course in appealing to the rationality of the universe as in- 
volving a degree of correspondence between part and part, and so 
providing that data in one department may have more or less 
significance for another province." 126 

It was Boyce Gibson's conviction when he published his inter- 
pretation of Eucken's philosophy — November, 1906 — that anti- 
intellectualism was not a necessary feature of the system ; that the 
author's premises, in fact, justified solutions doing truer justice to 
the dignity of our reason than those which he offered. He even 
held that Eucken was his own best critic; in support of this state- 
ment he quotes the following letter from him : 

"You are perfectly right in supposing that my distrust of intel- 
lectualistic philosophies has prevented me from fully recognising 
the value of an intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas. 
The fact that the conflict with intellectualism plays so prominent 
a part in my treatment may be largely accounted for by the 
conditions which influence our thinking in Germany to-day. We 
are veritably deluged with intellectualism. A man will believe 
that he has won the good life when he has reached satisfactory 
ideas upon the subject." 127 

We must differ from Boyce Gibson in our estimate of Eucken's 
power of self-criticism; the cited extract suggests a misapprehension 
on the part of the critic as to what "Intellectualisni'' really stands for. 
The intuitive power of reason is, surely, but ill described in the 
phrase "intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas;" indeed the 
expression indicates cross-division. Further, though Eucken is 
right in insisting on the necessity of good practical living, he is 
wrong in slighting the equally great need of knowing ichat is good. 



128 R. Eucken's Message to Our Age, New York, pp. 47 sqq. 
127 See Boyce Gibson, op. cit., pp. 10-1 1, 10G. 



48 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

"I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be 
one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching," 128 is a poet's 
statement of the profound psychological truth against which 
Eucken is rebelling, viz., that the will does not always follow the 
dictates of "right reason." One thing is certain, however, — if 
no one knows "what were good to be done," then no good can be 
done, though many useful actions may be accomplished; in order 
that an action may be good, in the true signification of the word, 
some sort of knowledge, either actual or habitual, must be possessed 
of its end. 

Conclusion 

The development of Eucken's thought has not turned in the 
direction of Intellectualism, on the contrary, the irrationalistic 
element seems more pronounced in his later works. The Theory 
of Knowledge which Boyce Gibson looked forward to as the 
"sole true remedy" for Eucken's "spiritual mysteries" 129 has 
appeared. Its advent, for those who accept the system, has but 
intensified the darkness enveloping the entire sphere of human 
knowledge. It reiterates the exorbitant, irrationalistic demands 
which Eucken makes upon our faith as the first step in the paths 
of knowledge. In the second part of Erkennen und Leben he 
writes : 

"Unsere kritische Untersuchung lief in die Forderung aus, dass 
im Bereich des Menschen ein selbstandiger Lebenskomplex, ja eine 
Welt entstehe; nur eine solche Welt, die ihm aus den Bewegun- 
gen seines eignen Lebens zugeht und ihm daher gegenwartig 
bleibt, kann zum Standort seines Denkens und zum Vorwurf seines 
Erkennens werden. Ein derartiger Lebenszusammenhang wird 
nicht zu erreichen sein ohne eine wesentliche Umwandlung der 
vorgefundenen Lage, aber wenn er insofern neu ist, so fehlt ihm 
nicht eine Ankmipfung an den Gesamtstand des menschlichen 
Lebens." 130 

In his summary he states : 

1. Nur so we it wir an einem Beisichselbstsein des Lebens teilge- 
winnen, ist fur uns Erkennen moglich. Es bleibt dabei viel Platz 
fur andere intellektuelle Leistungen, aber Erkennen sind diese 
nicht. 



128 Shakespeare, Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. II (Portia). 

129 Op. cit., p. 114. 

130 Erkennen und Leben, p. 76, Leipzig, 1912. This volume gives the first 
formulation of the Theory. (Knowledge and Life, translated by Tudor Jones, 
London, 1913, p. 143.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 49 

2. Ein solches Beisichselbstsein muss ira Grunde unseres 
Wesens wirken, aber zu unserm vollen Eigentum wird es nur 
mit Hilfe der weltgeschichtlichen Arbeit; wer es durch blosse, 
Bewusstseinsanalyse glaubt unmittelbar ergreifen zu konnen, 
der unterschatzt den Tatcharakter unseres Lebens und verfallt 
unvermeidlich einem Intellektualismus, wenn auch feinerer Art." 131 

Even if we blindly bow before his dogmas we are as far off — in 
truth much further — from the knowledge we seek as we were 
before. A theoretical description of how knowledge is acquired, 
though it may win belief, or faith, does not necessitate practical 
results. It must be remembered that however much Eucken 
advocates action, he has still to prove that truth is won through 
action. Experience — whether popular or scientific — does not 
reveal any trace of the "Lebensprozess" of Eucken's conception; 
reason rejects it as a contradiction. We must therefore either 
accept it in blind faith with a hope that knowledge will come 
"somehow or other," or, turn our attention to "the widely held 
view of truth as a correspondence of thought with an external 
reality" which Eucken so "decidedly rejects." In the next section 
we shall examine this "Life-Process" — which he considers to be at 
once the source and instrument of all true knowledge — more in 
detail. In connection with anti-intellectualism — whether of 
Activism or Bergsonism — it may be pointed out that a system of 
philosophy, based on the discrediting of the faculty which generic- 
ally marks off man from brute, is a travesty of all scientific knowl- 
edge — and here we use "scientific" in its widest sense, to include, 
therefore, the philosophical as well as the empirical sciences. 
Yorke Fausset, in his criticism of Eucken's religious position says: 

"But a Christianity in which the Divine-Human personality of 
Jesus Christ is no longer the determining factor or, in New Testa- 
ment language, the 'chief corner-stone' is not 'another' but a 
'different' Gospel." 132 

With equal truth we may affirm that a world in which man's 
intellect had ceased to be his means of knowledge and his guide 
through life would not be a more modern world, it would be an 
absolutely different one. 



131 Ibid., p. 160. 

132 w Yorke Fausset, Neo-Christianity of R. Kucken. Ch. Quarterly Review 
London. Oct., 1912, p. 32. 



CHAPTER II 

THE LIFE-PROCESS 

The Life-Process (Der Lebensprozess) or Spiritual Life (Das 
Geistesleben) is, according to Eucken, the foundation of all 
reality and truth; it is more: it is itself reality and truth. The 
individual can win a spiritual content for his life and attain to true 
knowledge only through an "immediacy" of the Spiritual Life. 
In the inmost depth of his being man discovers the Spiritual Life, 
which is also "his own," present to him "as a possibility." By 
spiritual work ("geistige Arbeit") he appropriates it, and, in so 
doing, wins knowledge and truth. 

Activism 

"Durch die Tatigkeit und innerhalb der Tatigkeit erfolgt eine 
Scheidung zwischen Sinnlichem und Unsinnlichem; hier vermag 
das Unsinnliche sich rein zu entfalten und auch zu einem Ganzen 
zusammenzuschliessen, die Tatigkeit kann sich des Eindringens 
fremder Elemente erwehren, das Sinnliche aus dem Kern in die 
Aussenseite drangen und es zu einer nebensachlichen Begleiter- 
scheinung herabsetzen. . . . Das Problem des Denkens ist 
aber nur ein Auschnitt aus dem Problem des Lebens, uberall kann 
die hohere Stufe eine Selbstandigkeit wahren. ... So wenig 
sich daher sagen lasst, dass reines Denken und reines Wollen als 
fertige Grossen vorhanden sind, sie sind Tatsachen, Wirklichkeiten 
im Reich der Tatigkeit, sie sind Triebkrafte geistigen Schaffens. 
. . . Begriffe wie die des Unendlichen, Unbedingten u.s.w. 
werden in der geistigen Arbeit positive Grossen; auch hat alle jene 
Bildlichkeit oder Negativitat des Gottesbegriff es den Aufbau eines 
Reiches der Religion nicht gehindert; wie hatte sie von den grossen 
Ordnungen des Menschheitslebens bis ins innerste Gemtit des 
Individuums so machtig wirken kdnnen, wenn nicht die Grossen 
innerhalb ihres Gebietes eine positive Bedeutung gewonnen hatten? 
Verstandlich wird allerdings diese geistige Positivitat erst vom 
Selbstleben aus; denn, wie wir sahen, kann erst dadurch, dass ein 
Selbst in den Betatigungen gegenwartig bleibt, in ihnen Erfahr- 
ungen macht, aus ihnen zur Einheit zuruckkekrt, dem Leben ein 
Inhalt erwachsen." 133 

"Die Welt selbstandigen Geisteslebens kann unsere Welt nur 
werden, wenn sie auch bei uns entsteht; das aber heisst, dass ein 
urspriinglicher Lebensprozess in uns aufgehen und eine geistige 



133 j) er Xampf urn einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, op. cit., pp. 168-170. 
Italics are ours. 

50 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 51 

Wirklichkeit erzeugen muss. Ein solcher Prozess diirfte nicht 
Dinge ausser sich anerkennen und sich von draussen her an ihnen 
zu tun machen, sondern er miisste als Volltatigkeit in dem oben 
erorterten Sinne den Gegenstand in sich schliessen und aus sich 
entwickeln. Er diirfte ferner nicht eine blosse Leistung innerhalb 
einer gegebenen Welt, sondern er miisste ein selbsttatiges Leben 
gegeniiber aller Gegebenheit sein; er diirfte nicht in einer vorge- 
fundenen Welt nur dieses und jenes verbessern, sondern er hatte 
ein neues Sein mit eigentiimlichen Grossen und Giitern zu 
schaffen." 134 

Two questions require a satisfactory answer before we can 
rationally accept the new criterion of truth: 

1. What, in last analysis, is the nature of this Life-Process? 

2. How is it revealed to us? Under what conditions does the 
"immediacy" of the Spiritual Life occur? What makes us aware 
of the peculiarly objective 135 character of that which is experienced 
in the "Gemiit?" or "Unmittelbarkeit?" 135a Eucken has, him- 
self, rejected the intellectualistic standpoint. 136 

Nature of the Life- Process 

The answer to the first question may be sought in citations from 
the philosopher's works. In "Meaning and Value of Life" he 
writes : 

"The natural and the spiritual stages both fall within an all-envel- 
oping life whose very process of self-development is to pass upward 
from the one to the other, and so come into full realization within 
our universe through the very impulse of its own movement." 137 

"The links that mediate between the two show that natural 
and spiritual alike belong, in last resort, to one and the same world, 
and that there is a Whole transcending all difference, and even all 
opposition" 138 



134 Ibid, p. 27. 

135 Eucken insists on the objective character of the Spiritual Life — even 
though it is "our own" life — and he draws a sharp contrast between "subjec- 
tive" or merely "psychical states," and the spiritual life whereby the soul 
wins a "content." 

i36 a Eucken makes frequent use of this term in Hauptprobleme der 
Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart; see esp. pp. 28-32. 

136 See Truth of Rel. passage cited chapter I. "The experience of history 
testifies to the particular naivete of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will." 
p. 84. (Wahrheitsgchalt der Rel., p. 56: "Nach den Erfahrungen der 
Geschichte lasst sich nicht wohl aus Denken, Fiihlen, Wollen Religion zusam- 
mensetzen," but the adjective "naive" is found on p. 55.) 

137 Meaning and Value of Life, p. 80. Italics are ours. See Sinn und 
Wert des Lebens: Geistesleben und menschliches Dasein, pp. 91-101, especially 
p. 100. 

138 Ibid, pp. 115, 116. Italics ours. 



52 EUDOLF ElTCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

From Die Einheit des Geisteslebens we have selected the 
following : 

"Das Geisteswesen ist nicht eine punktuelle Existenz, welche 
erst nachtraglich zu einem fremden All in Beziehungen tritt, 
sondern es hat an einem allumfassenden Ganzen unmittelbar Teil, 
und es entwickelt nur seine eigene Natur, wenn es seine Interessen 
ins Unermessliche ausdehnt, ohne auf eine Ganzheit verzichten 
zu wollen. Diese Thatsache erhalt jetzt beim Problem des 
Personal seins eine weitere Bekraftigung und Entfaltung. Ein 
personales Lebenssystem kann es schlechterdings nur geben 
zusammen mit einem Ganzen personaler Wirklichkeit, einer 
personalen Welt. Diese aber lasst sich, da die Umfassung des 
Lebensprozesses von einer zentralen Einheit, die Erhebung des 
Daseins zum Selbstleben, hier die entscheidende Eigentiimlichkeit 
ausmacht, nur gewinnen, wenn eine kosmische Einheit die Wirk- 
lichkeit umspannt, wenn alles Geschehen einen Einheitspunkt hat, 
wenn also ein universales Personalwesen die Grundlage der Ent- 
faltung alles Personallebens bildet." 139 

"Als allgemeinste These erscheinen in dem Zusammenhange 
unserer Untersuchung die Satze, dass alles Sein in einem Selbts- 
wesen wurzelt, dass aber verschiedene Stufen der Gegenwart 
des Selbst moglich sind, dass mit dem Eintreten des Selbst in den 
Lebensprozess die Geistigkeit beginnt und mit der Entwickelung alter 
Wirklichkeit aus dem Selbst sich vollendet. Was als Selbstwesen 
Voraussetzung, wird als Selbstleben Aufgabe;eshandeltsichdarum, 
ein zunachst in scheinbarer Jenseitigkeit befindliches Prinzip, 
ohne das einmal die Wirklichkeit keine Wahrheit erreichen kann, 
fiir uns und unsere Weltlage zu voller Entwickelung zu bringen. 
Dies aber kann nur geschehen, indem das Selbst sich zur That 
verkorpert, sich in ein Thun hineinlegt, dadurch das entgegen- 
stehende Dasein in sich zieht und in sein Werk verwandelt. Da 
das Selbst in dem kosmischen Sinne, wie es hier verstanden wird, 
nicht von draussen an die Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern innerhalb 
ihrer liegt und wirkt, so kann sein Fortgang zur That eine Erhebung 
der Dinge zu ihrem eigenen Wesen sein." 140 

"Des weiteren haben uns auch daruber die Untersuchungen 
aufgeklart, dass in der spezifischen Auspragung des Geisteslebens 
zur Vernunft- und Personalwelt nicht eine nachtragliche Zuthat 
vorliegt, die man abldsen und fallen lassen konnte, um einen all- 
gemeineren, minder problematischen Begriff desto sicherer festzu- 
halten, sondern jene Welt zeigte sich als die begriindende Vor- 
aussetzung und als die treibende Kraft aller und jeder geistigen 
Wirklichkeit, mit em Selbstleben steht und fallt die Geistigkeit." 141 



Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 355. Italics ours. 
Op. cit., pp. 401 sqq. Italics ours. 
Op. cit., p. 463. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 53 

In the Truth of Religion we find: "There originates in nature 
in its wending towards the animal level numerous and clear 
traces of psychic life. . . . But the inner life remains scattered 
and bound, a mere piece of an alien world, empty in the midst of 
all the passion of the animal impulse. If now — not in man himself, 
but yet within the range of humanity — a clarification and a libera- 
tion arise, if here the inner life becomes independent and a depth 
of existence opens — that such a fact has happened from simple 
beginnings and by a very slow ascent does not alter the main fact 
in the least, — then nature cannot any more signify the whole of 
reality, but can only signify a special stage of it — a stage beyond 
which the world-process proceeds to an existence-for-self. This 
new fact is far too original and signifies far too much an inverted 
order of things to be understood as a mere furtherance of the 
mechanical movement of nature itself; rather must it be a cosmic 
life superior to nature which breaks forth thus — a cosmic life 
which works also in nature but which proceeds beyond it to a 
stage of self -completion. In such a connection the Spiritual Life 
cannot at all be viewed as only a result; it must also be valid as a 
principle ; it can be the aim and the culmination of the world-process 
only if it also forms its foundation and presupposition, and if 
that which at first appears as a result works in and through the 
whole movement. An energy of the Whole must be active from 
the outset if the manifold is to be united into a Whole, and through 
such a union is to rise to a higher plane. How could an All bring 
forth an independent inner life if it were soulless in itself? 

"Nature and the unfolded spirit become herewith stages of the 
world-process which, beyond the juxtaposition of nature with its 
bare relations, progress to a total-life which overcomes the cleft 
between obscure substance and unsubstantial happening, by 
making the Life-process independent and developing all substance 
from it. At the same time, the All-life can no more be a stream 
flowing nobody knows whither and which nobody experiences." 142 

"What happens here is mysterious enough. Life forges its way 
here, beyond the work of the world, to a persistency and duration 
in itself, to a new kind of being, but in all this it is at the outset 
split up into so many isolated appearances, and it falls easily into 
mere subjectivity. But some kind of unity seems present in the 
foundation, but it is not able to overcome the hindrance, and 
succeeds in bringing forth no more than poor results. . . . And 
here Characteristic religion steps in with its fundamental assertion 
that a 'becoming' independence of pure inwardness and the un- 
folding of a new unity of life result, but this is shown to happen not 
through the energy of these qualities themselves but through the 

142 Italics ours. Truth of Rel., pp. 164-166. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., 
pp. 113, 114.) Compare Sinn un<l Wert des Lebens, op. cit., pp. 60 sqq. 



54 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

communication of the inmost nature of things — from the pure self- 
subsistence of reality." 143 

In the Life of the Spirit we read: 

"Where Nature ranks as a stage of reality, which remains even 
when the spiritual is developed, the power which this stage contains 
must be enlisted in the service of the life-process, in order that it may 
not become too weak. Not by withdrawing from nature, but only 
by overcoming, appropriating, and penetrating it can the spiritual 
life attain its full height and strength; only thus can life be brought 
from mere outline to the finished product." 144 

" . . . man can participate in a cosmic life that forms the essence 
of things, and so gain possession of truth." 145 

"If truth, if a life which fashions the world and partakes of the 
essence of things, are not in the first place incontestable facts for 
us, then all our trouble about them is wasted." 146 

In Main Currents of Modern Thought occurs the following: 

"In spiritual life we recognize a new development of the universe 
in which it unfolds a depth and gathers itself together to form 
a world-life. To participate in spiritual life means therefore to 
participate in a world-life. The experiences which the movements 
and changes of the spiritual life give rise to do not belong to any 
atomic self, but are appreciated only as revelations of reality as a 
whole. 

"Moreover this new life has shown itself superior to the contrast 
between subject and object; it is no half -being needing to be com- 
plemented from without, but as fully active life it is raised above 
this contrast . It carries within itself the tracings of an independent 
reality, and its movement is a struggle towards the complete develop- 
ment of this reality. " 147 

"Our concept of Spiritual life as the orientation of reality towards 
an inner life of its own [der Wendung der Wirklichkeit zu einem 
Eigen- und Innenleben], again reveals a passage between Scylla 
and Charybdis. For we look upon spiritual life as the 'coming to- 
itself of the world-process [Zusichselbstkommen des Weltprozesses], 
the winning of an esential being and meaning over against the 
meaningless network of relationships and self-preservative activ- 
ities which result from the regime of the mere individual." 148 



143 Ibid., pp. 420 sqq. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 292.) 

144 The Life of the Spirit, p. 272. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung in eine Philos- 
ophic des Geisteslebens, p. 129.) 

145 Ibid., p. 327. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung, p. 156, "an einem wesen- 
bildenden Weltleben.") 

146 Ibid., p. 331. Italics ours. (Einfuhrung, p. 158, "ein weltbildendes und 
wesenhaftes Leben.") 

147 Translated by Booth, New York, 1912, p. 132. Italics ours. (Geistige 
Stromungen, p. 96.) 

148 Ibid., p. 390. Italics ours. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 326.) 



EUDOLF EuCKEX AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 55 

In Der Kampf urn einen geistigen Lebensinkalt Eucken writes : 

"Einen weg, in der Einheit die Versckiedenkeit festzuhalten, 
eroffnet aber die Idee, dass Natur und Geist die Hauptstufen einer 
Bewegung des Alls bilden, dass Ein begrtindendes und unifassendes 
Sein in ihnen und durch sie seine eigne Verwirklickung findet. 
In solckem Zusammenkange sckeint erst mit der Wendung zum 
Geist das All ein Beisickselbstsein zu erreicken, sick zu einem 
inneren Zusammenkang und einem deutlickenSinn aufzuringen." 149 

"Jene icesenhafte Geistigkeit . . . muss die erste und urspriing- 
UcheLebensquelle tverden, die Kraft, die alles iibrige tragt und treibt, 
der feste Punkt, woran sick alles andere kalt. Dazu gekort an 
erster Stelle, dass ein Allleben wesenhafter Geistigkeit in uns unmit- 
telbar durckbrickt." 150 

In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, ke states: 

"The life-process is . . . seen to be a movement tkat is neitker 
from object to subject, nor from subject to object; neitker tke 
subject's attainment of content from tke object, nor tke object's 
becoming controlled by tke subject, but an advance of a self- 
conscious life in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement, 
ceases to be a single, thin thread; it wins breadtk; it expands to an 
inner universality. At tke same time a deptk is manifested in 
tkat a persistent and comprekensive activity emerges wkick lives 
in tke antitkesis. In this manner life first becomes a life in a 
spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, a self- 
consciousness." 151 

"Nature, wkick tkere was a tendency to regard as tke wkole, 
is now of tke essence of a wider reality and a stage in its 
development." 152 

"Tke transition to an independent inwardness is not sometking 
wkick kappens externally to tke world but within it: no special 
spkere, separate from all tke rest, is originated; but reality itself 
evolves an inner life: it is tke world itself tkat reveals a spiritual 
deptk, or, as we might say, a soul." 153 

"It is necessary not only tkat tke life-process ackieve more, but 
also tkat it grow in itself, ckange tkat wkick is alien to it into its 
own, and display more reality witkin itself; life must experience 
every single activity as tke manifestation of tke activity of tke 
wkole, and tkus, along witk unlimited extension, preserve self- 
consciousness. 154 



149 Op. cit., pp. 24 sqq. Italics are ours. 

150 Ibid., p. 09. Italics ours. 

161 Italics ours. Life's Basis, p. 146. (Grundlinien einer neuen Leben- 
sanschauung, p. 73.) 

152 Ibid., p. 149. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 75, "die Natur, die sonst 
das Ganze scheincn mochte, wird jetzt zu ciner Stufe einer weiteren Wirk- 
lichkeit.") 

163 Ibid., p. 148. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 74.) 

164 Ibid., p. 213. Italics ours. 



56 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

"The more necessary it is to insist upon an animation of reality 
through the development of self-conscious life, the more must we 
guard against the danger of anthropomorphism. . . . Only 
with much toil and with continual self-criticism can life be brought 
to the point where the transition to self-consciousness is possible; 
and even then the whole cannot, under human circumstances, 
be attained at one stroke; but at first life must endeavor to concen- 
trate, to form a nucleus so that in this way it may acquire a firm 
basis, and from this take up a struggle for its further spiritualisa- 
tion." 155 

"... this life ["a world-transcendent spiritual life which is 
purely and absolutely self conscious"] must become man's own 
life, and spirituality in this way self-consciously advance towards 
divinity"[!!] 156 

In "Konnen wir noch Christen sein?" we find: 

"So steigen mit der Wendung zur Geistigkeit die Ideen eines 
inneren Zusammenhanges und einer Ewigkeit auf und werden zu 
Machten iiber das Leben. Aber die Wandlung greift noch tiefer 
in das innere Gewebe des Lebens ein. Schon die Betrachtung der 
Neuzeit zeigte, wie das geistige Leben eine Scheidung und Wieder- 
verbindung vollzieht, wie es Kraft und Gegenstand, Subjekt 
und Objekt zunachst auseinanderriickt und sie dann durch 
erhohendes Schaffen wieder zusammenbringt. Hier erscheint 
zunachst die geistige Bewegung nicht als ein Mosses Hin- und Her- 
gehen von einer Seite zur andern, sondern als eine Tatigkeit, die 
beide Seiten umfasst, und die mit ihrer Versetzung des ganzen 
Lebensumfanges in Bewegung Volltatigkeit heissen mag; ferner 
aber erscheint hier das geistige Wirken nicht als ein blosses Verwer- 
ten gegebener Elemente, sondern als ein Quell selbstdndigen Lebens, 
als eine Kraft der inneren Erhohung. Hier befindet sich das 
Leben noch mitten im Fluss und stellt sich dabei als ein Vordringen 
und Aufklimmen dar, die von ihm vollzogene Verbindung ist 
keine blosse Zusammensetzung, sondern ein Eroffnen neuer Tiefen, 
ein Sichentziinden des Geistes im Zusammenstoss." 157 

"Es gilt bei der Religion den Gewinn eines Lebens, das uns mit 
iiberwaltigender Kraft ergreife und uns iiber den vorgefundenen 
Stand hinaus zu neuer Hohe erhebe, es tut hier ein gewaltiges 
Aufriitteln not, ein Abbrechen des Alten, ein Hervorbrechen 
urspriinglicher Lebensquellen." 158 



165 Ibid., p. 214. Italics are ours. 

160 Ibid., p. 275. See Grundlinien, p. 132, "Es erscheint ein starkes Ver- 
Jangen," etc., to "zur Gbttlichkeit steigern." 

167 Op. cit., pp. 98 sqq. Italics ours. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 92.) 
R. Siebert in his interpretation of Eucken writes: "Zur Geistigkeit entwickelt 
sich die Menschheit und der Mensch auf dem Grunde einer ewigen Geisteswelt." 
Rudolf Eucken's geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten, Berlin, 1909, p. 70. 

1M Ibid., p. 145. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 135.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 57 

In Erkennen und Leben we read: 

"Dies Problem des Tragers aber fiihrt unmittelbar zum Lebens- 
problem, und hier wird sofort ersichtlich, dass unser Leben nicht 
ein blosses Stlick eines gegebenen Daseins ist, dass es sich nicht in 
das Verhaltnis zur Umgebung erschopft, sondern dass es aus 
den Verkettungen des Daseins herauszutreten, eine Selbstandigkeit 
zu gewinnen, eine Selbsttatigkeit zu entwickeln und eine Tatwelt 
aufzubringen vermag. Solche Wendung ergibt einen vollig neuen 
Anblich der Wirkliehkeit und stellt sie als eine grosse Aufgabe 
dar. . . . Dass hier grosse Verwicklungen entstehen, dass die 
Welt, die von innen aufsteigt, und die Welt, ivelche wir um tins und 
audi in uns finden, in harte Konflilde miteinander geraten, das ist 
die gemeinsame Uberzeugung aller Religionen, aber auch alter 
sehaffenden Kunst und aller durchgreifenden Philosophic. Sie alle 
bejahen nicht das gegebene Dasein, sondern das Ja, auf dem sie 
bestehen, finden sie nur im Bruch mit jenem Dasein, nur durch 
Erschutterung und Verneinung hindurch. Die Verneinung wird 
ihnen damit bei allem Schmerz ein wesentlicher Faktor des geistigen 
Lebens, ja sie erscheint als das Salz des Lebens, ohne das es schal und 
seelenlos wird. Erst die Verneinung fiihrt das Leben zu rechter 
Bewegung, Kraft und Vertiefung." 159 

In Christianity and the New Idealism Eucken gives a warning 
which does not tend to lessen the difficulties in the way of the 
Life-Process as Truth-Standard; his words are: 

"Only we must beware of confounding the form that religion 
takes among men — the existential form, in a word — with its origin- 
ating ground or its spiritual substance." 160 

Such is the exposition, in the philosopher's own words, of the 
central conception of Activism. 

Analysis and Criticism 

A single reading suffices to show that the proposed basis is too 
insecure a foundation for the structure of human knowledge. 

What reality can that have which, in itself, is neither matter 
nor purely spirit, nor essentially different from either since each is a 
stage in its self-development? Alban G. Widgery, in his Introduc- 
tion to "Life's Basis and Life's Ideal" says: 

"The careful reader cannot fail to see that, ultimately, the 
philosophy is essentially mystical." 1 " 1 



169 Erkennen und Leben, pp. 69 sqq. Italics ours. (Knowledge and Lif< 
pp. 128 sqq.) 

180 Op. cit., p. 23. Italics ours. (Hauptprobleme, p. 25.) 
JC1 Op. cit., p. XVIII. 



58 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

It seems to us that Eucken's conception of the Life-Process is 
not so much "essentially mystical" as it is wholly unintelligible. 162 

It does not baffle the Reason because it discloses a truth that is 
above Reason; it defies it because it seeks to unite elements which 
are essentially incompatible; it suggests a concept which is contrary 
to Reason, and, therefore, absolutely inconceivable. The doctrine 
of the Resurrection, which Eucken dismisses with the uncritical 
reflection that it is not necessary for Christianity, 163 is a mystery 
but it is not a contradiction. Life is a mystery, as the futile 
attempts of Burke, Pfliiger and other experimenters in the cause of 
abiogenesis have testified; it is nevertheless, a reality. To hold 
that the Power which endowed the vital principle with the capa- 
bility of developing a single cell into a human body, is also able 
to reunite the vital principle to the matter it once animated, is not 
opposed to reason, though reason perceives its difficulties all the 
more clearly from the fact that it cannot penetrate to the secret 
of Vitalism, but must acknowledge that the first living cell was the 
direct result of a Creative act, or, illogically, assume an Agnostic 
standpoint. But the "mystery" for which Eucken claims recogni- 
tion is of a very different type. 

He posits as "the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality" 164 
a Life which is not made known to us through Biology or Psy- 
chology, still less through Cosmology; a Life which can be reached 
only by a "noological" "supreme" or "sovereign" ("eigenstand- 
lich") 165 method which, by transcending the opposition between 
subject and object, treats immediately of the First and Final Cause 
— the All-Life (All-Leben) which contains within itself both nature 
and spirit. 

Modern science has greatly increased our knowledge of matter 
and our power over the forces of nature, but it has not thereby 
lessened the opposition between the "material" and the "spiritual." 



162 yy e use j-jjg t erm "conception" here for convenience sake: a conception 
that is unintelligible is, strictly speaking, an impossibility. 

163 See Truth of Rel., pp. 550-554 (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 370-373). 
In Truth of Rel., p. 553, he says: "Religion, which has already shown so much 
energy, will finally find the energy to subsist without sensuous signs and 
wonders." German text, p. 372 sqq. See also Prob. of Human Life, pp. 
167 sqq. (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker, op. cit., pp. 168 sqq.) 

164 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 5. See Grundlinien, p. 2; the wording 
is changed. 

165 Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 123, 318. (Truth of Rel., pp. 178 sqq.; 
455 sqq.) (Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 56, 421.) G. Strom- 
ungen, pp. 29, 354. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 59 

Empirical Psychology has brought out the contrast between sense- 
knowledge and the spiritual activity of thought in a still stronger 
light than was thrown on it by the older method — though the 
result is an indirect one, in no way aimed at by those who sought 
to separate the study of the mental activities from the study of 
the nature of the mind itself. Although Eucken, in dealing with 
Naturalism, distinguishes between the "material" and the "spir- 
itual," 166 he insists that we can only reach truth by transcending 
the antithesis between nature and spirit. We maintain that we 
have no faculty or power whereby to do so; we cannot even conceive 
of how it could be done. Matter and spirit are essentially different 
in nature and mode of action; how then can they be united so as 
to form a third "Whole" which is both their starting-point and 
goal in the evolutionary course upon which they enter? Even in 
purely chemical changes the new substance imprisons the gases 
which were contained in the old, but it was in the nature of the 
gases to enter into the fresh combination, otherwise the transforma- 
tion of energy could not have taken place. Eucken's statement 
about the implication of the "Geistesleben" may be recalled here: 

"The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is repre- 
sented by the customary conception of that life." 167 

"Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, 
of which that other than nature may in agreement with established 
usage be called 'spiritual,' however little may be implied by this 
expression." 168 

If we were translated to a realm in which the sum of the com- 
ponent parts of a positive quantity equalled nothing, the trans- 
cendence which Eucken demands might be accomplished. One 
thing is certain : we have no present experience either of the trans- 
cendent reality itself — i.e., the reality of Eucken's conception — 
or of the manner in which the transcendent viewpoint is gained: 189 

188 See Life's Basis and Life's Ide.al, pp. 24 sqq. (Grundlinien, pp. 14 sqq.) 
Main Currents, pp. 227 sqq.; 232 sqq. (G. Strbmungen, pp. 180 sqq.) 
Meaning and Value of Life, pp. 26 sqq. (Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 19 
sqq., esp. p. 24.) In most of his works the contrast is made, though it is 
destroyed by the exposition of the constructive portion. 

167 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 240. (Grundlinien, see pp. 104, 105, to 
"sein," end of paragraph.) 

183 Ibid., pp. 131, 132. (Grundlinien, p. 63.) 

169 "Noological," from Nous the spirit, is an adjective better applied to 
the methods of Rational Psychology than to the irrational system of Eucken. 
"Noeticism" is, strictly speaking, the equivalent for Rational Psychology or 
Philosophy of Mind — a science which has received careful development and 
elaboration in the scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy. See Truth of 
Rel., p. 235. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 160.) 



60 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

we have no knowledge of it through Science, Philosophy or 
Revelation. We cannot, therefore, stake our life on the hope that 
a self-evident contradiction may be "somehow or other" possible. 
A closer examination of the "Geistesleben" or "Lebensprozess" 
shows it to be an eclectic conception, the borrowed elements 
being taken from conflicting systems of thought — even truths 
of Revelation are caught up, and become notes in this all-embracing 
concept. The result is that the philosopher who starts his con- 
structive work by stating that the "fact" of a spiritual life is the 
"axiom of axioms," has hardly begun his exposition ere he negates 
the concept of the spiritual, and completely negatives his own 
position. An analysis of this complex conception reveals the 
following elements : 

1. The "Absolute Spiritual" which is none other than the 
First Cause of Scholastic Philosophy and the God of Christian 
Theology. 

This Absolute Spiritual possesses the plentitude of all being and 
is the Source (Urspriingliche Quelle) of all reality. The Absolute 
Spiritual is according to Eucken, "Infinite Love" and unchanging 
Truth : a truth that would be valid only for a time he declares to 
be a contradiction : 

"Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question 
as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned. The concept 
of truth . . . tolerates neither growth nor change." 170 

The concept may be compared with that of Parmenides and his 
school in that the oneness of reality is held both by Eucken and 
the Eleatics. Eucken differs from them in, illogically, passing 
on to the dynamism of Heraclitus, and holding the reality of 
change, without acknowledging a creative act of the First Cause or 
Absolute Spiritual. 

2. The Life-Process. 

This bears, in general outline, an unmistakable resemblance to 
the divine all-controlling world-fire of Heraclitus in Ancient 
Thought, and to the central conception in the systems of Fichte, 
Schelling and Hegel in the modern world. The resemblance does 
not, perhaps, extend to details; in fact in the exposition Eucken 
rather seeks to differ from his predecessors in the New Pliil- 



170 Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 274. (G. Stromungen, p. 223.) 



EUDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 61 

osophy; an fond, however, the likeness remains. Fichte lTOa 
insists on the importance of action, and of free action. Schelling 
maintains that the "Eternal Itself" is also nature, while Eucken 
states that nature is a stage in the development of the one reality. 
Hegel insists that the rational alone is real, Eucken — that the goal 
of human endeavor should be the overcoming of the irrationality 
of nature: the "spiritualization" of nature. 

Eucken's striking point of difference lies in his recognition of 
evil and sin in the full Christian sense. This idea, however, does 
not belong to the concept of the Life-Process, strictly speaking; 
it is one of the interpolated elements wholly at variance with its 
environment. 

3. The Christian concept of an offended Goodness and a guilty 
creature. In no portion of his inconsistent system is Eucken 
weaker than when attempting to deal with the problem of evil. 
Evil and sin, apart from the recognition of a free creative act of 
the First Cause, are insoluble mysteries: more, sin itself is wholly 
unintelligible. When sin is acknowledged, the mind must forth- 
with recognize a Being sinned against, but in Eucken's system 
"Sinned against" and "sinner" must, in last analysis, be one and 
the same. He asks, in the Truth of Religion (the passage is cited in 
chapter III, p. 78), whether we shall dare ascribe guilt to the Deity. 
But he offers no solution which will enable us to do otherwise. 

4. The human spiritual, or the "existential form" of the 
Absolute Spiritual. This is an essentially Pantheistic conception; 
the influence of Kant 171 and even of Spinoza 172 are traceable in its 
development, which is at variance with its definition. 



ma p or an inquiry into the relation between Eucken and Fichte see 
"Eucken's Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung und sein Yerhaltnis zu 
J. G. Fichte," by Paul Gabriel; pp. 35-44. 

171 See Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 32. "Erst Kant 
brachte die Wendung in Fluss, welche die geistige Arbeit des 19. Jahrhunderts 
beherrscht, die deutliche Abhebung eines Geisteslebens vorn blossseelischen 
Getriebe. Denn bei ihra erscheint jenseit des Unterschiedes der Individuen 
eine gemeinsame geistige Struktur, ein Grundgewebe, das alle geistige Betatig- 
ung beherrscht und gestaltet. Aber die Sache blieb bei ihm insofern noch 
unvollendet, als sich weder das neue fcst genug bei sich selbst zusammenschloss, 
noch eine deutliche Abgrenzung des Geistigen erfolgte." Eucken offers us 
his concept of the Geistesleben as the completion and perfection of Kant's 
work ("bei ihm . . . noch unvollendet") see Der Grundbegriff des Geistes- 
lebens; ibid., pp. 30 sqq. 

172 Though Spinoza and Eucken may seem at first to have little in common 
a close comparison suggests distinct similarities. Compare, e.g., Spinoza's 
description of the life of passion, or, even of mere scientific pursuit, with 
Eucken's account of blouse Menschen, blouse Menschenkultur, blossmenschliches 



62 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

In conclusion we must reject Eucken's "All-Leben" just as de- 
cidedly as we must keep certain of the concepts it seeks to unite. 
In the next chapter we shall examine into the second point of 
our inquiry. 



Wohlsein, and of the Kleinmenschlich, Blossmenschlich, and Das Heine Ich: 
See, e. g., Grundlinien, op. cit., pp. 68, 186, 196, 210; Die Einheit des Geistes- 
lebens, p. 460. Again the peculiarly religious role, as we may call it, which 
Eucken assigns to philosophy is surely not wholly uninfluenced by Spinoza's 
idea of the philosopher who, rising above the strife of passion and the life of 
worldly interest, views all things sub specie aeternitatis. See Geistige Stro- 
mungen (pp. 97-104) where Eucken unfolds the task of philosophy. On 
p. 99 we find "das alles ist eine Frage der Tatsachlichkiet, aber freilich einer 
Tatsachlichkeit, die nicht von aussen her zufallen kann, sondern in Zusam- 
menfassung des Lebens, im Aufklimmen zu einem Sehen und Messen vom 
Ganzen zum Ganzen immer neu zu erringen ist." Italics are ours. See also 
Grundlinien, p. 177, where the words of Spinoza occur: "Wenn das Denken in 
seiner Arbeit eine Erhebung Uber die Zeit vollzieht, wenn es sub specie aeterni- 
tatis wirkt," etc. 



CHAPTER III 

THE "IMMEDIACY" OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE 

The inquiry into the nature of the "Immediacy" involves a 
double problem — the subjective How, the objective What. 

The psychological question concerns us mainly here, but we 
cannot form a fair judgment of the satisfactoriness of the solution 
in the first case, without adverting to that offered in the second, 
for the reason that the "immediacy" under one aspect is the how 
of our knowledge of the Spiritual, under another aspect it is, itself, 
the spiritual which we know. Eucken's hybrid concept of the 
"Geistesleben" affects his exposition even of the "Absolute Spir- 
itual:" hence the descriptions of the "immediacy" in his different 
works — sometimes in different parts of the same work — are m 
pointed contradiction. 

In Christianity and the New Idealism he writes: "As we 
understand the Spiritual Life, it is not this or that feature of it 
which assures us of the presence of a transcendent Life and unites 
us to it, but rather the totality of an underived and independent life 
within our own." It is "the revelation of a world-transcending 
totality of life." 173 

The force of the italicized passage is destroyed by the previous 
statement (p. 10). "It [i. e., the Spiritual Life] cannot be under- 
stood save as a development of the organized universe." 

In Truth of Religion he writes in treating of the "Revelation of 
an Absolute Spiritual Life:" "We need not open any laborious 
and lengthy investigation in order to prove that a Spiritual Life 
superior to the world not only touches us with its effects, but 
that it is also present in us as cause with all the fulness of its 
energy. It is revealed to us as a great fact that a Spiritual Life 
can rise up as our own life: and this actually happens. The 
significance of this fact can be judged fully after we have recognized 
that a total-life presents itself in the Spiritual Life, and that in 
this total-life a new degree of reality arises, and an inverted order 
of the world-process takes place; such a turn could not proceed out 
of the potency of the individual elements of life, but has to proceed 



173 Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 1C. (Hauptprob. dcr Religions- 
philosophie, op. cit., p. 18.) Italics ours. 

63 



64 BlTDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

out of the energy of the Whole. Therefore this Whole must be, 
in a form of immediacy, present in us, and also, the great change 
shall ensue as a gain of our own life." 174 

So far from recognizing that in the "Absolute Spiritual," or 
"Whole," "a new degree of reality" rises up, "and an inverted order 
of the world-process takes place," we hold that the statement is 
contrary to the recognized signification of the term "Absolute 
Spiritual." 

In Main Currents of Modern Thought we find : 

"It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him 
through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated 
from itself) ; it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole 
in all its infinity [als Ganzes mit all seiner Unendlichkeit]." 175 

It is needless to multiply quotations; one other passage, however, 
may be cited as instancing Eucken's view both of the human 
spiritual and the "immediacy." It occurs in the Problem of 
Human Life : 

"And by personality is meant a concentration-center of the 
spiritual world, a point of convergence for countless threads of 
existence, a point, again, at which life acquires the immediate 
certainty of its own existence, is exalted to a state of pure self- 
immediacy, and can at the same time gather itself together for 
resolute action and energetically challenge such abuses as its 
environment offers." 176 

There are two stages to be distinguished in our knowledge of 
the spiritual, according to Eucken's exposition : 

1. The recognition of the existence of a Spiritual Life. 

2. The realization of that Life as a personal experience; this 
latter constitutes the "immediacy." 

Psychological Method 

In the facts which he brings forward as the basis of the first 
stage he is practically at one with the scholastics — he differs from 
them in the wording and setting of the proofs. These facts may 
be stated as follows : 

a. (1) The unifying power of thought. 



174 Truth of Religion, p. 203 (cc). (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 141.) 

175 Op. cit., p. 60. (Geistige Stromungen, p. 33.) 

176 Problem of Human Life, p. 557. See Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das 
Personalsein als Weltwesen, pp. 354 sqq.; ibid., pp. 468 sqq. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 65 

(2) Unity of consciousness. 

b. Intellectual or Universal Ideas. 

c. The Altruistic emotions and other forms of rational conation. 
Most of Eucken's constructive works treat of this first revelation 

of a spiritual reality. The following citations will suffice for our 
present purpose: 

a. (1) In Christianity and the New Idealism he writes: 

"Thought refuses to be a mere link in the chain of causes and 
effects; it steps outside the series, confronts it, and seeks to unify 
it. Even when gauging the external world, the imaginative flight 
of thought, piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of 
sense-perception. ' ' m 

In Main Currents of Modern Thought he writes: 

"Nothing is more characteristic of the distinctive nature of 
thought than the fact and power of the logical contradiction. It 
would be impossible to perceive this contradiction if, in thought, 
multiplicity was not comprehended within the scope of an all- 
inclusive activity, and it could not be so unendurable as it is if 
the desire for unity were not enormously powerful." 179 

In Ethics and Modern Thought he states: 

"Here ['wherever spiritual life develops'] life is not decomposed 
into a multitude of separate particles, but inner cohesions are 
formed, which embrace and dominate all achievement of individual 
beings. This is especially the case when human thought aspires 
towards Truth." 180 

Eucken's peculiar view of spiritual life is suggested by the expres- 
sion "inner cohesions." 

(2) In Main Currents a good defense of the "Unity of Con- 
sciousness" and its import is found. 

"Moreover it is necessary to call particular attention to the fact 
that above and beyond all intellectual processes there develops 
an inner life, a life which exhibits, in spite of all manifoldness, a 
permanent character, persisting through all changes and move- 
ments." "But is there not a unity of a spiritual kind which 
persists with living force in the face of all the changes and obscura- 
tions of consciousness, does not all progressive scientific and artistic 
creation work through this unity of the spiritual individuality, and 
is not this same unity the source of all thorough-going achievement 
also in the practical and technical domain?" 181 



173 Op. cit., p. 7. (Hauptproulome, p. !).) 
"» Op. cit., p. 183. (Grundlinien, p. 143.) 
wo London and New York, 1913, p. 28. 
181 Op. cit., pp. 52, 53, and footnote. 



66 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

b. The Moral judgments — to which conscience testifies — and 
the ideas of the True, the Good and the Beautiful are phenomena 
inexplicable on any hypothesis except that of a spiritual reality . In 
Life's Basis Eucken writes : 

"In the development of a self -consciousness and of a movement of 
life itself, we rise above the motive of utility, by which nature is 
swayed. It is a moral element in the widest sense; it is the con- 
sciousness of something objectively necessary, unconditionally 
transcending the ends of the narrowly human, that first gives to 
convictions axiomatic certainty and to conduct the right energy. 
This moral element attains to a more independent display in the 
moral self -judgment of man that is called 'conscience.' " 182 

The expressions "movement of life itself," "narrowly human," 
point to the philosopher's inconsistent theory of the "human 
spiritual." Moral values and conscience are but contradictions 
if the spiritual nature of man is a "concentration-center" for the 
"Absolute Spiritual." Again, Eucken has identified necessary 
and moral truths. All moral truths are of an objective necessary 
character, but there are other necessary truths which cannot be 
termed moral. 

In Truth of Religion we find : 

"Also, all the darkness leaves no doubt that the Divine emerges, 
first of all, not from the outermost boundary of our life, but 
through a creativeness and activity in the inmost life itself. . . . 
This appears clearly in a twofold direction. On the one hand, it 
is seen in the power of logical thought, in which something superior 
to all human opinion and inclination appears which shows fear- 
lessly the weal and woe of mere man." 183 

We may point out again Eucken's peculiar view of man's 
spiritual nature. According to him the human spiritual is none 
other than the Absolute Spiritual finding self-expression in and 
through human psychic activities. It is not accurate therefore 
to conceive of man as possessing a spiritual soul; rather he may 
win a soul by "anchorage" in the Absolute Spiritual, the Soul of 
souls; the soul thus won will not be, however, distinct from the 
Absolute Spiritual itself. 

c. In Christianity and the New Idealism we find: "In the 
case of the True and the Good, our effort is not concentrated on the 
external aspects of things, nor does it rest content with a merely 



182 Op. cit., p. 129. (Grundlinien, pp. 61, 62.) 

183 Op. cit., p. 356. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 246.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 67 

external contact. . . . Our feeling, again, through the exaltation 
of life above the natural level, can focus itself within the life of 
another, and, through righteousness and love, realise the being of 
another as a part of that larger and richer life in which we and it 
alike participate." 184 

In Main Currents of Modern Thought Eucken criticizes sharply 
those naturalistic systems which, while denying the existence of a 
spiritual activity, make full use of it in the construction of a theory. 
He does not grasp the fact that he is himself as inconsistent as any 
monist, and more so than most, for the very reason that he posits 
an independent Spiritual Reality as the Source of nature, and yet 
concludes that spirit and matter are, ultimately, belonging, 
essentially, to the one all-embracing Life. 185 

Scholastic Influence 

The influence of the Scholastic philosophy on Eucken at this 
juncture is too evident to escape detection. A comparison of 
some of the cited passages with the exposition of the scholastic 
theory will prove it beyond a doubt. St. Thomas establishes the 
spiritual nature of thought thus: "nullum enim corpus invenitur 
aliquid continere nisi per commensurationem quantitatis; unde, 
et si se toto totum aliquid continet, et partem parte continet, 
majorem quidem majore, minorem autem minore. Intellectus 
autem non comprehendit rem aliquam intellectam per aliquam 
quantitatis commensurationem, quum se toto intelligat et compre- 
hendat totum et partem, majora in quantitate et minora. Nulla 
igitur substantia intelligens est corpus." 186 



184 Op. cit., p. 9. 

185 See G. Stromungen, pp. 185-191 [Main Currents, pp. 232-238]. For 
development of knowledge of spiritual, see also: G. Stromungen, pp. 27, 30, 
104, 222 sqq., 265 sqq. [Main Currents, pp. 54, 57, 141, 273, 274, 322, 323]; 
Einfuhrung in eine Phil, des Geisteslehens, pp. 7-14, 15, 47, 157 sqq.; Wahrheits- 
gehalt der Rel., pp. 271-284 [Truth of Rel. r Chap. XII, pp. 391-409]: the ex- 
position here is in parts irreconcilable with the concept of an Absolute Spiritual 
Being; Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, pp. 109-120. It is un- 
necessary to multiply references as an attentive reading of any one of Eucken's 
constructive works gives a fairly complete view of his entire philosophy. 
Warner Fite has noticed this point in his article in the Nation; he writes: 
"Notwithstanding the systematic development announced in his tables of 
contents, a limited range of variations upon this theme [the independence of 
the Spiritual Life] constitutes (if we omit the historical works) the nearly un- 
changing content of every chapter, every volume and almost of every page." 
(Eucken's Philosophy of Life, Nation, Vol. 95, July 11, 1912, p. 29.) 

186 Contra Gent., Lib. II, Cap. XLIX. For a good brief exposition, see 
M. Maher, Psychology, 7th ed., 1911, Bk. I, Part II. 



68 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

The remainder of the passage is condensed by Rickaby through 
the "commingling" of some of the arguments; in the English it 
is as follows : 

"If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action 
would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore 
it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is mani- 
festly false, for we do understand many things that are not 
corporeal. 

"There can be no infinite power in any finite body : but the power 
of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of 
intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite 
in its logical extension. 

"Of no bodily substance is the action turned back upon the agent. 
But the understanding in its action does reflect and turn round 
upon itself: for as it understands an object, so also it understands 
that it does understand, and so endlessly." 187 

The following is an extract from St. Thomas' proof of rational 
appetency : 

"Ad secundum dicendum, quod appetitus intellectivus, etsi 
feratur in res, quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in 
eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit 
aliquid, quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit in sua Rhetorica 
(Lib. II, Cap. 4, circ. fin.), quod odium potest esse de aliquo 
universali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Simi- 
liter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus 
immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit, sicut scientiam, 
virtutes, et alia hujusmodi." 188 

Points of Difference between Scholasticism and Activism 

Here, however, Eucken parts company with the Scholastics, 
posits unfounded assumptions as facts and involves himself in 
self-contradiction . 

Whereas Christian philosophers have used the foregoing argu- 
ments as stepping stones in the ascent towards a more perfect 
knowledge of the First Cause, and have based natural religion on 
the intellectual perception of the True and the Good, and on the 
yearning of the will towards the Infinitely Beautiful, Eucken 
declares that religion cannot be based on thought, feeling, or 
will — neither on their individual nor combined revelations. 189 



is7 of q 0( j an( j Uis Creatures: a translation of Summa Contra Gentiles, by 
J. Rickaby, S. J., St. Louis, Mo.; London; 1905, Bk. II, Chap. XLIX. 

158 Suimna Theologica I, q. LXXX, art. II. 

159 See Truth of Religion, pp. 72-85, esp. 84; p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der 
Rel., 49-57, esp. 56; p. 134.) 



KUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 69 

The point of vantage reached so far has but proved the reality 
of an independent Spiritual Life, however; "the mere existence 
of a power superior to man is a very insufficient basis for religion. 
Religion requires that this power in all its fulness, should be 
livingly manifest in us . . . and so far we have done no more 
than reach a starting-point for our quest. We have but shown 
the possibility of this manifestation: it still remains to prove its 
reality." 190 

We do not propose to refute at length Eucken's inconsistent 
statement — that the combined manifestations of Thought, 
Feeling and Will afford us no evidence of the intimate relations 
subsisting between us and the Supreme Spiritual Reality. His 
own proofs for the existence of this Reality offer the best refutation 
of the illogical position he has taken up. If the spiritual activity 
of thought, transcending particulars and stretching out to infinity; 
if the moral judgment, proclaiming a truth objectively and neces- 
sarily valid; if the rational emotions of "righteousness and love" 
reveal the existence of an independent Spiritual Life, they thereby 
enable us to recognize that Life as being for us the Supreme and 
ultimate Reality — in the language of religion "our first beginning 
and our last end." If Eucken denies this fact we can but con- 
front him with his own "Entweder-Oder." Either, distrusting 
the manifestations of intellect and will, take up a position of 
absolute subjectivism, or, acknowledging the existence of an 
independent Spiritual Life, acknowledge also the trustworthiness 
of those rational activities which alone reveal it to us. in 

We may quote again here the apt criticism of Henry C. Sheldon: 
"What we know immediately is certain effects in us which serve 
as a ground of rational inference — an inference none the less actual 
because possibly very swift and confident." 192 

The second fundamental point on which Eucken differs from the 
Scholastics is that concerning the nature of the human spiritual. 
It does not fall to our task here to prove at length that man's 
soul is an individual, spiritual substance. Two of the facts 
already adduced, viz., the unity of consciousness and the moral 
judgment, bear irrefragable witness to it. In addition we may 



190 Italics ours. Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 12. (Hauptprob- 
leme, p. 14.) 

191 We speak here of knowledge that can he acquired by Reason alone, 
apart from historical Revelation which Eucken denies. 

192 Sheldon. R. Eucken's Message to Our Age, op. cit., pp. 47 sqq. 



70 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

call attention to the incalculably grave implications which are 
contained in such a theory as Eucken propounds: 

1. The view that the "human spiritual" is but the "existential 
form" of the "Absolute Spiritual" destroys the force of the epithet 
"Absolute," and negates the attribute of infinite perfection which 
Eucken himself ascribes to the "Geistesleben" as ultimate founda- 
tion of truth. 

2. Man's freedom, on such an hypothesis, is an impossibility, 
not a "mystery" as Eucken suggests. 

3. Moral evil is an absolute contradiction, if, indeed, we may 
use the term "absolute" in connection with a nonentity; and the 
moral values and the yearning towards the Good, which formed 
the basis of Eucken's proofs for the existence of a Spiritual Life, 
are vain, illusory phantoms. Finally, the universe is irrational 
from apex to foundation. 

In no way affected by the irretrievable consequences which 
follow from his irrationalism, Eucken proceeds to the second point 
of his investigation, viz., the "personal immediacy" of the spiritual 
life. The criticism of Boyce Gibson is worthy of attention here: 
"Eucken's defective treatment of psychology is again answerable, 
in my opinion, for a strange doctrine of his that our psychical 
activities, whether of thought, feeling, or will, are mere existential 
appearances of the substantial oneness of the spiritual life. Eucken 
has not endeavored to follow up the pseudo-mystic implications 
of this view . . . but, with a happy disregard of all psychological 
inadequacies, proceeds to develop his philosophy of freedom in 
his own way." 193 

Noology 

A passage in the Truth of Religion gives in, perhaps, the clearest 
manner Eucken's teaching regarding the "immediacy: "At 
the very point where the negation had reached its climax and the 
danger had reached the very brink of a precipice, the conviction 
dawns with axiomatic certainty that there lives and stirs within 
us something which all obstacles and enmity can never destroy, 
and which signifies against all opposition a kernel of our nature 
that can never get lost." 194 



193 R. Eucken's Phil, of Life, note p. 160. 

194 Truth of Rel., p. 62. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 42.) Italics ours. 
The danger referred to is that of "the apparent total loss of what we dare not 
renounce — our best and most real treasures," i.e., the "inner elevation of 
human nature" and the winning of genuine happiness; op. cit., p. 61. 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 71 

There are three statements which call for special examination 
in this citation; the investigation will reveal three aspects of the 
philosophy of Activism. 

1. What is the ground of this "axiomatic certainty?" An 
axiom is a self-evident necessary truth, objectively valid for all 
time. The hypothesis of innate ideas and the intuitional theory 
have been put forward to account for our knowledge of such. 195 

Subjectivism 

(a) Eucken's "axiomatic certainty" cannot be based on the ra- 
tional intuition of our relations with a supreme Spiritual Being, since 
it is just at this point that he diverges from the Scholastic position, 
and asserts that we cannot ground religion on the knowledge we 
acquire through our faculties. His Anti-Intellectualism debars 
the possibility of explaining it by the hypothesis of innate ideas. 
Eucken holds that the axiomatic character of the conviction is 
due to the fact that the Absolute Spiritual Life is present to the 
soul in the moment of the "immediacy," and in the revelation of 
Itself makes man aware of his own spiritual possibilities. But 
this does not render the epistemological issue more satisfactory. 
If the psychic faculties through which — as Eucken himself acknowl- 
edges 196 — the spiritual is revealed, are untrustworthy in their 
ordinary manifestations, what assurance can we have concerning 
the trustworthiness of extraordinary manifestations coming through 
the same channels? Even if we grant the truth of Eucken's abitrary 
assumption that life, by its movement, develops its own norms — 
the fact remains that no "turn towards the Life-process" can help 
man to reach truth, as long as he distrusts the medium through 
which it is to be revealed to him — his own intellect. So far from 
having an "axiomatic certainty" we are left with an irrational 
belief and the dilemma is again inevitable. In the Truth of 
Religion Eucken writes : 

"Finally, the position of our question contains also a raising of 
religion above the ramifications of the psychic life — above the 
so-called faculties of the soul; the question concerns itself with 
a particular development of a Spiritual Reality which certainly 
unfolds itself in thought, feeling, and will, but which proceeds not 



195 We omit the Associationist doctrine because it denies that any of our 
cognitions bear this character. 

196 See Truth of Religion, p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 134.) 



72 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

from one or from a combination of them. All the strict fulfilment of 
religion in the provinces of the so-called faculties of the soul yield 
a formation of the periphery, behind which remains unexperienced 
and undeveloped a centre of life — the workshop of original mould- 
ing and creativeness . . . the whole man seems to have been 
won, and religion seems to have become the possession of his soul. 
But is it so in reality? Or remains there not unconceived behind 
all the expansion that which is really the fundamental fact — man 
as a superior Whole, as a participator in infinity, as a warrior for 
a spiritual self? This depth of his nature has now come to a full 
consciousness, and, along with this, it has become clear that such 
a fact alone grants him secure stability against unutterable dangers, 
tribulations, and doubts; so that he will found his religion upon this 
rock, weary throughout of the strife whether intellect, or will, or 
feeling, plays the main part in the concern." 197 

The italicised passage reveals once again Eucken's pantheistic 
conception of the Absolute Spiritual Life; the phrases "centre" 
("zentrum") and "periphery" ("eine periphere Gestaltung") point 
in the same direction: the metaphor of a "workshop" fits in well 
with his exposition of the "Life-prOcess," but radically destroys the 
idea of a supreme Spiritual Reality. The antithesis which he 
seeks to make between the psychic activities or "faculties," of 
thought and will, and the spiritual life of man is fatal. If the 
spiritual character of thought and rational conation is acknowl- 
edged — and we have shown that Eucken does acknowledge this — 
the fact of a spiritual power, or mode of action, of the soul from 
which these activities issue is, at the same time, recognizable, 
and hence the spiritual, substantial nature of the human soul itself 
can be affirmed. These three facts are inseparable; we cannot 
accept one and reject the others, because they are but different 
aspects of the one truth, viz., man's spiritual nature. The alterna- 
tive which Eucken suggests — that the spiritual in man is no part 
of his human endowment, but results from a direct participation 
in the Divine Life, from essential oneness with the Godhead — is so 
far-reaching in its disastrous implications that we need not 
further comment on it, except to remark that Eucken makes no 
attempt to prove it. 

The denial of the native spiritual activity of the Intellect, and 
of the individual, spiritual substantiality of the human soul, 
constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of Eucken's system of philos- 



197 Truth of Religion, pp. 194, 195. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der 
Rel., pp. 134, 135.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 73 

ophy, insisting, as it does, on a negative movement, and a religious 
conversion. 

(b) Appealing to personal experience, who of us can say, with 
comprehension of the terms, that he has an immediate knowledge 
of God "in all" His "infinity?" That man's happiness, even in 
this life, consists in the knowledge and love of God and in union 
with His Will is the teaching of Christianity, but this knowledge 
is not constituted by the direct vision of the Deity. God is known 
through His works in the natural order, through His Grace in the 
supernatural, 198 but even in the supernatural order immediate 
vision is not attained. Such vision is the reward of the faithful 
soul after death; through it knowledge and love are perfected. 
The Apostle tells us "we see now as in a glass, darkly; but then 
face to face" 199 ; to ignore the distinction between the two kinds 
of knowledge is folly. 

Eucken's error follows logically enough from his view of the 
"human spiritual" and of immortality. He insists that we need 
not relegate immortality to a "future" life, a "Beyond." His 
attitude towards this fundamental truth is shown in the following 
passages : 

"Time is for us rather a problem than a rigid destiny. How 
far, however, life overcomes time and attains to a present superior 
to it depends, above everything else, on the spiritual power which 
it is capable of putting forth. It rests with ourselves whether the 
centre of gravity of our being falls in the temporal or the eternal. In 
any case, this action of ours in thus overcoming time has for its 
indispensable preliminary condition the reality and the inner 
presence of a spiritual icorld. Even the most passionate excitation 
of the mere subject can never give rise to a spiritual content and 
with it a superiority to time, and it remains true that, for man, all 
creation is at the same time a reception, a drawing upon invisible 
relationships." 200 

"So hangt das Unsterblichkeitsproblem aufs engste mit der 
Frage eines Selbstandigwerdens des Geisteslebens in unserem 
Bereich zusammen. Die Bejahung dieser Selbstiindigkeit muss 
daher auch das Problem der Unsterblichkeit in eine eigentiimliche 
Beleuchtung stellen; der Unsterblichkeitsglaube zieht dann seine 
Kraft nicht aus den Wunschen und Bediirfnissen des blossen 
Menschen, sondern aus der Eroffnung eines ewigen und unendlichen 



198 Eucken does not recognize the existence of a supernatural order in the 
Christian signification of the term. 
198 Paul, Cor., Chap. XIII, V, 12. 
200 Main Currents, pp. 327, 328. First italics are ours; second, Eucken's. 



74 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

Lebens in ihm; wem sich solches Leben erschloss und was an ihm 
teilgewann, das kann nicht schlechthin der Zeit verfallen sein. 
Hat das Ganze des Geisteslebens eine Gegenwart in uns gewonnen 
und ein selbstandiges Leben in uns geschaffen, so wird es dieses 
irgendwie auch erhalten, indem es damit sich selbst erhalt. In 
diesem zusammenhange ist es das Geistesleben selbst, von dem aus 
sich die Uberzeugung eines Beharrens begriindet und aus dem 
sie ihre Gewissheit schopft, das in ahnlichem Gedankengange, 
wie ihn Augustin in den Worten bekundet : 'Fin sich selbst kann 
nicht untergehen, was filr Gott nicht untergeht (sibi non perit 
quod deo non perit).' Dann diirfen wir aber die Ewigkeit nicht 
erst jenseits des Grabes beginnen lassen, sondern wir haben anzuer- 
kennen, dass sie schon hier uns umf angt und sich von uns aneignen 
lasst." 201 

The conclusion of this passage betrays the influence of Kant, 
and may be contrasted with the teaching of the Scholastics who 
hold that every soul is endowed with personal and therefore indi- 
vidual immortality, and is destined, if faithful to the Moral Law 
during its earthly term of existence, to lead after death a more 
complete and perfect life. Since the soul is immortal we may say 
in one sense that immortality does, in fact, begin in this life — i.e., 
the soul's immortality; nevertheless the full blessedness of immor- 
tality belongs to the state after death. 

2. The second point to which we wish to call attention is the 
peculiarity of the circumstances under which the "Gemiit" is 
experienced. 

Pessimism 

The conviction "dawns," according to Eucken, when the "danger" 
is at "the very brink of a precipice." In this extreme of peril the 
fact of the Eternal Spiritual is an "axiomatic certainty." But 
why is it not self-evident before this drastic extreme is reached? 
Why may not man when his powers are developed have an 
"axiomatic certainty" of, i.e., intuit, the spiritual, even amid peace 
and harmony ? Is it not true that for the artist, the contemplation 
of some scene of quiet beauty, with his own simultaneous convic- 
tion that his nature is capable of appreciating infinitely more than 
all that, is, at least, as ripe a moment for the dawning of the 
"axiomatic certainty" as the one which Eucken describes? The 
. WliM 

201 Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensangschauung, op. cit., pp. 158, 159. 
See also Essay on Immortality in Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, p. 836, and in 
Collected Essays, ed. by Booth, New York, 1914, pp. 193 sqq. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 75 

element of opposition which we find within ourselves may be a 
powerful factor in determining our knowledge of a spiritual 
reality, but it is not an essential attribute of the concept. Eucken 
exaggerates alike the difficulties of recognizing the existence of the 
spiritual, and of leading a life in accordance with such knowledge. 
Every Christian, indeed every earnest man, must agree as to 
the imperative necessity of saying the powerful "nay" to the 
lower part of our nature, and of adding the energetic "yea" 202 
which affirms the higher, but no true Christian will grant that 
"All doubt and sorrow . . . must fall with their whole energy 
on the soul of the individual after the inauguration of an Absolute 
Life within man's domain has immeasurably raised him," 203 
nor that the man who realizes the fact of a spiritual reality "sees," 
thereby, "all his work and being placed under a pointed contra- 
diction which limits his actions, which renders his feelings uncer- 
tain, and which makes his whole existence problematic." 204 
These passages breathe a pessimism which is unchristian. The 
recognition of the existence of the Absolute Spiritual, and of man's 
relation with Him, 205 so far from rendering one's existence prob- 
lematic, throws the necessary light upon it, and upon the entire 
world. History proves this: A St. Paul, a St. Augustine, a St. 
Francis of Assissi, a St. Teresa, a St. Ignatius Loyola found their 
problem solved as soon as they had made the Spiritual Life their 
one aim and end. The struggle against lower nature had not 
ceased but their ignorance of life's full meaning for themselves 
and others was dissipated. The Absolute Spiritual Life makes 
Itself felt in the soul as the Spirit of light and peace. It is true 
that Christ warns us against false peace: "Think ye, that I am 
come to give peace on earth? I tell you, no; but separation." 206 
We must take these words in their context, and understand them 
in the light of all His teachings. Sacrifices, bitter to nature, are 
demanded from him who would lead a truly spiritual 207 life, and 



202 See Truth of Religion, op. cit., pp. 248, 353, 441, 528 (Wahrheitsgehalt 
der Rel., pp. 169, 244, 307, 355); Christianity and the New Idealism, pp. 75-79, 
op. cit. (Hauptprobleme, pp. 81-85); Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., 
pp. 185-187 (Grundlinen, pp. 89, 95, 127, 128 sqq.; 140 sqq.). 

203 Truth of Religion, p. 344. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 237.) 

204 Ibid., p. 344. (Wahrheitgehalt der Rel., p. 238.) 

205 We are using Christian terms, Eucken would say with It. 

206 St. Luke, Chap. XII, 51. 

207 We are following Eucken closely at this point into the field of religion: 
it is not necessary to remark that from a philosophical standpoint every human 
being must, to some extent, lead a spiritual life, whether he will it or not, for 
the reason that the spiritual is of his very nature. 



76 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

hard conflicts must be endured, but accompanying them is a peace, 
and even a sweetness, which tempers the suffering. St. Paul 
alludes to it when he wishes the Faithful that "peace of God which 
surpasseth all understanding." 

This is not the place for a treatise on the happiness of a truly 
Christian life: we merely seek to refute Eucken's statement as to 
the effect of what he terms "the inauguration of an Absolute 
Life." 208 

It is significant that Eucken's deepest and, according to some, 
most valuable work — Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion — from 
the English translation of which the above passage has been 
cited — is stamped by a dark and gloomy ir rationalism. Hermann 
criticizes very mildly when he writes that it "leaves a cloud of 
misgiving upon the spirit." 209 

If it were true that we were engaged in a "seemingly impossible 
struggle for a spiritual self — for a soul and meaning of life," 210 
few indeed would be the number of those who would persevere 
until "a new wave of life universal . . . which carries man into 
entirely other bearings, and which is a flowing tide that heralds 
the inauguration of a better day" appeared. 211 

Eucken tells us that we not only can, but must be Christians : 
"Unsere Frage war, ob wir heute noch christen sein konnen? 
Unsere Antwort ist, dass wir es nicht nur konnen, sondern sein 
miissen." 212 

To his disheartening exposition of our spiritual condition we 
oppose, therefore, the direct teaching of the Founder of Chris- 
tianity: "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and 
I will refresh you. Take up My yoke upon you . . . and you 
shall find rest to your souls. For my yoke is sweet and my burden 
light," 213 and again: 

"Seek and you shall find." 214 



208 rpjjg p ecu liar phraseology of the cited passage is indicative of Eucken's 
pantheistic tendency. 

209 Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99. 

210 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 62. Italics ours. The German text runs 
"in dem schweren, ausserlich fast aussichtslosen Karapf um ein geistiges 
Selbst, um eine Seele und einen Sinn seines Lebens." Wahrheitsgehalt der 
Rel., p. 42. 

211 Ibid., p. 62. (Wahreitsgehalt der Rel., p. 42.) 

212 Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein? p. 236. 

213 Matthew, Chap. XI, verses 28-30. 

214 Matthew, Chap. VII, 7. 



Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 77 

Perhaps no writer on philosophy in modern times has taken 
more pains to introduce a note of gladness into his work than 
Eucken. This strikes us forcibly in the Problem of Human Life 
(Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker). His allusions 
to joy of spirit, in one form or another, are numerous — although 
it is often impossible to endorse his application of the term — and 
they mark his approval of the man, or views, under consideration. 
The following phrases may be noted: "a fresh and glad spirit;" 215 
"the whole of existence [becomes] filled with an exalted joy;" 219 
"gladness and joy of life;" 217 "force and activity and joyous 
assertion;" 218 "activity, joy and love;" 219 "youthful freshness 
and joy;" 220 "courageous and joyful outlook;" 221 "joyful grati- 
tude;" 222 "A new joy," "a larger gladness." 223 

Luther is described as introducing a change from which springs 
"a new life full of fresh and glad activity." 224 

Even a meagre knowledge of the facts of Luther's life, and of the 
scenes of bitter party strife amid which he moved, is sufficient to 
debar assent to this statement, apart altogether from the considera- 
tion of his religious principles. 225 



215 Prob. of H. Life, op. cit., p. 293 (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker: "ein 
Geist der Frische und Frohlichkeit," p. 280). 

216 Ibid., p. 310. 

217 Ibid., p. 345. 

218 Ibid., p. 370. 

219 Ibid., p. 377. 

220 Ibid., p. 418. 

221 Ibid., p. 462. 

222 Ibid., p. 475. 

223 Ibid., p. 475. 

224 Ibid., p. 276 (Lebensabschauung der g. Denker, p. 265). 

225 For the historical Luther refer to works by Janssen, Denifle, and Herman 
Grisar on Catholic side; to the biography of Kostlein on non-Catholic. See 
also "Luther in the Light of Facts," Cath. Univ. Bull., Feb., 1914, in which 
occurs the following passage: "Right in the beginning it can be stated . . . 
that the very cardinal principle of his religious system was debasing to humanity 
as such. That cardinal principle was the doctrine of the utter corruption of 
human nature due to original sin, and the consequent denial of free will. 
'Articulus omnium optimus et rerum nostrarum summa' in his own words. 
Along with these doctrines likewise went that other of Predestination. Man, 
according to him. was utterly incapable of doing good without supernatural 
grace: man has no freedom of choice even in the performance of works not 
connected with salvation. It is either God or the Devil that rules him. . . . 
Now with such a dismal and low estimate of human nature can Luther be 
legitimately regarded as in any sense an apostle of humanity, of human 
liberty, of human dignity or inherent worth? Pushed to its logical conclusion 
such a doctrine would debase man below the most devil-ridden superstitious 
savage. What becomes of human dignity or intrinsic natural nobility and 
daring and Promethean struggle upwards, of human development and progress, 
of aspirations for liberty, for light, for anything that mankind h:ts ever attained 



78 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

Of Zwingli he writes: "though his practical tendency might 
easily result in a confusion of religion and politics, indeed, of 
religion and the constabulary, still, the peculiar significance of 
this simple and healthy, fresh and buoyant Christianity should 
have permanent recognition." 226 This is an excellent example of 
unconscious burlesque; it is also a good instance of one of Eucken's 
misnomers. 

Notwithstanding the tremendous toil and arduous effort which 
the philosopher has bestowed on his system, "Activism" is a 
joyless creed, and the implications imbedded in its principles lead 
to a pessimism more extreme than that of Schopenhauer. 

We have already referred 227 to the weak treatment — or lack of 
treatment — of the most difficult and important problem which 
the philosopher of the spiritual has to face — the existence of evil; 
the following passage may be taken as typical of the manner in 
which Eucken recoils when confronted with fundamental issues: 
"Also, in spite of his guilt and in the midst of his guilt God must 
be near to man. Dare we for this reason ascribe guilt to God? 
All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of religion 
becomes inevitably a rationalism and a treatment of the problem 
by means of human relationships and according to human stand- 
ards. Such a rationalism would have injured religion for more than 
it has already done were not life itself raised beyond all the disputa- 
tion of ideas through the inner abiding energy of the Divine. 
It is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness 
of God in human suffering and His help in the raising of life out of 
suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason. 
Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the 
less does it combine into a dogmatic speculation, and the purer 
and more energetically is it able to work." 228 

in his age-long painful struggle from barbarism to civilization, if he were as 
Luther would have him — a hopelessly corrupt being, devoid of spiritual 
liberty as a mere animal, utterly incapable of himself of doing good, the mere 
sport of either a devil that mocks bim or of a God that damns him without 
mercy, a plaything in the hands of fate, an automaton? Such doctrine ipso 
facto kills every aspiration of humanity. It halts human progress more 
effectually than Confucianism. It would paralyze every noble aspiration and 
stop every wheel of progress. Is it not, therefore, more correct to say that 
humanity has progressed since Luther's day in spite of Luther anism?" (p. 108). 

226 p roD> jj. Life., op. cit., p. 293. Italics are ours. (Lebensanschauung der 
g. Denker, p. 280.) 

227 P. 61 . 

228 Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 434. Italics are ours. Wahrheitsgehalt 
der Rel., pp. 301, 302: 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 79 

This fallacious reasoning needs little criticism; the flaws are 
self-evident. 

(1) As rational beings we cannot be content with an irrational 
religion wherein the sanctity of the Deity is in jeopardy. 

(2) The "inner abiding energy of the Divine" cannot raise man 
"beyond all the disputation of ideas" in such a manner as to 
make contradictories reconcilable, because God is Eternal Truth. 229 

(3) Eucken has used "human suffering" and "guilt" as inter- 
changeable terms. 

(4) The last paragraph states gratuitous assumptions without 
any evidence to support them. 

Materialism 

3. The materialistic language which Eucken employs in describ- 
ing the "Geistesleben" is too significant to pass unnoticed. A 
philosopher has the right to use a metaphor when by so doing he 
makes his meaning clearer, but he is not justified in giving an 
exposition of what he holds to be spiritual life in terms of material- 
ism. This, however, is what Eucken does in a large majority of 
instances, as an examination of several of the passages already 
cited will show. If by "a kernel of our nature that can never get 
lost" ("ein unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens") 230 Eucken 
refers to man's spiritual soul his language is most misleading: 
if he does not intend to imply that man possesses a spiritual soul, 

"Auch die Religion kann nicht an der einen Stelle geben ohne an der 
anderen zu nehmen; so muss das unmittelbare Verhaltnis zu Gott Schaden 
leiden, wenn das Heil von der Vermittlung erwartet wird; ja die Meinung, 
das Gbttliche helfe nicht aus eignem Wollen und Vermogen, sondern miisse 
erst durch besondere Mittel dazu angeregt sein, kann leicht die Grundlage 
aller Religion verdunkeln: die unmittelbare Gegenwart der unendlichen Liebe 
und Gnade. Auch wird eine Schuld dadurch nicht aufgehoben, dass ein 
anderer die Folgen auf sich nimmt, sondern nur durch die Schopfung eines 
neuen Lebens. Alle dogmatische Formulierung der Probleme ftihrt gegen die 
eigne Absicht leicht zu einer Rationalisierung, zugleich aber zu einer 
Behandlung aus den menschlichen Verhaltnissen heraus und nach dem Masse 
des Menschen; dieser Rationalismus wiirde die Religion weit mehr geschiidigt 
haben, als er es in Wirklichkeit tat, hatte nicht das Leben selbst immer wieder 
durch die ihm innewohnende gcittliche Kraft alle Irrung der Begriffe iiberwun- 
den. Der religiosen Uberzeugung genilgt die Niihe Gottes im Leid, seine 
Hilfe aus dem Leid durch die Erhebung in ein neues, aller Irrung Ubcrlegenes 
Leben; je einfachcr diese notwendige Wahrheit gefasst wird, je weniger sie 
sich mit dogmatischer Spekulation verquickt, desto reiner und kraftiger 
kann sie wirken." 

229 Refer to Truth of Rel., op. cit., p. 446, "All spiritual Life is here a struggle 
against the flux of time — an ascent to eternal and immortal truth." (Wahr- 
heitsgehalt der Rel., p. 311.) 

230 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. 



80 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

in the full and accepted meaning of the words, he is but restating 
one of the truths of science, viz., the indestructibility of matter: 
there is no need of a special revelation, whether in the form of 
"personal immediacy" or otherwise, to make us cognizant of the 
fact. The following citations may be studied in this connection: 
in our opinion they either fail to convey an idea owing to the 
conjunction of incompatible terms, or they suggest movements in 
matter : 

"Nur bei der Richtung auf das Geistesleben befindet sich der 
Lebensprozess auch in dem Aufstreben bei sich selbst, denn er geht 
j a auf nichts anderes als auf das eigne innerste Wesen des Mens- 
chen." 231 

"Werden wir damit zu freien Mitarbeitern, ja zu Mittrdgern des 
Alls berujen" . . . 232 

"Mit jener Wendung gewinnt die ganze Wirklichkeit einen 
inneren Zusammenhang und eine Tiefe; der Fortgang unserer 
Welt aber erscheint, wenigstens in den entscheidenden Wende- 
punkten, nicht als ein einfaches Hervorgehen des Hoheren aus 
dem Niederen, sondern als ein Weitergetriebenwerden und eine 
innere Erhohung aus dem Ganzen des Alls." 233 

"Wie aber steht diese Welt, dieser Lebensprozess, an dem wir 
teilgewinnen, zum All, und was bedeutet sie ihm? Gewiss erfassen 
wir sie nur innerhalb des Bereichs des Menschen, aber dieser 
Bereich braucht keineswegs einen geschlossenen Sonderkreis zu 
bilden, ganz wohl kbnnte in ihn sich uriendliches Leben erstrecken, 
und etwas, das in ihm vorgeht, zugleich eine Beivegung des Alls 
bedeuten. 234 

"Dass so innerhalb des Menschen sich eine Umwalzung vollzieht 
und ein neues Leben durchbricht, das muss auch sein Gesamtbild 
verandern, er ist nun nicht mehr ein blosser Punkt, sondern ein 
Mitbesitzer der Welt." 235 

It is needless to multiply passages from Eucken's various works 
since his entire system is expounded in this manner. His imagery 
is not conducive to ideas of the spiritual. Although the philosophic 
truths which he holds to be the corner-stone of Activism — viz, the 
existence of an independent Spiritual Life, and the reality of 
human freedom and responsibility — entitle him to a position far 

231 Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., 118. (Truth of Religion, op. cit., 
p. 172.) 

232 Ibid., p. 119. Italics ours. (Truth of Religion, p. 173.) 

233 Ibid., p. 169. (Truth of Religion, p. 274.) 

234 Ibid., p. 109. Italics ours. (In Truth of Religion, 1911, this passage 
does not occur but the general purport of the section is unaffected. See part II, 
Chap. VII, 2a, pp. 156-163.) 

235 Erkennen und Leben, op. cit., p. 125. Italics ours. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 81 

superior to that of Spinoza, nothing throughout his numerous 
volumes can be found so suggestive of the spiritual ideal as are the 
happy expressions of the earlier philosopher: Sub specie aeterni- 
tatis; 236 amor intellectus; beata immortalitas. 

It may be objected that Eucken insists on the reality of Infinite 
Love and Mercy; Redeeming Grace, etc.; this is true, but he does 
not employ these truths of Christianity in the exposition of the 
development of the Life-Process to self-realization: they are 
reverted to later for ethical purposes: moreover in his monistic 
system, as has been pointed out already, they can have no place; 
the words become vain phrases devoid of all real content. Indeed 
Eucken himself assures us that he is not referring to Christian 
dogma : 

"Wir konnen auch die gottliche Liebe und Gnade nicht von der 
einen Erweisung in Jesus Christus abhangig machen, wir mtissen 
weiter die Vorstellungen, welche den Aufbau jener dogmatischen 
Lehren tragen, namentlich die von dem Zorne Gottes, den erst das 
Blut Seines Sohnes beschwichtigt, als viel zu anthropomorph und 
mit reineren Begriffen von der Gottheit unvereinbar verwerfen." 237 

Dr. Yorke Fausset, whom we have already cited, commenting 
on this passage writes : "To an English Churchman it seems passing 
strange that a profound German thinker should thus unconsciously 
travesty the doctrines of the Creed." In the same article he 
criticizes Eucken's "rather supercilious depreciation of the 
Christian documents." 238 

What shadow of a meaning does Eucken wish to convey by 
the words "Redeeming Grace?" We can hardly look to them for 
light on the nature of the "unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens." 
Hence even if the supposed "immediacy" were a trustworthy 
source of truth its revelations would be too vague and problematic 
to afford a rational basis for life or religion. 

Further Consequences 

Two other points maybe noticed: (1) at the heightened tension 
at which the spiritual, according to Eucken, manifests itself in a 
form of "immediacy" the vicious man seems to have a better 

236 This is to be found in some of his works — borrowed from Spinoza. The 
image suggested to the writer by the reading of certain passages in Der Wahr- 
heitsgehalt der Religion was that of a walk in a blinding storm of sleet, where 
one is obliged to force an advance in the teeth of a violent wind. 

237 Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein?" op. cit. p., IKfi. Italics ours. 
"< Op. cit.. pp. 8S, 35. 



82 KUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

chance of becoming a "self-conscious spirituality" than the 
virtuous: those attracted by kindness, goodness, love, appear to 
be the least favorably situated. (2) There is absolutely no place 
in Eucken's philosophy for the little ones whom Christ especially 
honored: "Suffer the little children to come unto Me and forbid 
them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven." 239 

These, at least, have not encountered bitter oppositions and 
"intolerable contradictions" either within or without. Christ 
Himself, both by word and act, taught that children truly possess 
a spiritual life and are destined to immortality. The susceptibility 
of the child to religious influence, the quick response of the young 
heart to the teachings concerning the great Father of all are facts 
too well known to need development. The innocence and ingenu- 
ousness of childhood seem better able to lay hold on spiritual 
realities than is the philosophic research of maturer years as our 
Divine Lord tells us : 

"I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because 
Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast 
revealed them to little ones." 240 

We may note also those other words: 

"And he that shall receive one such little child in My name, 
receiveth Me. But he that shall scandalize one of these little ones 
that believe in me, it were better for him that a mill-stone should be 
hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth 
of the sea." 240 * 

"See that you despise not one of these little ones." 241 

Yet Eucken's principles seem to necessitate the ranking of 
children among those whose "centre of gravity," according to him, 
falls in the "temporal," not in "the eternal." 242 



239 Matthew, Chap. XIX, Verse 14. 

240 Matthew, XI, Verse 25. 

240a Matthew, XVIII, Verses 5, 6. We have italicized part of verse 6. 

241 Matthew, XVIII, Verse 10. 

242 See Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, p. 271. "Wie weit aber das 
Leben sie iiberwindet und eine uberzeitliche Gegenwart erreicht, das hangt 
vor allem an der geistigen Kraft, die es aufzubieten vermag; bei uns selbst 
steht es schliesslich ob der Schwerpunkt unseres Seins ins Vergangliche oder 
ins Unvergangliche fallt." 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 83 

Conclusion 

We reject the "immediacy" of Activism because, (1) in this 
theory it is necessarily a purely subjective phenomenon; 243 (2) 
even if it were a trustworthy source of truth its revelations would 
be too vague and problematic, as has been already pointed out, 
to afford a solid basis for life or religion. 

We must reject, further, Eucken's account of the circumstances 
under which the existence of the Supreme Spiritual Life is inti- 
mately realized by man, if the account is held to be complete and 
exhaustive. Doubt and keen mental suffering may sometimes 
be the antecedent states to such realization, but they are not 
always so : to maintain the contrary would be to deny the possibility 
of knowledge of the Spiritual Life to a large majority. 



243 Cf. Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das Gesamtbild des neuen Lebenssystems, 
p. 471, where Eucken illogically refuses to accept the consequences of his 
theory: "Mehr noch als bis dahin wird damit das menschliche Leben auf die 
Innerlichkeit des Geistes gestellt, man konnte von einer Wirklichkeit des 
Gemiites sprechen, wenn darunter nicht leicht eine bloss subjektive und 
individuelle Begleitung des Lebensprozesses verstanden wiirde, wahrend die 
Innenwelt des Geisteslebens und der Geistesarbeit notwendig eine zentrale 
und beherrschende Stellung verlangt." 



CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF NATURE 

In close connection with the genesis of our knowledge of the 
spiritual we may call attention to Eucken's extraordinary attitude 
with regard to nature. We have already dealt with the cosmo- 
logical 244 aspect, in so far as was necessary for our present purpose; 
we shall treat the matter very briefly from a teleological or religious 
standpoint. 

The beauties of the material universe which have raised the 
hearts and minds of poets, artists, saints, in every age and every 
clime, swiftly and surely to spiritual realities find no home in this 
philosophy; they are not welcome even as stepping-stones to 
"higher things." 

Hostility to Nature 

In accordance with the entire trend of his thought Eucken's 
attention is arrested less by the continuous benefits which accrue 
to man from nature, than by the occasional calamities which 
befall him from the same source: the waving crop receives little 
notice until the advent of the sudden storm which destroys it. 
In Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion he writes : 

"Die Zwecke und Werte des Geisteslebens scheinen fur das blinde 
Getriebe der Naturgewalten nicht vorhanden; diese kennen keinen 
Unterschied von gut und bose, von gerecht und ungerecht, von 
innerer Grosse und Kleinheit. Erdbeben und Wasserfluten 
vernichten blfihendes Geistesleben wie im Spiel; Pest und Hungers- 
not halten ihre Ernte unbekummert um menschliches Wohl und 
geistige Werte. Nirgends weist die Natur fiber sich selbst hinaus 
auf eine hohere Ordnung; . . . sie bildet ein geschlossenes, 
nur mit sich selbst befasstes Reich. Wie eine ratselhafte Sphinx 
steht sie vor unseren Augen: unermiidlich Leben gebarend und 
Leben zerstorend, langsam bereitend, rasch vernichtend, iursorg- 
lich und gleichgfiltig, wohlwollend und grausam zugleich, die 
Geschopfe bald einander befreundend, bald zu unerbittlichem 
Kampf gegeneinander hetzend, zugleich schutzende und zerstor- 
ende Waffen schmiedend, nach einem alten Ausdruck weniger 
eine Mutter als eine Stiefmutter ihrer Kinder. Ein unverwfist- 
licher Trieb zum Leben, aber in aller Erregung und Bewegung 
kein Beisichselbstsein, kein Ffirsichleben, daher kein echter 



214 See Part II, Chap. II. 
84 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 85 

Ertrag, kein Sinn, keine Vernunft des Ganzen, ein leidenschaftliches 
Spiel um Nichts und abermals Nichts. Freilich nicht ohne alle 
Vernunft, denn es erfolgt ja alles Wirken der Natur in einfaehen, 
unverbriichlichen Grundformen und in strenger Verkettung des 
Geschehens, es erfolgt gesetzlich und kausal. Das ist eine Ver- 
nunft, gewiss, aber doch nur eine formale Vernunft, die gegen den 
Inhalt des Geschehens gleichgiiltig ist. Aueh die schmerzlichste 
Zerstbrung des Lebens, die Entstehung entsetzlicher Missbild- 
ungen, die Vererbung schwerer Krankheiten erfolgt gemass jenen 
Gesetzen und in kausaler Ordnung. Was ist das aber fur eine 
Vernunft, die so ihr Vermogen sachlicher un vernunft dienen lasst? 
. . . Konnten wir nur aller Unsicherheit der ausseren Lage ein 
gefestiges Innenleben entgegenhalten!" 245 

"Vor allem geht das Anliegen des Menschen darauf, durch die 
tiberweltliche Macht in seinem Streben zur Geistigkeit gefordert 
zu werden, gefordert namentlich in dem harten Kampf gegen eine 
fremde, undurchsichtige, ubermachtige Welt." 2i6 

"Kleine Zufalle zerstoren Leben und Lebensgliick, ein Augen- 
blick vernichtet den Ertrag miihsamster Arbeit. Oft auch ein 
chaotisches Durcheinander, ein rasches Umschlagen der Geschicke, 
eine scheinbare Gleichgiiltigkeit gegen alles menschliche Wohl 
und Webe, ein blindes Umhertappen ; dabei stets verhangnisvolle 
Mbglichkeiten wie dunkle Wolken iiber dem Menschen schwebend 
und bisweilen niederfahrend wie ein zerschmetternder Blitz." 247 

In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal he expresses the same views : 

"We see now with complete clearness the indifference of the 
forces of nature towards the aims of the spirit; we see the incessant 
crossing of the work of reason by blind necessity; we see the 
spiritual life divided against itself, eminent spiritual powers drawn 
into the service of lower interests, and carried away by unre- 
strained passion." 248 

"If nature simply follows its own tendencies; if, indifferent to 
value and lack of value, without aim and ideal, nature lives its 
life of soulless movement, union with an order so alien and im- 
penetrable must most seriously affect the spiritual life. The world 
goes on its course unconcerned with the weal or the woe, the per- 
sistence or the disappearance of spiritual being, of spiritual rela- 
tions, indeed of spiritual life in general. Not only do great 
catastrophes, as in earthquakes, storms, and floods, show how 
indifferent the existence or the non-existence of spiritual life is to 
the forces of nature, but the commonplaces of everyday experience 
and of individual destiny also show the same indifference. In 

246 Op. cit., pp. 201, 202. (Truth of Rel., pp. 292-2!)-!.) 
2 "' Ibid., p. 224. Italics ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 326.) 

247 Ibid., p. 226. (Truth of Re)., p. 328.) 

248 Op. cit., p. 20. (Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung, p. 12, 
top.) 



86 EUDOLP EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

nature we find no difference of treatment in accordance with any 
distinction of good and evil, great and mean, noble and vulgar. 
Even the most eminent personality, who may be almost indispen- 
sable to our spiritual welfare, is subject to the same contingency, 
the same fate as all others. Regarded from the point of view of the 
world of sense, all spiritual life is a chaotic confusion of fleeting 
appearances, all of which are dependent; it is not an independent 
world, but a subsidiary addition to a world which is other than 
spiritual." 249 

"We feel the rigid actuality of occurrences, the indifference of 
the machinery of the world towards the aims of the spirit, and the 
contradictions of existence. . . . we . . . feel . . . our bond- 
age to obscure powers and at the same time our insignificance." 250 

Identification of Nature and Human Nature 

As we examine Eucken's account of nature we are struck by the 
suggestion of a certain wilfulness in its resistance to the claims of 
the spiritual. This suggestion is intensified by the practical 
identification of nature and human nature in his analysis of the 
"human spiritual." A passage in Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion 
states his position : 

"Auch die Stellung des Menschen verandert sich wesentlich, 
wo alle Grosse und alles Gelingen seines Lebens von der Teilnahme 
an einem iibermenschlichen Geistesleben abhangt. Zunachst 
erscheint er stark gegen die iibliche Fassung herabgesetzt. Pfleg- 
ten wir bei-ihrn den Scheidepunkt der Welten anzunehmen und ihm 
in seiner eignen Natur einen unvergleichlichen Wert beizumessen, 
so wird das nun hinfallig. Denn das Neue und Hohere liegt in 
dem Geistesleben, als der Eroffnung einer selbstandigen Innenwelt, 
nicht in dem Menschen als solchem. Lange, lange Zeiten verlasst 
er kaum den Bereich der Natur, und wenn schliesslich Geistesleben 
bei ihm erscheint, so ist es nicht sowohl sein eignes Werk als die 
Mitteilung jener iiberlegenen Stufe. Wenn sich ferner Geistes- 
leben im Bereich des Menschen entwickelt, so wird keineswegs 
dieser ganze Bereich dafiir gewonnen. Vielmehr verbleibt die 
niedere Art, leistet hartnackigen Widerstand und zieht das Geistes- 
leben zu sich herab; so wird der Durchschnittsstand der einer 
Halbgeistigkeit, dem eben das Grosse und Eigentiimliche des 
Geisteslebens fehlt. Solche schiirfere Scheidung des Menschen 
vom Geistesleben stellt auch die einzelnen Aufgaben in eine neue 
Beleuchtung und steigert iiberall die Spannung der Arbeit. So 
darf z. B. nun und nimmer die Moral als eine natiirliche Eigen- 

249 Ibid., pp. 263, 264. (Grundlinien, p. 123.) 

250 Ibid., p. 301. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 191.) 



EUDOLP EtTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 87 

schaft des Menschen gelten . . . sie [echte Moral] aber wird 
erst moglich vom Geistesleben aus, und der Aufstieg zu ihr bleibt 
eine fortwahrende Aufgabe, die nur zum kleinsten Teile gelingt. 
So erfolgt durchgangig die entscheidende Wendung innerhalb des 
Menschenlebens, nicht schon mit seinem ersten Erscheinen. Das 
alles besagt ohne Zweifel eine Demutigung des Menschen als 
blossen Menschen. Aber der Herabsetzung entspricht eine 
Erhbhung, insofern sich ihm die Moglichkeit des Teilhabens an 
einer neuen Stufe der Wirklichkeit und zugleich an einem Gesamt- 
leben erofnet, das iiber den Verwicklungen des menschlichen Kreises 
liegt. Nun kann alles, was das Geistesleben auszeichnet; die 
Universalitat, die Souveranitat, die Autonomie, auch zum Besitze 
des Menschen werden, der zu ihm vordringt; nun kbnnen die 
geistigen Inhalte sich abheben von der blossmenschlichen Lebens- 
form." 251 

In Life's Basis we read: "we see something grow up within the 
human sphere which leads man beyond himself, and which is valid 
not simply for him but even in opposition to him. The whole 
matter bristles with problems: from the point of view of the life 
of nature this new life must appear to be an insoluble riddle; . . . 
Along with this detachment of life from the mere individual and 
the mere subjectivity of man, there is a liberation from external 
ties, and the development of a self-conscious spirituality. 252 

As at the level of nature life is spent in the development of 
relations with the environment, in action and reaction, so the 
form of life in man remains bound, since the life of the soul cannot 
dissociate itself from the experience of sense. The apparent 
inwardness that is evolved at this level is simply an after-effect of 
sensuous feelings and desires. So far as the life of nature extends, 
the forces and laws of the life of the soul will only refine what the 
external world exhibits in coarser features. The mechanism of 
nature also extends into human life; natural impulses of conduct, 
as well as association of ideas, reveal the fact that the life of the 
soul is in complete dependence upon natural conditions. From 
this point of view it seems impossible that inwardness should ever 
become independent. The actual experience of human life, 
however, shows that what is thus regarded as impossible is indis- 
putably real." 253 

251 Op. cit., pp. 116, 117. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., pp. 169, 170.) 
262 See Grundlinien, p. 58. The remainder of the passage is somewhat 
altered in the 2d German ed., 1913. 
2 « Op. cit., pp. 123, 124. 



88 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Consequences 

We have not to criticize here Eucken's faulty analysis of human 
nature, nor his erroneous conception of man's spiritual endowment : 
the matter has been already briefly dealt with. Attention may 
be called, however, to the astounding assumptions which he makes 
in the above citations. If Eucken were correct we might well 
wonder who among our friends were "self-conscious spiritualities," 
and who were but "blosse Menschen." He, himself, finds nothing 
strange in such a problem. In Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion 
he writes: "wie oft erlischt alle geistige Regung schon innerhalb 
des Lebens, die Geistigkeit wird stumpf und matt, sie erstirbt 
fast noch bei Lebzeit des Menschen." 264 And in Life's Basis we read : 

"There is no greater contrast than that between simple disposi- 
tion and spiritual depth, between the man of mere sentiment, with 
his dependence and vacillation, and the personality rooted in an 
inner infinity." 255 

The contrast between a weak and a strong character is always 
striking; it is, however, a contrast in degree, not in nature as 
Eucken implies. A "man of mere sentiment," i. e., without a 
true, substantial, spiritual soul, which is the root of the sentiment, 
is a creation of the imagination, not a reality. 

Eucken voices the suggestion most clearly, perhaps, when he 
complains of "der Mangel an Liebe und Gerechtigkeit in der Welt 
und bei den Menschen," 256 and elsewhere he refers to the "want of 
affection in things." Dr. Caldecott in his appreciation of Eucken's 
Philosophy writes as follows: 

"We now come to a problem which looms large in Eucken's 
treatment: the lower levels of life, both in our human nature and 
in external nature, what are these? We might have thought 
that in a philosophy which begins so clearly with the One Cosmic 
Spirit who descends into finite spirits of the same nature we were 
dealing with the whole universe. But now there arises before us 
a realm to which we are not led by Eucken on this line of descent, 
but which presents itself unbidden, a non-spiritual range or kind 
of being. We call it Nature: as physical it envelops us, as 'mere 
human nature' it seems to be a part of ourselves. We know how 
difficult it was for the Classical German idealists to take nature 
into their account: how Hegel is alleged to have treated her as a 

"< Op. cit., p. 201. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 292.) 
m Op. cit., p. 72. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 42, towards end.) 
266 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. Italics ours. (Truth 
oj Rel., p. 61.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 89 

stepchild in the cosmic family; how, indeed, his high philosophy 
led him to a positive contempt of all that nature can show . . . 
Eucken himself alleges this contempt as a reason for renouncing 
Hegel's lead; but how does nature fare in Eucken's own Activism? 
Here are vast ranges of cosmic being which are accounted suffi- 
ciently honourable to be taken in hand by 'Spirit,' and after trans- 
formation to be admitted, it would seem, even into the life. They 
lack high values of their own, certainly; they are manifold, par- 
ticular, disconnected, conflicting; but at least they seem to have 
sufficient value to enable them to furnish material upon which 
'Spirit' can work. Indeed, in the chapter 'Growth of Man beyond 
Nature' in Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, Eucken gives a very fine 
account of the way in which stage after stage of improvement and 
elevation is effected in them. But it is a very marked feature of 
Eucken that he regards Nature with distrust and melancholy. 
Sometimes he speaks sadly of its indifference to the requirements 
of Spirit; at others he rises to indignation, speaking of its 'alien' 
character, its 'opposition,' its 'hostility,' and flat refusal to submit 
to organization. And his general estimate of what natural 
civilization, even as assisted by Spirit, has so far accomplished is 
a very low one. . . . We are bound to ask, what is Eucken's 
view both of the origin and of the persistence of this alien part 
of the Cosmos? What has become of his Monism, his unity of the 
Cosmic Spirit? It seems to me that we have here the most 
serious deficiency in Eucken's philosophy as a system. The 
widespread indifference of nature has proved the rock on which 
many an Idealist has suffered shipwreck before, but in Eucken's 
case there seems to be an inexplicable unconsciousness on his 
part that his bark is in peril. Apart from physical nature the 
lower ranges of mental life are outside his system, and present 
themselves in this alien and even hostile guise. Mr. Boyce 
Gibson tells us that he has called Eucken's attention to this, and 
that the deficiency of his interest in psychology is acknowledged 
by him; but it is plain that the far-reaching effect of this is not 
appreciated by Eucken : otherwise he could not continue at once to 
proclaim the all-sufficiency of his Spiritualism and to give forth 
incessant lamentations over the immensity of the oppositions to 
be encountered, the grievous burden of the task of overcoming 
them, and the prevalence of failure over success in the history 
of culture and civilization." 257 

Eucken's Proposed Goal — Monism 

Dr. Caldecott seems to us to touch the crux when he asks : 

"What has become of his Monism, his unity of the Cosmic 
Spirit?" In truth Eucken has proposed an impossible task, viz., 

257 Church Quart. Review, Religious Phil, of R. Eucken, London, April, 
1913, pp. 57-59. 



90 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

the identifications of two Orders of reality which are, in se, ulti- 
mately irreducible: there is absolute irreconcilability between his 
fundamental assumptions and his final goal. Insisting, often 
with the vigor of a Scholastic, on a real duality of nature 258 and 
spirit, he holds that the task of spirit is to overcome nature by 
assimilating and thus spiritualizing it. The following passage 
from Geistige Stromungen is an unmistakably clear statement of 
the proposed goal: "im Streben zu sich selbst bleibt das Geistes- 
leben zugleich mit der grossen Welt befasst, es kann sich selbst 
nicht finden, ohne diese an sich zu Ziehen, es kann nicht ruhen und 
rasten, bis es sie vollauf uberwunden und in sich aufgenommen hat. 
Darum ist all sein Gehalt zugleich eine Behauptung, die Behaupt- 
ung, das Letzte, Ganze, Allumfassende, der Kern der gesamten 
Wirklichkeit zu sein. Dies aber kann es nur sein, wenn die 
Weiterbildung, die es an den Dingen durch die Aneignung bewirkt, 
diese zur Hohe ihres eigenen Wesens flihrt, wenn der Gehalt des 
Geisteslebens die eigene Wahrheit der Dinge bedeutet. Das 
Geistesleben wird in sich selbst ein unertraglicher Widerspruch, 
wenn es neben und gegeniiber der Welt, nicht innerhalb ihrer 
steht, wenn nicht in der Wendung zu ihm sich die Wirklichkeit 
selbst vollendet. Die Anerkennung dessen versetzt unsere Welt 
in Fluss und verwandelt sie in ein Reich von aufsteigender 
Bewegung." 259 

There can be no doubt as to the literal meaning which Eucken 
intends these words to bear: the same thought is conveyed in 
similar language in his various works; and he recognizes, according 
to Boyce Gibson, the applicability of the term "Idealism" to his 
system. Gibson writes: 

"The following extract, which Professor Eucken kindly permits 
me to quote from a letter of April 19, 1907, sets this step of his 
[viz, the adoption of 'the activistic label as a distinctive philosoph- 
ical badge'] in a clear light. T fully recognize,' he writes, 'the 
advantages of the term 'Religious Idealism.' But the expression 
'Activism' has peculiar significance in relation to the spiritual 
condition of Germany today. . . . But the name is, after all, 
of little consequence; what matters is the meaning we attach to 
it.' " 26 ° 

Idealism is an ambiguous term being applied to such widely 



258 By "nature" Eucken understands the non-spiritual. As well as the material 
universe, therefore, including human organisms, man's sensuous, psychic life 
falls under the term. We hold that owing to the fact that sensuous and 
spiritual activities are, alike, modes of action of the one, indivisible, spiritual 
soul, it is practically impossible for any mental state of an adult to be wholly 
sensuous. 

269 Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, pp. !50, 31. Italics ours. 

260 Rudolph Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit.. Appendix, p. 170. footnote. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 91 

different systems of thought as those of Plato and Hegel, 261 but 
in the present instance, the meaning is evident; the "name" 
stands for spiritualistic monism as Booth points out in the Intro- 
ductory Note to Main Currents of Modern Thought: 

"Eucken's ultimate goal is a monism — not naturalistic, as it is 
hardly necessary to point out, but spiritualistic in character." 262 

Metaphysical Idealism even in its most favorable aspect — i.e., 
when, as with Berkely, it is grounded on the assumption that God 
and finite spirits alone exist 263 — defies alike popular and scientific 
experience; but when it starts from the Aristotelico-Scholastic 
principle of a duality of nature 264 and spirit, it presents — borrowing 
language from Eucken — "an unendurable contradiction." 265 

We may remark that Eucken recoils, baffled, from his attempt, 
and weakly acknowledges his failure in the following passage: 
"To be sure, the world of sense retains a certain independence; it 
resists a complete transformation into spiritual magnitudes, and 
our life, therefore, retains a certain restriction and impenetrabil- 
ity." 266 In these words he practically yields the entire situation, 
and yet, as Dr. Caldecott observes, on his part "there seems to be 
an inexplicable unconsciousness . . . that his bark is in peril." 267 



261 See article on Idealism by Otto Wilmann in Catholic Encyclopedia; 
Professor Creighton has also called attention to the point in his article in the 
Americana under this heading. 

262 Op. cit., p. 12. 

263 a s Father Maher points out, "God, without the intervention of a material 
world, could potentia absoluta immediately produce in men's minds states 
like to those which they experience in the present order. The only demonstra- 
tive argument against the Theistic Immaterialist is, that such a hypothesis 
is in conflict with the attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity. 
God could not be the author of such a fraud." Maher, Psychology, 1011, p. 
109, footnote. 

264 We use "nature" here in Eucken's signification of the term, i.e., to 
designate the non-spiritual. The Scholastics prefer to speak of matter and 
its forces. Eucken in der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion writes: 

"Das ist ein anderer Gegensatz als der von Kiirper und Seele, von Ausserem 
und Innerem, von raumlicher Ausdehnung und bewusster Tatigkeit, wie die 
Aufklarung ihn in den Vordergrund riickte." op. cit., p. 58. (Truth of Itel., 
p. 86.) See also Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 3. The consideration of material 
forces under the concept of the non-spiritual, whether these operate within 
or without the organism, renders the field covered by the term in each system 
practically co-extensive. Cf. Note 258. 

265 Geistige StrLimungen, op. cit., p. 30, "unertraglicher Widerspruch." 
Problem of Human Life, p. 286. (Lebensanschauung der g. Denker, op. cit., 
p. 273.) 

266 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 238. Italics ours. In tin- 
second German edition the wording and arrangement are much changed 
through here, Cf. Part II (Grundlegender Teil), but the ideas are the same. 
The reason of the change is indicated in the Preface to this edition. 

207 Loc. cit. 



92 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

From the effort to bridge this impassable chasm spring the most 
serious of the errors which disfigure Eucken's thought. The 
most telling in its effects is that which makes the spiritual nature 
of man the "existential form" of the Absolute Spiritual Life. 
Such a tenet, as has been already pointed out, must logically 
ascribe all guilt to the supreme Being, as to its source. Moral 
evil can result only through freedom, and freedom can come only 
from the spiritual life. Eucken terms freedom "die Grund- 
bedingung alles Geisteslebens." 268 

Where, however, the human spiritual is but a "centre-point" 
or a "concentration-point" — "einen Mittel- und Konzentrations- 
punkt," 269 of the Absolute Spiritual, the Absolute Spiritual, the 
only Free Being, is necessarily made responsible for the crime of 
the universe. On such an hypothesis crime, guilt and moral law 
are terms wholly devoid of meaning: the following passages reveal 
the Pantheism underlying it: 

Der Zusammenhang unserer Betrachtung verlangt eine Weiter- 
bewegung zunachst deshalb, weil der Mensch nicht in die Stufe 
der geistigen Individuality aufgeht, die uns bis dahin beschaftigte. 
Auch bei glanzendster Leistung umfangt diese Stufe ihn nicht 
ganz und gar, er kann dariiber hinausblicken, sich in andere 
Individualitaten versetzen und durch sie erganzen, er muss das 
tun, um dem Zufalligen und Problematischen seiner eignen Natur 
uberlegen zu werden, um bei sich selbst das Unechte ausscheiden, 
das Echte starken zu konnen. Von hier atis gelangt das Leben auf 
einen Standort, wo es die verschiedenen Kreise uberschaut und ihrer 
allerGehalt in eignen Besitz verwandelt, wo sich ihm die game Unend- 
lichkeit zusammenfasst und zu einem Beisichselbstsein wird. Hier 
bleibt das Leben auch in scheinbarer Wendung nach aussen immer 
mit sich selbst befasst, hier ist die Stufe der blossen Leistung 
sicher uberwunden, und es bildet die eigne Erhohung des Lebens 
das beherrschende Ziel alles Muhens. Das entspricht der christ- 
lichen Uberzeugung von einem unermesslichen Werte des Menschen 
in seiner reinen Innerlichkeit, der t)berzeugung, 'dass fur den Preis 
der ganzen Welt, nicht eine einzige Seele erkauft werden kann' 
(Luther); wie aber Hesse sich solche Schatzung rechtfertigen, 
stiege nicht in jener Tiefe der Seele eine neue Art des Lebens auf, 
erhobe sich hier nicht ein neues Reich, das den innersten Kern der 
gesamten Wirklichkeit bildet? Wie die Sache gewohnlich gefassl 
wird, als Empfehlung einer bloss subjektiven, von der grossen 

268 "Wie das rnoglich sei, wie aus Gnade Freiheit . . . entspringen kttnne, 
das iibersteigt als ein Urphanomen alle Erkliirung, es ist, als die Grundbedingung 
alles Geisteslebens, durchaus axiomatischer Art." Der Wahrheitsgebalt der 
Religion, op. cit., p. 155. (Truth of Rel., p. 22S.) 

• <v Der Wahrbeitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit.. p. 108. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 93 

Welt sich in eine private Klause zuriickziehenden und dort tatlos 
verharrenden Gesinnung, hat sie keinen geniigenden Grund, ja 
droht sie zu einer leeren Floskel und Phrase zu werden. Jene 
Schatzung erlangt ein gutes Recht nur, wenn in der Tiefe des 
Seelenlebens eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit aufgeht, und dies 
kann nicht aus der Kraft des blossen Punktes, sondern nur dadurch 
geschehen, dass hier unendliches Leben unendlichem Leben begegnet, 
dass sich an dieser Stelle ein Kreuzungs und Konzentrationspunkt 
unendlichen Lebens bildet. Ahnliches scheint Goethe in jenen 
merkwurdigen Worten vorzuschweben : 'Gott begegnet sich 
immer selbst; Gott im Menschen sich selbst wieder im Menschen. 
Daher keiner Ursache hat, sich gegen die Grossten gering zu 
achten.' 

Handlet es sich also nicht darum, das Leben auf einen besonderen 
Punkt zu beziehen und dessen Eigentiimlichkeit zu unterwerfen, 
sondern darum, es auf seine eigne Tiefe zu bringen und ihm einen 
Halt in sich selbst zu geben, so wird die Sache gewaltig schwer. 
Vollauf eignes Leben kann nur entstehen, wenn sich die Tatigkeit 
in Selbstbetatigung verwandelt, wenn sie ein lebendiges Selbst 
zum Ausdruck bringt, wenn die umfassende Einheit durch Heraus- 
arbeitung eines durchgehenden und beharrenden Lebens einen Kern, 
ein Wesen gewinnt und damit zum iibringen Leben wirkt, es 
darauf bezieht, es daran misst. Nur eine solche Scheidung und 
Wiederverbindung, eine solche innere Abstufung und Zuriick- 
beziehung des Lebens lasst die Frage nach einem Inhalt entstehen, 
nur wenn das umfassende Ganze sich die zerstreute Mannigfaltigkeit 
unterwirft und sich selbst in sie hineinlegt, erwachst eine in sich 
selbst beruhende Wirklichkeit. Ob solches Leben personliches Leben 
heissen darf, darilber lasst sich streiten. . . . es ware also keine 
Absonderung, sondern das gerade Gegenteil: innerste Verbindung 
mit den Dingen, ja mit der Unendlichkeit . . .So empfiehlt es 
sich vielleicht mehr, von autonomem Leben und von Autonomien zu 
sprechen; und liegt vornehmlich an der Tatsache, dass im Geistes- 
leben selbst eine Bewegung zur Bildung eines Kernes und zur Ver- 
wandlung in Selbstleben im Gange ist, und dass mit solcher 
Wendung des Lebensprozesses eine Innenwelt entsteht, die etwas 
ganz anderes bedeutet als die schattenhafte Innerlichkeit des auf 
sich beschrankten Subjekts." 270 

"Wohl hat auch sie anzuerkennen, dass ein beisichselbst befind- 
liches Leben und eine zeitiiberlegene Wahrheit im Menschenwesen 
irgendwie angelegt sein, als treibende Kraft in ihm wirken und 
ein Mass seines Unternehmens bilden muss." "Lebenskonzen- 
trationen entstehen und wachsen zu Autonomien." 271 



270 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., pp. 103-105. Italics are ours 
(Truth of Rel., 150-153.) 

271 Erkennen und Leben, pp. 98, 99. 



94 KlTDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

Conclusion 

The reflex of this peculiar form of Pantheism is found in Eucken's 
hostility to the physical world. Having failed to grapple with the 
problem of evil, 272 the suffering and misery in the world, which 
he so graphically describes, confront him as a baffling puzzle. 
He makes no distinction between the pain or loss which accrues 
to a man from the forces of Nature, and the wrong which a fellow- 
man deliberately inflicts on him except that the presence of the 
Spiritual Life in the second case makes the doer responsible and 
therefore renders the act more reprehensible. In each case, 
however, he finds a similar inappreciation of spiritual values, a 
similar "lack of righteousness," "der mangel an Liebe und Gerech- 
tigkeit." 273 

The uniformity of nature, which has uplifted countless minds to 
the unchanging Truth, proves an insuperable stumbling block to 
Eucken. Kant compared the Moral Law to the starry heavens 
"and found them both sublime," but Eucken rails at what he 
terms the blind mechanism of the natural process, "das blinde 
Getriebe der Naturgewalten." 274 

It is not surprising therefore, that the account which he gives 
of the genesis of our knowledge of the spiritual is unsatis- 
factory. The ideas of the Sublime, the Beautiful, the Infinite 
are essential elements in the content of our concept of a Supreme 
Spiritual Reality, but these are gathered from Nature. Christ 
Himself drew his similitudes from the physical universe, and called 
attention to its beauty : 

"Consider the lilies ... I say to you, not even Solomon in 

272 We are aware that Eucken devotes a large portion of his work Der 
Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion to this problem, but he makes no attempt at a 
solution. He exaggerates the misery of our human lot, and leaves his student 
in the most painful doubt as to the cause of the suffering. Although he draws 
so copiously from Sacred Truth on other occasions he refuses to accept its 
teaching on this point. He refers to the doctrine of original sin as "jene 
unglilckliche Lehre von der Erbsiinde, welche das Christentum zum Man- 
ichaismus herabzieht." Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 155. The reference to 
Manichaeism, however, and in fact the entire context show how erroneous his 
ideas of the Christian doctrine are. The allusion to Luther ("jene bedenkliche 
Meinung Luthers, dass der mensch die Gerechtigkeit nicht sowohl erlange 
als nur zugerechnet erhalte, eine Meinung, die, zu Ende gedacht, den grossen 
Weltkampf in blossen Schein und Spiel verwandeln wlirde," op. cit.) may 
be compared with a passage already cited from Luiher in the Light of Facts, 
vide footnote 225, p. 77. 

273 Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. 
iU Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 201. 



Rudolf Efcken and the Spiritual Life 95 

all his glory was clothed like one of these." 275 "Consider the 
ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap, neither have they 
storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them. How 7 much are you 
more valuable than they?" 276 

We may note here that Our Saviour uses the comparative 
degree. Man is more the object of the Creator's solicitude than 
all material objects, nevertheless these have a value in themselves, 
apart altogether from their spiritual cognition by man. Boyce 
Gibson holds that "Eucken's philosophy is essentially a Christian 
philosophy of life; a restatement and development in philosophical 
form of the religious teaching of Jesus." 277 

We do not propose to criticize such a view at any length: 
Eucken certainly borrows from the Gospel, and from the Fathers 
even, when it suits his purpose, but his own contribution renders 
the Gospel narrative void of all meaning, "Benedicite omnia 
opera Domini Domino" breathes the spirit of Christ, but the 
canticle 278 has no place in Eucken's system where nature and spirit 
are in an internecine warfare. Our English poet is nearer the 
Gospel spirit when he tells us that we may find : 

"tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in 
stones, and good in everything." 279 

»» Luke XII, Verse 27. 
278 Luke XII, Verse 24. 

277 R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 166. 

278 Canticum, Dan. III. 

279 Shakespeare, As You Like It, Act II, Sc. I. 



CONCLUSION 

Eueken's epistemological position is aptly criticized by Baron 
von Hiigel as follows: "Everywhere in this philosophy we find the 
assumption of a strictly Idealist Epistemology, and an insistence 
. . . upon this Idealism as the starting-point of every philosophy 
that has a right to count at all. ... in Epistemology, the present 
writer has been driven to think that an unprejudiced analysis of 
our actual knowing, the discoveries and requirements of modern 
times, the history of Epistemology itself and the evidences and 
needs of the spiritual life, conjointly clamor for a frank reconsidera- 
tion of the entire question, and even for some critically Realist 
conclusion. ... in knowledge we have the irreducible trinity 
of knower, known and knowing, since the distinctness and inde- 
pendence of the known from the knower and the knowing ever 
appears as a fundamental condition of anything being known, 
and as part of the information yielded by the analysis of the knowl- 
edge thus achieved." 280 

Although Eucken speaks of Von Hiigel in terms which he intends 
to be the highest praise, and has even devoted a special essay to 
a warm appreciation of his work, 281 the first formulation of his 
theory of knowledge, Erkennen und Leben, which appeared some 
months later than the article from which we have just cited, does 
not indicate that he profited by the criticism more than he did 
by the earlier one of Boyce Gibson. In the works since published 
or revised there is the same insistence on the overcoming (iiber- 
windung) of the difference between subject and object by a trans- 
cendence of the antithesis. 282 It is quite evident, however, that 
his desired goal is not ontological but religious. This accounts 
for his friendly acknowledgment of, yet entire disregard for, just 
criticism. 

Eucken is neither a natural philosopher nor a metaphysician. 
A cursory examination of Activism suffices to show the unfitness 
of the first title; his impatience of, and even contempt for ontology 
debars him from the second. Metaphysics without careful 
ontological speculation is an impossibility; hence the charge of 

tg0 Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, Hibbert Journal. April, 1912, 
pp. 667, C68. 
'-"■" Collected Essays, op. tit.. V1I1, p. 115. 
•"See Grundlinien, 2te Anil., 1913. p. 73. 
96 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 97 

German critics that his philosophy is not Wissenschaft but Kunst; 293 
hence Von Hugel's complaint that he treats "an abstraction as 
though, of itself, the most fruitful of realities." 284 

In so far as Eucken can be called a philosopher he must be 
ranked with the Moralists: we say "in so far as" because a system 
in which so many incompatible elements find a home is not 
strictly speaking philosophy at all. M. Alden points out that 
"his phraseology as an open air prophet often contradicts the 
most essential formulations of his philosophy." 285 

He himself, points out the ethical character (einen ethischen 
Charakter) of Activism. 286 He knows that he is morally right in 
recognizing the reality and claims of the Spiritual Life and heeds 
little whether he be metaphysically and psychologically wrong in 
his exposition of the same. He describes his own frame of mind 
in a passage already cited 287 from the Truth of Religion "so that 
he will found his religion upon this rock [i. e., 'the fundamental 
fact — man as a superior Whole'], weary throughout of the strife 
whether intellect, or will, or feeling, plays the main part in the 
concern." 

We have dealt with Eucken from the philosophical standpoint 
and have found that his theory is equally unsatisfactory in the 
fields of psychology, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. In 
concluding we shall touch on its religious aspect. 

Eucken's motto might be Excelsior, so often and with such 
vehemence does he insist on the necessity of transcendence. It 
cannot possibly be any ontological unity that he is interested in 
for the reasons already pointed out: the "inner life he identifies 
with religion," 288 and "man's deepest life" with "a kind of Theistic 
Absolutism." 289 

The transcendence which Eucken is striving after and vigor- 
ously, though incoherently, preaching is not only possible in the 
field of religion but has been perfectly accomplished wherever and 
whenever a Saint has lived. It is held up to us by the Church, 
is luminously explained in ascetic theology, and is mirrored most 



283 G. Wunderle, op. cit., p. 30 and footnote. 

284 Op. cit., p. 669. 

285 Op. cit., p. 61. 

286 Grundlinien, p. 144. 

287 See p. 72. 

288 H. M. Alden, op. cit., p. 58. 

289 Von Hiigel, op. cit., p. 665. 



98 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

vividly in the epistles of St. Paul. 2890 There is not any possibility of 
literally transcending the antithesis between subject and object, 
e.g., between a flower and the one who admires it, so that the 
difference between the two would not exist; but just as "the life" 
is "more than the food and the body more than the raiment," 290 
so the soul is incomparably more than earth's most precious treas- 
ures, and man can rise above created objects to contemplate their 
Infinite Source Who is Himself the Cause of all, Whose Divine 
Ideas are the prototypes of all, in Whom all Being is One and 
undifferentiated. The more the human spirit transcends all 
finite things by thought and desire and yearns for better knowledge 
of — even in the natural order — and closer union of will with the 
Supreme Infinite Spiritual Life, God, the more is the entire man 
perfected. It is true that even in the natural order such a life 
would bring an independence of the trivial, the "pettily human," 
and would be filled with a profound peace and a solid happiness 
unknown to the victims of passion and appetite. 

Nevertheless we have on the one hand an individual, substantial, 
spiritual soul, and on the other its Infinite Creator — not one, there- 
fore, but two; and if we take into our calculation the material 
goods that man has risen above we have three. Metaphysical 
monism of Eucken's type is an intrinsic impossibility. What 
matter is, in last analysis, we do not know, but that it is not, and 
never can be, spirit, we do know. Monism of purpose is a neces- 
sity, and the union of the soul with its Creator by conformity of 
thought and will is, even in the natural order, the supreme end of 
human life. Moreover it is the only fount of all true activism. 

A St. Peter Damien transcending the differences between him- 
self and the shapeless mass of hideous disease in whom he recognizes 
a fellow being, a brother, is no isolated example of Christ -like 
Activism, and in the spheres of Art, Letters, even Science, Geistige 
Arbeit spiritually inspired in the manner indicated, has ever been 
the preserving leaven. 

( luist Himself pointed out the path of transcendence when asked 
what was necessary for salvation. Thou .shall lore (he Lord thy 



289a Q ur analysis (if the Geistesleben shows, however, Imw little we a^ree 
with the following statement of Richard Roberts: "1 cannot help feeling 
thai tin' Pauline conception 'in Christ' is identical in all essential respects 

with Encken's idea of the universal spiritual life." Rudolf Eucken ami St. 
Paul, Contemporary Review, Vol. 97, Jan.. 1910, p. 71. 

3W Matthew, Chap. VI, *5. 



Rudolf Eucken axd the Spiritual Life 99 

God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with all thy 
mind and with all thy strength and thy neighbor as thyself for the 
love of God. The man who strives to fulfill these "two great 
commandments of the Law" is continually transcending the 
difference between subject and object, in that every attraction, 
every sweetness, every goodness, every loveliness, every beauty and 
perfection whatsoever of created objects he refers back to their 
Infinite Uncreated Source, and loves them because of their Source, 
and loves the Creator ever more because of the ever new knowledge 
acquired of Him through these created perfections. Thomas 
a Kempis in the twenty-first chapter of the third book of the 
Imitation unfolds this transcendence when praying to find his 
rest in the Absolute Spiritual Life: 

"Above all creatures, above all health and beauty, above all 
glory, all honor, all power, all dignity, all science, all penetration 
of mind, all riches; above all arts; above all joy and all diversions; 
above all reputation, all praise, all sweetness, all consolations, all 
hopes, all promises, all merits and all desires; above all the gifts 
and all the graces that You can give; . . . above all things 
visible and invisible; above all that is not what Thou art, Oh God!" 



PART III 

THE "PERMANENT FOUNDATION" OF A PHILOSOPHY 
OF THE SPIRITUAL 

In Which the Basic Principles of Knowledge and the Necessary 
Ground of All Truth and Reality are Exposed 



INTRODUCTORY NOTE 

Eucken's theory has failed all along the line. The question 
arises — Is there then no knowledge possible? No satisfactory 
solution of life and the universe? 

Eucken claims that Scholasticism will not meet the require- 
ments of today: he considers that it will not measure up to the 
needs of the modern thought-world. 

We recall here what has been already said (Part I, Chap. IV) — 
that the fundamental laws which govern the working of the human 
mind are unchangeable. If, therefore, the psychology and meta- 
physics of Scholasticism did really offer a satisfactory interpretation 
of life and the universe in the Middle Ages — and Eucken prac- 
tically grants that they did — it follows that that solution holds 
good today. 

In the two following chapters we shall unfold the Scholastic 
theory of knowledge and idea of truth : in Chapter III we shall give 
the Scholastic teaching with regard to the Foundation of all truth 
and reality: in Chapter IV we shall direct attention again to 
Eucken's challenge and point out its answer. 



CHAPTER I 

INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE 
GENERAL SURVEY 

It may be well to point out that the question at issue is not the 
existence of a Spiritual Life, since Eucken is one with us in affirming 
this truth and in asserting that an Absolute Spiritual Life forms 
"the ultimate basis of all reality:" our inquiry here is concerned 
with the necessary conditions of that existence. 

It must be clearly borne in mind that Eucken has posited an 
Absolute Spiritual Life. The spiritual is that which is wholly 
distinct from and essentially opposed to matter, 291 hence material- 
ism and pantheism in any and every form are eliminated from our 
examination. 

Eucken has also posited the "human spiritual," and has called 
on us energetically to "fight a battle for the preservation of the 
human soul." 292 

He has, further, posited higher knowledge and unchangeable 
truth as within man's reach. 

We saw in Part II that he did not develop his theory in accord- 
ance with the necessary conditions of spiritual existence and, 
therefore, his system results in a complete failure. The Scholastic 
philosophy does recognize these conditions and offers in conse- 
quence a system which is consistent, rational and in harmony with 
the implication of the term spiritual. All that is best in Eucken 's 
thought may be found here freed from the incompatible elements 
with which it was encased in Activism. 

The Scholastic teaching with regard to the "human spiritual" 
has been already dealt with. 293 The human soul is a spiritual 
substance, wholly distinct in essence, though depending for 
existence upon the Absolute Spiritual Life: the very words "Abso- 
lute Spiritual" and "human spiritual" imply this. Only on this 
condition can man's individuality, abiding identity, freedom and 
personality be safeguarded. A philosophy, such as Eucken's, 
which makes the "human spiritual" the "existential form" of the 
Absolute Spiritual; which regards man's spiritual soul not as a 



291 Refer to Part I. 

292 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. <it., p. 129. 
2C3 Part II, Chap. III. 



106 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

really distinct entity but as a focus or "concentration point," 
whereat the Absolute Spiritual Life finds self-expression, sacrifices, 
at one stroke, God's integrity and sanctity and man's individuality 
and freedom and destroys the entire spiritual structure it sought 
to raise. 

In this and the following chapters we shall deal with the other 
points of our investigation. 

Discussion of the "immediacy" 

Eucken insists, as we have seen, that all higher knowledge is 
due to an "immediacy" of the spiritual life. In this he is not 
originating any distinctively new idea. The bent of contemporary 
philosophy is to lay great stress on the native energy of 
man's soul. The "reality-feelings" of James, the "instinct" 
of Bergson, the "Gemiit" of Eucken all point in the same 
direction, and may be looked on as outlying wavelets of the 
reaction against the intellectual absolutism of the Hegelian school 
— wavelets, moreover, of a common distinctive character in that 
they are left from the ebb of two tides. The Materialism which 
followed Hegelianism with quick reactionary flow was itself 
counter-crossed by new currents: the resultant gives two anti- 
thetical movements in present-day thought — the Absolutist, 
or that of "Objective Idealism," and the Pragmatic in which may 
be classed generically the humanistic and anti-intellectualistic 
systems whatever may be their specific differences. 

Eucken will not call himself a Pragmatist, yet his assertion that 
the "human point of departure" is "the only possible [one] for the 
work of Knowledge," 294 his denial of the trustworthiness of our 
sense perceptions and his insistence on action as the indispensable 
instrument of truth connect him intimately with the pragmatic 
leaders. He acknowledges his affinities with them and even goes 
so far as to say "we are at one with the main atmosphere of 
Pragmatism." 205 On the other hand he touches the Absolutist 



-" Knowledge and Life, p. Sf>. Erkennen and Leben, op. rit., p. 46. 

295 Knowledge and Life, p. 94. Erkennen und Leben. p. 51. Eucken has 
treated, al Bome length, of Pragmatism. Sec in particular Geiatige StrOm- 
ungen; Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauungj Einftlhrung in eine Philos- 
ophic dea Geiateslebens; Erkennen und Leben. The following passagea give « 
fair indication of Ids attitude towards it. 

In Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung be writes: "Bd socher 
inneren Erhohung und mit soldier Porderung einer neuen Welt trennt sieh dec 
Aktivismua von allem bloasen Voluntariamua und Pragmatiamus, denen er 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 107 

position when he maintains that truth is reached by a transcendence 
of the difference between subject and object. 296 

We are not concerned here with intellectualistic Absolutism. 
The Scholastic doctrine of the real duality between subject and 
object, which we shall touch on again later, is a refutation of the 
theory. The third distinct system which offers us an interpretation 
of reality today lies in the "via media" between the other two: 
it is indeed that "golden mean" which is so attractive to the sane 
man of every age, whether in philosophy or outside of it. This 
third — Scholastic Realism — in its theory of knowledge falls in no 
way short of Pragmatism in emphasing the native energy of the 
soul; here, too, "immediacies" find a prominent place, but they are 
ascribed to a different activity from that to which Pragmatists 
attribute them. And it is just at this point that the line of 
demarcation between Scholastics and Anti-Intellectualists is 
strongly drawn. The "immediacy" of the Scholastic system is 
held to issue not from the lower activities of the soul but from the 
higher — not from instinct, therefore, nor from feeling but from 
reason. 

We shall compare, by carefully chosen selections, the Scholastic 
position on this point with the Pragmatic, and then estimate the 



nahezustehen scheint, und mit denen er die Verneinung gemeinsam hat. 
Denn er teilt mit ihnen die Ablehnung einer intellektualistischen Lebens- 
gestaltung, die den Intellekt aus eignem Vermogen Wahrheit finden und sie 
dem iibrigen Leben zufiihren lasst, mit ihnen will er die Wahrheit auf ein 
urspriinglicheres und wesenhafteres Tun begriinden. . . . Auch der 
Pragmatismus gestaltet die Welt und das Leben mehr aus der Lage und den 
Bedlirfnissen des Menschen, als dass er die geistige Tatigkeit zur Selbstandig- 
keit gegeniiber dem Menschen erhobe und von hier aus eine Priif ung und Sich- 
tung seines Lebensbefundes vollzoge." Op. cit., p. 144. (Life's Basis, pp. 
256, 257.) 

In Erkennen und Leben he discusses the subject more fully: two selections 
will suffice for our purpose: "Aber es ist nicht zu verkennen, dass dem starken 
Eindruck, den der Pragmatismus eine Zeitlang machte, schon wieder ein 
Rlickschlag gefolgt ist, und dass sich mehr und mehr Bedenken wider ihn 
erheben. Diese Bedenken dringen von einzelnen Punkten schliesslich zum 
Kern der Behauptung vor, und es ist uberall eben das, worin der Pragmatismus 
seine Starke sieht, was sich ihm schliesslich zum Nachteil wendet." Erkennen 
und Leben, op. cit., pp. 39 sqq. Knowledge and Life, p. 74. 

"Wir sind uberzeugt, mit solcher Aufstellung der Lebenserhohung als einea 
Priifsteins der Wahrheit mit vielen Pragmatisten, ja mit dem Hauptzuge des 
Pragmatismus zusammenzugehen. Aber dann mtissen wir ihm den Vorwurf 
machen, dass er Lebenspflege und Lebenserhohung, Ausschuiuckung einer 
gegebenen und Erringung einer neuen Welt, Ntltzliches und Gutes nicht zur 
Geniige scheidet." Op. cit., p. 51. Knowledge and Life, pp. 94, 95. 

298 The affinity between the "Geistesleben" and the central conception of 
Absolutism has been already pointed out. We are now dealing with the 
theory of knowledge and it is here that Eucken is pragmatic. 



108 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

relative value of the "immediacy" in each. In our exposition of 
Scholasticism we have taken the extracts from Cardinal Newman 
because he has treated of the point in detail; as the exponent of 
Pragmatism we have elected James as being a good representative 
of the current tendency to make feeling of paramount importance 
in philosophy. 

Scholastic Theory of Intuition, or Reason-" Immediacies" 

That intuition is our highest and surest means of reaching truth 
needs no demonstration. Cardinal Newman, in his Grammar of 
Assent, has dwelt at length on the difference between the process 
of formal reasoning and the intuitive power by which truths are 
immediately apprehended. When the intuition is due directly 
to the special nature of the data presented to the mind he terms 
it Speculation: "Speculation is one of those words which, in the 
vernacular, have so different a sense from what they bear in 
philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean a conjecture, or a 
venture on chances; but its proper meaning is mental sight, or the 
contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed 
to experience, experiment, or sense, analogous to its meaning in 
Shakespeare's line, 'Thou hast no speculation in those eyes.' . . . 
Of course mathematical investigations and truths are the subjects 
of this speculative assent. So are legal judgments, and constitu- 
tional maxims, as far as they appeal to us for assent. So are the 
determinations of science; so are the principles, disputations, and 
doctrines of theology." 297 

When the intuition does not arise from the intrinsic nature of 
the things under consideration but is realized in consciousness 
"without conscious media," even "without conscious antecedents," 
in a way that defies analysis, it is, according to Newman, an exercise 
of what he terms the Illative Sense or Faculty. 298 

"Judgment ... in all concrete matter is the architectonic 
faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judg- 
ment in ratiocination, is one branch of it." 299 



297 Newman, Grammar of Assent, p. 73. It must be noticed that Newman 
attaches a signification to speculation which is wider than that of intuition, 
in the strict sense. 

m "Illative Sense, a use of the word 'sense' parallel to our use of it in 
'good sense,' 'common sense,' 'a sense of beauty.' " Newman, op. cit., p. 345. 
It is thus an intellectual activity. 

»»Op. cit., p. 34*. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 109 

The following extracts throw light upon this second class of 
reason- "immediacies." As the personal element enters in they 
have not necessarily the marks of objectivity and universality 
which characterize the philosophical intuitions in the stricter sense : 
in fact though they are reason-immediacies they are not always 
frif^-immediacies : in other words, man may err. 

"I say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is, not 
from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from 
concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes. Whether the conse- 
quents, at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we 
start, lead us to assent or only towards assent, those antecedents 
commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for analysis; nay, 
often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not 
only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent 
also. To the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or 
'prediction; as it literally is in the instance of enthusiasts, who 
mistake their own thoughts for inspirations. This is the mode in 
which we ordinarily reason, dealing with things directly, and as they 
stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal 
power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or 
expedient; and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men, 
and in men of genius, — in those who know nothing of intellectual 
aids and rules, and in those who care nothing for them, — in those 
who are either without or above mental discipline. . . . Some- 
times, I say, this illative faculty is nothing short of genius. Such 
seems to have been Newton's perception of truths mathematical 
and physical, though proof was absent. . . . Such is the gift of the 
calculating boys who now and then make their appearance, who 
seem to have certain short-cuts to conclusions, which they cannot 
explain to themselves." 300 

"It is to the living mind that we must look for the means of using 
correctly principles of whatever kind, facts or doctrines, experiences 
or testimonies, true or probable, and of discerning what conclusion 
from these is necessary, suitable, or expedient, when they are taken 
for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift, or from 
mental formation and practise and a long familiarity with those 
various starting-points. . . . The mind contemplates them without 
the use of words, by a process which cannot be analyzed. Thus it 
was that Bacon separated the physical system of the world from 
the theological; thus that Butler connected together the moral 
system with the religious. Logical formulas could never have 
sustained the reasonings involved in such investigations." 301 



300 Op. cit., pp. 330-333. Italics ours. 
• 10 ' Op. cit., pp. 360, 361. Italics ours. 



110 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

We may also notice the following : 

"... thought is too keen and manifold, its sources are too 
remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, 
its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit of the tram- 
mels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever 
compass." 302 

"That there are cases, in which evidence, not sufficient for a 
scientific proof, is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude, 
is the doctrine of Locke, as of most men. . . . that supra-logical 
judgment, which is the warrant for our certitude about them, is not 
mere common-sense, but the true healthy action of our ratiocina- 
tive powers, an action more subtle and more comprehensive than 
the mere appreciation of a syllogistic argument." 303 

Pragmatic Theory of Feeling-' "Immediacies" 

In Varieties of Religious Experience James writes : 

"But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion 
something like this : It is as if there were in the human conscious- 
ness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception 
of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general 
than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the 
current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally 
revealed. ... So far as religious conceptions were able to 
touch this reality-feeling, they would be believed in in spite of 
criticism, even though they might be so vague and remote as to be 
almost unimaginable, even though they might be such non- 
entities in point of whatness, as Kant makes the objects of his 
moral theology to be. [Examples of what he terms "sense of 
presence" follow.] ... If we look on man's whole mental life as it 
exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning 
and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have 
to confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an 
account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige 
undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for 
proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it 
will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb 
intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions 
at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the 
loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole sub- 
conscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divina- 
tions, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness 
now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely 
knows that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping 



'Op. cit ., 284, 

'Op. rit.. pp. 816 sqq. Italics ours. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 111 

rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. . . . 
The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, 
the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads 
intelligence does but follow." 304 

In Essays on Popular Philosophy we find: 

"What, in short, has authority to debar us from trusting our 
religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, 
for she can only say what is, not what is not; . . . now, when I 
speak of trusting our religious demands, just what do I mean by 
'trusting?' ... to trust our religious demands means first of 
all to live in the light of them, and to act as if the invisible world 
which they suggest were real. ... If this life be not a real 
fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe 
by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from 
which one may withdraw at will. But it feels like area! fight. . . . 
The deepest thing in our nature is this Binnenleben (as a German 
doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the heart in which 
we dwell alone with our willingnesses and unwillingnesses, our 
faiths and fears. As through the cracks and crannies of caverns 
those waters exude from the earth's bosom which then form the 
fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of per- 
sonality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take their 
rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature 
of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our 
soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments — the veto, 
for example, which the strict positivist pronounces upon our 
faith — sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth." 305 

A comparison of the extracts from Cardinal Newman with those 
from Professor James reveals how closely, at moments, the later 
writer approaches the earlier. James recognized the native 
energy of the human mind, but his anti-intellectualism forced 
him to attribute to blind feeling what could result only from reason. 
When he states that "your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your 
divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your conscious- 
ness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you 
ansolutely knows that that result must be truer than any logic- 
chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict 
it," he is but repeating what Newman has already said about that 
"supra-logical judgment" which is "the true healthy action of our 
ratiocinative powers," and he is undoubtedly right; but when he 



304 Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, 1902, pp. 58-74. [talica 
are those of the author. 

305 Essays in Popular Philosophy. Is Life Worth Living? New York, 1899, 
pp. 57-62. Italics are those of the author. 



112 KUDOLF EuCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

passes on further to describe "intuitions" as "inarticulate feelings 
of reality" we are upon the error of Bergson and Pragmatists in 
general. 

We have not to undertake a criticism of Pragmatism here; the 
work has been ably done by others: one point, however, may be 
briefly referred to — it is the denial of the power of the intellect to 
reach objective truth. James is unmistakably clear in the 
expression of his views : 

"Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals 
to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet 
are they found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so 
far as my theory of human knowledge goes. . . . There is but 
one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhon- 
istic scepticism itself leaves standing — the truth that the present 
phenomenon of consciousness exists." 306 

It is interesting to find, in Geistige Strbmungen, the following 
trenchant criticism of the pragmatic notion of truth, from Eucken 
himself: 

"Der starke Eindruck des Pragmatismus stammt namentlich 
daher, dass hier die gewohnliche Betrachtungsweise umgekehrt 
wird; wie aber, wenn dabei der Begriff der Wahrheit selbst auf den 
Kopf zu stehen kommt? So aber geschieht es in Wahrheit . . . 
Wahrheit ist nur als Selbstzweck moglich, eine 'instrumentale* 
Wahrheit is keine Wahrheit." 307 

We fully endorse the critic's words — that in Pragmatism "the 
idea of truth itself is reversed and ends by standing on its head;" 



306 Essays in Popular Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq. 

He saw fit to modify his dogmatic assertion, somewhat, in his volume on 
Pragmatism: "Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible 
objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more 
play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our 
sense-experiences. They coerce vs\ we must treat them consistently, whether 
or not we like the results." Pragmatism, New York, 1907, pp. £10 sqq. 
Italics ours. 

Lovejoy, in the journal of Philosophy, commenting on this writes: 
"This obviously, is no doctrine that axioms are postulates, or that behind 
every 'can't' there lies a 'won't;' it is the doctrine that axioms are necessities 
and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a perman- 
ent system of a priori principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the 
nature of intellect, ... It is compatible, at most, with the opinion that 
there are not so numerous, nor so useful, axioms as some dogmatic philosophers 
have supposed, and that, when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases 
be resorted to." The Thirteen Pragmatisms (II); Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology and Scientific Methods, vol. 5, 1908, Jan.. p. 29. 

307 Op. cit., pp. 49, 50. Italics ours. (Main Currents of Modern Thought, 
pp. 77, 78.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 113 

but while so doing we are irresistibly drawn to think of the man 
of fable who, though living in a glass house, would throw stones. 

Conclusion Drawn 

Eucken condemns with justice the pragmatic conception of 
truth and objects, in particular, to the subjective character of the 
religious basis of pragmatism, but his own truth-standard and his 
method of reaching it are condemned a fortiori by his words, since 
the "immediacies" described by James are at least more intelligible 
than that on which Eucken seeks to ground religion. 

He is at one with James in denying the power of the intellect 
but insists, most illogically, as has been already pointed out, on 
the axiomatic character and the objective value of the Gemiit or 
Unmittelbarkeit . 

We are here confronted with three systems of thought — 
Scholastic Realism, Pragmatism and Activism. 308 

The first, following the Scholastics, owns 

1 that there are necessary, universal truths; 

2 that there are contingent truths, objectively valid; 

3 that the human intellect by the power of reason is able 

(a) to reach both classes of truths, i. e., to attain to 
certainty; 

(b) to know that it has reached truth — this is certi- 
tude. 

The second denies 

1 all necessary truths; 

2 the power of the intellect to reach truth; 

3 all philosophical certainty; nevertheless it claims 
certitude, based on the revelations of supposed feelings, 
and reached by a deliberate act of the will. Faith, 
not in supernatural revelation, but in the supremacy of 
feeling as the guide of life, is the pet maxim of Prag- 
matism. 309 

The third maintains 

1 that truth is eternal and unchangeable, yet in the 
exposition of the Geistesleben destroys the significance 
of the word "truth;" 



308 It has been objected that Pragmatism is not a system but we use the 
word for convenience sake. 

309 For the extent to which the criterion is pushed see Essays in Popular 
Philosophy — The Sentiment of Rationality, pp. OS sqq., op. cit. 



114 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

2 that neither intellect, feeling, nor will, whether in isola- 
tion, or in combination, can serve as the basis of phil- 
osophy or religion: they cannot reach objective truth; 

3 that man can and does, although imperfectly, lay hold 
on eternal truth. Certainty, therefore, is here based 
on — ? 

Eucken has, in fact, cut the ground from under his own feet in 
the philosophic field: certainty cannot be attained until the sods 
are restored, in other words, until the general trustworthiness of 
the revelations of our faculties is re-affirmed. 

A comparison of the above theories reveals the first and most 
essential condition of all knowledge: it is certainty — certainty of 
some facts, some truths. Unless this foundation is solid beneath 
our feet we cannot take a step forward. James insists on personal 
certitude regarding the "reality -feelings;" Eucken proclaims the 
certainty of the "Gemuf ': "the corner stone of all philosophical 
thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing 
spiritual life." 310 This may be called the objective point of 
view, but the subjective is inseparable from it, i. e., in this 
certainty is implied the trustworthiness of the mental state 
through which the "fact" is known. Eucken's "corner stone" 
has itself to rest on something : this something, as has been repeat- 
edly pointed out, is the general trustworthiness of our faculties. 
Here we have indeed, a "double-aspect" fact, for the trustworthi- 
ness of our faculties and the certainty that their revelations are 
trustworthy are but subjective and objective "aspects" of a 
fundamental and inevitable necessity of our very nature. James 
is willing to "trust" his "reality-feelings," but on what grounds 
does he elect one species of mental activity as "trustworthy," 
while discriminating against the others? This is wholly unphil- 
osophical. The Scholastics posit the general trustworthiness of 
our faculties, both sensuous and intellectual, and by so doing offer 
an interpretation of reality based on the necessary conditions of 
human knowledge. By this first affirmation they posit, indirectly, 
the existence of objects external to us, revealed through the 
senses; also universal, necessary truths disclosed through the 
intellect and a vast body of contingent truths made known through 
experience. Thus the universe, secured from theoretical destruc- 



310 Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. <it., p. 183. (G. StrOmungen, 
97.) 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 115 

tion, exists in its own right, independent of man's theories, though 
fit object for them; the structure of human knowledge rests on an 
unshakeable foundation; we ourselves are saved from mental 
bankruptcy and moral bewilderment. The natural law, evincing 
itself in the laws of science, the moral law revealing itself in the 
conscience of man are seen to be parallel manifestations of that one 
eternal law which governs alike the tiniest leaf, fluttering to the 
earth, and the planets revolving in unswerving course, and which 
is itself the Will of Divine Wisdom that creation be a cosmos, not 
a chaos. 

Lest we should seem to be drawing conclusions too wide for our 
premise we cite the words of Balmes : 

"All philosophical questions are in some manner involved in 
that of certainty. W T hen we have completely unfolded this, 
we have examined under one aspect or another all that human 
reason can conceive of God, man, and the universe. At first sight 
it may perhaps seem to be the simple foundation of the scientific 
structure; but in this foundation, if we carefully examine it, we 
shall see the whole edifice represented: it is a plane whereon is 
projected, visibly and in fair perspective, the whole body it is to 
support." 311 

Having taken for granted the general trustworthiness of our 
faculties we may, if we will, inquire into the nature of certainty and 
its basis — not question it, however, or we would approach the vicious 
circles of Descartes. 

Nature and Basis of Certainty 
According to Balmes certainty is "the spontaneous product of 
man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual 
and sensitive faculties. It is a condition necessary to the exercise 
of both, and without it life were a chaos." 312 

And again: 

"The certainty which is prior to all examination is not blind; 
on the contrary, it springs either from the clearness of the intellec- 
tual vision, or from an instinct conformable to reason: it is not 
opposed to reason, but is its basis." 313 

The following passage throws so much light on the question 
that we cite it at length : 

"That we have certainty, common sense assures us, but what is 



311 Fundamental Philosophy, translated by Brownson, Vol. 1, p. 4. N< 
York, 1903. 

312 Op. cit., p. 14. 

313 Op. cit., pp. 12, 13. 



116 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

its basis, and how it is acquired, are two difficult questions, which 
it is for philosophy to answer. ... It will greatly conduce to 
the due determination of our ideas, carefully to distinguish between 
the existence of certainty, its basis, and the mode in which it is 
acquired. Its existence is an indisputable fact; its basis the object 
of philosophical researches, and the mode of acquiring it frequently 
a concealed phenomenon not open to observation. That bodies 
exist is a fact that no man of sane mind can doubt. No questions 
raised upon this point can ever shake our firm conviction in the 
existence, without us, of what we call the corporeal world. This 
conviction is a phenomenon of our existence. Explain it, perhaps 
we cannot; but we certainly cannot deny it; we submit to it as to an 
inevitable necessity. What is the basis of certainty? Here we 
have not a simple fact, but a question solved by every philosopher 
in his own way. Descartes and Malebranche recur to the veracity 
of God; Locke and Condillac to the peculiar character and evolu- 
tion of certain sensations. How does man acquire this certainty? 
He knows not: he had it before reflecting on it; he is astounded to 
hear it made a matter of dispute, and he might never have sus- 
pected it could be asked, why we are certain that what affects our 
senses exists. . . . Philosophy should begin by explaining, not 
by disputing the fact of certainty. If we are certain of nothing, 
it is absolutely impossible for us to advance a single step in any 
science, or to take any part whatever in the affairs of life. . . . 
Certainty is to us a happy necessity; nature imposes it, and philos- 
ophers do not cast off nature. ... In sound philosophy, then, 
the question turns not upon the existence of certainty, but upon 
its motives, and the means of acquiring it. It is an inheritance 
of which we cannot divest ourselves, although we repudiate those 
very titles which guaranty its possession to us. . . . Prior to 
all systems, humanity was in possession of this certainty, so, also, 
is every individual, although he may never during his whole life 
have once asked himself what the world is, what bodies are, or 
in what sensation, thought, and will consist. . . . Since inquiries 
with regard to certainty were first instituted, it has remained the 
same with all men, even with those who disputed it. . . . We 
must, in discussing certainty, guard against the feverish desire of 
shaking the foundations of human reason. We should, in this 
class of questions, seek a thorough knowledge of the principles of 
science, and the laws which govern the development of our mind. 
To labor to destroy them is to mistake the object of true philos- 
ophy: we have only to make them a matter of observation, just as 
we do those of the material world, without any intention of dis- 
turbing the admirable order prevailing in the universe." 314 

Our purpose here is not to make a detailed examination of 
Scholasticism, but rather to expose its basic principles and direct 



Op. tit., pp. 7-12. 



Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 117 

attention to the broad outline. We shall not therefore investigate 
the question of sense perception, nor unfold the theory of the 
active and passive intellect (intellectus agens, intellectuspatiens), 
nor inquire into the metaphysical conditions of knowledge "ex 
parte objecti." All these points are indirectly, but satisfactorily, 
posited in the general affirmation of the trustworthiness of our 
faculties. If the senses reveal an object to us, and the intellect 
seizes upon its quiditas or, in other words, discloses its essential 
nature, it follows that the object thus made known is in itself et 
unuvi et cognoscibile. The mode of action of the intellect in 
cognition has been treated of extensively; moreover, Eucken, 
whose challenge we are answering, does not attack the explanation 
of the activity of the intellect, but rather the activity itself as a 
means of objective truth. He does not concern himself with the 
how of our intellectual knowledge since he denies that truth is 
reached through the intellect; hence his main assault on Scholas- 
ticism is directed towards the traditional conception of truth. 316 
Since our aim is to afford an opportunity of comparison between 
the system which Eucken deems naive and the Activism brought 
forward to supplant it we shall cite at some length from Scholastics, 
both mediaeval and modern. We have chosen this method of 
exposition as the fairest. Scholastic writings are most frequently 
criticised en masse and condemned unread. 

Kleutgen in his Exposition and Defence of Scholastic Philosophy 
has treated at length of the subject now under discussion — the 
basis of certainty. We have selected three extracts dealing 
chiefly with certainty in the matter of necessary truths and first 
principles. 

(1) According to Scholastic teaching truth itself is the constrain- 
ing force: it is impossible for us not to hold them true: moreover, 
we know these truths to be such that no one not deprived of 
reason can doubt them. St. Thomas points out that not only are 
these principles essentially true, but also we have necessarily the 
knowledge of their truth. 

"Avant tout la pensee pure, qui fait abstraction de toute con- 
naissance experimentale, est en nous accompagnee d'une adhesion 



316 For mode of activity of the intellect refer to St. Thomas: Sum. I; q. 85; 
Sum I,q. 54, a. 4 (in response) . Quaest., q. 2, art. 6; q. 10, a. 4, 5, 6. See also 
Maher, op. cit., pp. 305-313 (bibliography is given on p. 313). and Kleutgen, 
Phil. Scolastique, Vol. I, Chap. I, IV, and for a more detailed account of 
Scholastic theory of Knowledge refer to Theories of Knowledge, L. Walker, 
S. J. London and New York, 1910, pp. 340 sqq. 



118 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

ou d'un assentiment ferme et inebranlable. Or, si nous demandons 
pourquoi nous devons tenir ces pensees pour vraies, nous trouvons 
d'abord . . . [que] c'est qu'elles sont conformes aux principes 
d'apres lesquelles nous devons penser. Mais pourquoi regardons- 
nous comme vrais ces principes eux-memes? . . . Le motif 
pour lequel nous les admettons, c'est leur verite qui apparatt 
manifestement a notre raison, c'est a-dire leur evidence et pas 
autre chose. Aussitot que nous nous les representons, nous 
sommes contraints de les tenir pour vrais; toutefois ce n'est pas 
en vertu d'une propension aveugle de notre nature, ni a cause de la 
connaissance de quelque autre chose qui nous en garantisse la 
verite, mais parce que nous percevons cette verite elle-meme et 
qu'il nous est impossible de ne pas la percevoir . . . Suppose, 
par exemple, que nous ne sachions pas si dans la realite il existe 
des lignes droites, nous savons neanmoins que des lignes droites, 
s'il en existe, ne peuvent se couper qu'en un seul point. . . . 
Nous sommes certains de la verite de ces jugements, dis-je, parce 
que nous voyons cette verite nous-memes et que nous ne pouvons 
pas nous empecher de la voir, toutes les fois que nous nous repre- 
sentons ces jugements; mais ce n'est d'aucune maniere, parce 
que nous savons que tous les autres hommes les tiennent pour 
vrais. Au contraire, nous concluons plutot de l'evidence de ces 
verites que nous ne sommes pas seuls a les regarder comme vraies, 
mais que tous les autres pensent comme nous : car nous connaissons 
en meme temps ces verites comme telles que tout etre capable de 
les concevoir doit en comprendre l'evidence et que personne ne peut 
les nier, a moins d'etre prive de l'usage de la raison. Si done nous 
regardons comme atteint de folie l'homme qui nierait ces principes 
ou pretendrait en douter, ce n'est pas . . . parce qu'il pense 
autrement que le reste des hommes, mais parce qu'il ne comprend 
pas ce que tout homme jouissant de la raison doit necessairement 
comprendre. . . . Voila ce que disait Saint Thomas . . . , 
quand il soutenait que l'esprit ne connait pas seulement des choses 
vraies, mais encore la verite de sa connaissance, en comprenant 
qu'il est conforme a la nature de sa raison de connaitre les choses 
telles qu'elles sont. Tant qu'il ne s'agit que de la pensee pure 
et abstraite, on ne peut revoquer en doute la verite de cette asser- 
tion. Aussi le saint docteur releve-t-il que non-seulement ces 
principes de la pensee sont essentiellement vrais, mais encore que 
nous avons necessairement la connaissance de leur verite. 316 

(2) Certainty springs from the intimate perception that our 
thought is true, i. e., corresponds to the being possible and actual of 
things. St. Thomas further points out what St. Augustine had 
already spoken of, viz., that characteristic of intellectual knowl- 



318 La Philosophic Scolastique Exposee et Defendue, translated by Sierp, 
Paris, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 507-509. 



Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 119 

edge which causes us not only to perceive the truth but by the 
same light of reason by which we perceive it to know that we 
perceive it. As Suarez says, true science only exists if we know 
that we know. 

"Quelle est done la raison qui me force a juger que des lignes 
droites peuvent coiincider, ou, si elles se coupent, que ce ne peut 
6tre que par un seul point? Evidemment, il n'y en a point d'autre, 
sinon parce que je vois que la chose est ainsi et qu'elle ne peut 
6tre autrement. N'avons-nous pas la conscience claire et distincte 
que nous connaissons et que par cette connaissance, et non par 
d'autres raisons, nous sommes forces de croire que les lignes droites 
sont possibles et que les propositions citees doivent se verifier en 
elles, des qu'elles existent en realite? La necessite de penser 
ainsi ne resulte done que de la perception intime dont nous avons 
conscience que cette pensee, et non une autre, est vraie, e'est-a-dire 
repond a l'etre (possible ou actuel) des choses. II est aussi 
absolument faux que, pour etre certains, nous ayons besoin de 
soumettre nos pensees necessaires a l'examen d'une autre pensee 
qui ne serait egalement que subjectivement necessaire, et qu'ainsi 
nous ne puissions jamais parvenir au terme de ces examens 
successifs. Sans doute, si nos concepts etaient composes de 
plusieurs autres concepts, si les jugements qu'il s'agit d'examiner 
etaient derives d'autres jugements, nous devrions revenir aux 
concepts simples et aux principes qu'ils forment; mais parvenus 
a ces principes nous constatons en nous non-seulement la necessite 
de les penser, mais encore la raison de cette necessite, la perception 
claire de leur verite. Voila pourquoi Saint Thomas dit dans un 
passage deja cite: Proprium est horum principiorvm, quod non 
solum necesse sit, ea per se vera esse, sed etiam necesse est videre 
quod sint per se vera. Longtemps avant le Docteur angelique, 
S. Augustin avait parle de ce caractere de la connaissance intellect- 
uelle en disant que dans la meme lumiere de la raison dans laquelle 
nous percevons le vrai, nous comprenons en meme temps que 
nous percevons le vrai. Les scolastiques posterieurs n'ont pas 
perdu de vue ce commencement de toute connaissance certaine. 
'La veritable science,' dit Suarez, 'n'existe que si Ton sait que 
Ton sait; car la perfection de la connaissance intellectuelle consiste 
en ce que (ramenee a ces premiers commencements) elle se revele 
(dans ceux-ci) a elle-meme (comme vraie).' " 317 

(3) According to St. Augustine the rule and motive of all our 
natural knowledge is to be sought for in reason itself, because 
reason can take its own nature and its knowledge as objects of its 
reflexion. We find absolutely the same principle in St. Thomas. 



317 Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 57, 58. "Nunquam acquiritur vera scientia, nisi 
quis sciat se scire: nam scientia debet esse perfectum intellectuale lumen, 
quod seipsum manifestat." Metaph., disp. I, sect. 4. 



120 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

It is by the light of reason that the mind knows — the light of 
reason which renders the mind an image of the uncreated Truth. 
St. Thomas finds the cause of certitude in the reasonable nature 
of every man. 

"Tout ce que nous connaissons des choses qui depassent les 
sens, disait St. Augustin, nous le connaissons dans la lumiere qui 
brille au-dedans de l'homme, et tout ce que nous apprenons de 
ces objets par le temoignage d'autrui, nous le jugeons, pour l'adniet- 
tre ou le rejeter, par cette me'me lumiere inherente a notre nature. 
Or, cette lumiere qui demeure au-dedans de tout homme, qu'est- 
elle autre chose que la raison individuelle? C'est par consequent 
dans la raison individuelle que St. Augustin trouve la regie par 
laquelle nous discernons la verite de l'erreur en tout ce que 
d'autres nous apprennent sur les choses supersensibles. En 
d'autres endroits le me'me docteur de l'Eglise, revenant sur ce 
sujet, ajoute que tout ce que nous disons de la raison elle-m£me 
ne nous est connu que par la ni&me lumiere de la raison; car par 
cette lumiere nous ne connaissons pas seulement la verite, mais 
nous savons aussi que nous possedons cette connaissance. II 
enseigne de la maniere la plus nette que la regie et le motif de 
toutes nos connaissances naturelles doivent §tre cherchees dans la 
raison elle-meme, parce qu'elle peut prendre pour objet de ses 
reflexions sa propre nature et sa connaissance. Nous retrouvons 
absolument les memes principes dans les ecrits de saint Thomas. 
Suivant lui, toute science se forme en nous, parce que, partant des 
premiers principes, nous progressons dans la connaissance par le 
moyen des deductions. . . . C'est en effet par les principes 
que nous percevons intimement non-seulement leur propre verite 
et leur propre certitude, mais encore la necessite d'adherer avec 
certitude a tout ce qui en decoule necessairement et de rejeter 
tout ce qui y est contraire, tandis que le reste est du domaine des 
opinions libres. Or, la faculte par laquelle l'esprit connait ces 
principes, c'est la lumiere de la raison que Dieu lui a donnee et 
qui le rend image de la verite increee. Toute certitude de notre 
science a done sa source dans la lumiere de la raison que Dieu 
nous a donnee au-dedans de nous-memes. . . . Nous avons 
deja examine la doctrine du Docteur Angelique, selon laquelle 
notre intelligence ne possede pleinement la verite que si elle 
connait non-seulement la chose connue et sa propre connaissance, 
mais aussi l'accord de sa connaissance avec l'objet. Or, d'apres 
St. Thomas toujours, l'esprit est apte a connaitre cet accord, 
parce que non-seulement il percoit sa connaissance, e'est-a-dire, 
le phenomene par lequel il connait, mais qu'il se connait encore 
lui-meme, ou sa nature propre. . . . [Saint Thomas] en trouve 
la cause [i. e., de certitude] dans la nature raisonnable de chaque 
homme." 318 



Op. cit., I, pp. 541-543. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 121 

Means of Perceiving Truth 

According to Balmes he who seeks to acquire complete and 
accurate ideas upon matters relating to the first principles of 
human knowledge must distinguish between the different means 
by which truth is perceived. 

These means are of different orders: to them correspond truths 
of different orders. The three means are consciousness, evidence, 
and intellectual instinct or common sense; to which correspond 
truths of consciousness, necessary truths, and common-sense 
truths. 

"That means which we have called consciousness, or the intim- 
ate sense of that which passes within us, that which we experience, 
is independent of all others. Destroy evidence, destroy intel- 
lectual instinct, yet consciousness remains. In order to feel, and 
to be sure that we feel, and what we feel, we need only experience 
. . . Consciousness is independent of all extrinsic testimony, 
its necessity is inevitable, its force irresistible in producing cer- 
tainty; it is infallible in what concerns only itself; if it exist it 
must give testimony of itself; if it does not exist it cannot give 
it." 319 

The "intellectual light" or evidence by which necessary truths 
are known is contrasted with the subjective testimony of con- 
sciousness in the following passage. 

"Evidence is always accompanied by the necessity, and con- 
sequently, by the universality, of the truths which it attests. 
There is no evidence of the contingent, except in so far as subjected 
to a necessary principle. . . . That there is in me a being 
which thinks, I know, not by evidence, but by consciousness. 
That whatever thinks exists, I know, not by consciousness, but 
by evidence. In both cases the certainty is absolute, irresistible; 
but in the first it rests upon a particular, contingent fact; in the 
second upon a universal and necessary truth. That I think is 
certain for me, but not necessarily so for others; the disappear- 
ance of my thought does not overturn the world of intelligences. 
. . . But it is very different with the truths which are the object 
of evidence. It is not necessary for me to think; but it is so neces- 
sary for whatever thinks to exist, that no efforts of mine could 
suffice to abstract this necessity for one moment. If, taking an 
absurd position, I suppose the contrary, and imagine for an 
instant the relation between thought and being to be cut short. 



Op. cit., pp. 93 sqq. 



122 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

I break the chain which supports the order of the entire universe; 
everything is reversed, thrown into confusion; and I know not 
if what I see be chaos or nonentity. What has taken place? The 
intellect has only suffered a contradiction, at the same time 
affirming and denying thought, because it affirmed a thought to 
which it denied existence. It has violated a universal and abso- 
lutely necessasry law, the violation of which throws everything 
into chaos. Not the certainty of the soul's existence, supported 
by the testimony of consciousness, suffices to prevent the confusion : 
the intellect by contradicting itself has denied itself; from its 
insensate words, not being, but nonentity has resulted, not light, 
but darkness; and this darkness cast over whatever exists or is 
possible turns back upon it and involves it in eternal night." 320 

The third means of acquiring truth — "intellectual instinct" or 
"common sense," is one which Eucken holds in particular sus- 
picion. This is our apology for the lengthy passages we are 
about to cite. The difference of attitude with regard to matters 
of general belief — arising logically from the different valuation of 
the power of the human mind in the two systems — will be brought 
out by comparing the following with the Scholastic doctrine of 
"common sense:" In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal Eucken writes: 

"The fact that man feels — as an immediate impression — free 
in cases of hesitation between different possibilities has lost its 
power to convince the individual of the Modern Age. For the 
new mode of thought has evolved point for point along with an 
increasing divergence from the naive manner of representation, 
and it has won its greatest victories in opposition to this manner 
of representation. The revolution that Copernicus accomplished 
in the representation of the world has become typical of the whole 
of modern work; and as regards our problem [viz., the nature of 
Freedom] also, dissent from ordinary opinion is less a cause for 
doubt than a recommendation."* 21 

If Eucken consistently followed out the principle implied in the 
italicized sentence he would promptly reach the "nihilisme in- 
tellectuel" to which P. Pegues refers (vide, cit., p. 138.) 
The Scholastic position is well indicated by Balmes : 
"Common sense is an exceedingly vague expression. . . . We 
must not, in order duly to appreciate the meaning of such expres- 
sions, confine ourselves to their philosophical, and contemn their 
vulgar meaning. In the latter there is often a profound philosophy; 
for, in such cases, the vulgar sense is a kind of precious sediment 



»Op. cit.. 97-99. 

821 Life's Basis, op. cit., p. 175. Italics ours. Cf. also Tart I, Chap. IV, 
pp. «7. 88. 



ElDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 123 

left by the flow of reason upon the word during many ages. . . . 
The word common shows the objects of this criterion to be common 
to all men, and consequently referable to the objective order, 
since the purely subjective, as such, is limited to the individual, 
and in no wise affects what is general. ... I believe the expres- 
sion common sense to denote a law of our mind, apparently dif- 
fering according to the different cases to which it applies, but in 
reality and apart from its modifications, only one, always the 
same, consisting in a natural inclination of our mind to give its 
assent to some truths not attested by consciousness nor demon- 
strated by reason, necessary to all men in order to satisfy the 
wants of sensitive, intellectual, and moral life. . . . We at once 
detect it in the case of truths immediately evident. The under- 
standing neither does nor can prove them, and yet it must assent 
to them, or perish like a flame that has nothing to feed upon. 
The possession of one or more of these primitive truths is an 
indispensable condition to intellectual life; without them intelli- 
gence is an absurdity. Here, then, we find all that is comprised 
in the definition of common sense: the impossibility of proof, an 
intellectual necessity, which must be satisfied by assent, and an 
irresistible and universal inclination to give this assent. Is there 
any objection to calling this inclination common sense? ... I 
shall not dispute upon words; I mark the fact, and this is all I 
need do in philosophy. I grant that the inclination to assent is 
not, in treating of immediate evidence, usually called common 
sense ... In order that the word sense may be properly applied 
to it, the understanding ought to feel rather than know: but in 
immediate evidence it knows rather than feels. However this 
may be, I repeat that the name is of no account. . . . What I 
wish is to establish this law of our nature inclining us to give our 
assent to certain truths, independently of consciousness and 
ratiocination. Not immediate evidence alone has this irresistible 
inclination in its favor; mediate evidence also has it. Our under- 
standing necessarily assents, not only to first principles, but also 
to all propositions clearly connected with them. The natural 
inclination to assent is not limited to the subjective value of ideas; 
it also extends to their objective value. . . . What we have 
said of immediate and mediate evidence relatively to the objective 
value of ideas, is true, not only in the purely intellectual, but also 
in the moral order. The soul, endowed as it is with free will, 
needs rules for its direction: if first intellectual principles are 
necessary in order to know, moral principles are not less so in 
order to will and work. What truth and error are to the under- 
standing, good and evil are to the will. Besides the life of the 
understanding, there is a life of the will; the one, without principles 
on which to rest, is annihilated; the other, as a moral being, 
perishes, or becomes an inconceivable absurdity, if it have no 
rule, the observation or violation of which constitutes its perfec- 



124 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

tion or imperfection. Here is another necessity for the assent to 
certain moral truths, and another reason of this irresistible and 
universal inclination to assent. I would here remark, that as it 
is not enough in the intellectual order to know, but it is also necessary 
to act, and one of the principles of action is perception by the senses ; 
so moral truths are not only known but felt. When they are 
offered to the mind the understanding assents to them as unshaken, 
and the heart embraces them with enthusiasm and love." 322 

The italics in the closing paragraph are ours. Which promises 
better fruits: the enlightened Activism of the Intellectualist, 
which is guided by reason, or, the blind Activism of Eucken, 
which seeks to replace reason? Surely the answer is not hard to 
find. 

Conditions upon which the Criterion of Common-sense is Infallible 

Man's weakness may often turn his natural inclinations from 
their object, the result being that they are distorted and lead to 
error instead of truth; nevertheless a natural inclination, simply 
because it is natural, "is in the eyes of philosophy something 
highly respectable:" it is the province of reason and free will 
not to allow it to go astray. The following conditions are laid 
down by Balmes as being those of true and never-erring common- 
sense. 

"First Condition. — That the inclination be everyway irresistible, 
so that one cannot, even by the aid of reflection, resist or avoid it. 

"Second Condition. — That every truth of common sense be 
absolutely certain to the whole human race. This condition 
follows from the first. 

"Third Condition. — That every truth of common sense stand 
the test of reason. 

"Fourth Condition. — That every truth of common sense have 
for its object the satisfaction of some great necessity of sensitive, 
intellectual, or moral life. 

"When possessed of all these characters, the criterion of common 
sense is absolutely infallible, and may defy skeptics to assign a 
case wherein it has failed." 323 

Objectivity of Ideas 
In close connection with the criterion of common sense we shall 
touch upon the "problem which vexes fundamental philosophy," 
i. e., the transition from subject to object, from subjective appear- 
ance to objective reality. 



" J Op. oit., pp. 219 sqq. 
" 3 Op. cit., <2«, ill. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 125 

Eucken denies its possibility in emphatic terms, with more 
determination than strength of argument however. He is im- 
patient that men with such "a naive mode of thought" as to 
conceive it possible, are still in the front ranks. So much has 
been written on this point that it is not our intention to enter upon 
it in detail. 

Balmes shows that the natural inclination which men have to 
make the transition has all the characteristics necessary to elevate 
it to the rank of an infallible criterion : it is irresistible, universal, 
satisfies a great necessity of life, and stands the test of reason. 
The connection of evidence with reality, and consequently, the 
transition from the idea to the object, are "primitive facts of our 
nature, a necessary law of our understanding, the foundation of 
all that it contains — a foundation which in its turn rests, and can 
rest only on God, the Creator of our soul." We are now '*at the 
foundation of reason; this is the ne plus ultra of the human under- 
standing; philosophy can go no farther." 

Against Eucken's illogical affirmation of the axiomatic certainty 
of the "Gemiit," as against James' "reality-feelings," we cite the 
following : 

"We must observe the contradiction into which those philoso- 
phers fall who say: I cannot doubt what is subjective, what 
affects myself, . . . but I have no right to go out of myself, 
and affirm that what I think is in reality as I think. Do you 
know that you feel, that you think, that you have within you 
such or such an appearance? Can you prove it? Evidently 
you cannot. You yield to a fact, to an internal necessity . . . ; 
but then there is equal necessity in the connection of the object 
with the idea, . . . Neither case admits of demonstration; in 
both there is an inevitable necessity: where, then, is philosophy, 
when it is attempted to establish so great a difference between 
things which admit of none? . . . To take from ideas their 
objective value, to reduce them to mere subjective phenomena, 
to resist that internal necessity which obliges us to admit the 
correspondence of the soul to objects, is to destroy the very 
consciousness of the soul." 324 

"They who oppose objectiveness, attack a fundamental law of 
our mind, destroy thought, even consciousness, and everything 
subjective which could serve as its basis." 325 



324 Op. cit., pp. 161-166. For detailed proof of the objectiveness of ideas 
vide entire Chap. XXIV. 

325 Op. cit.. p. 170. 



126 EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

St. George Mivart, who followed so closely the Scholastic 
tradition, says: 

" . . . it is intellect and not sense which is the final judge and 
criterion of our certainty; and though the ultimate facts of sensa- 
tion are as certain and indisputable as the other ultimate declara- 
tions of our faculties, yet they are often misinterpreted. Though 
the facts of sensation are self-evident, we may judge wrongly as 
to what they point to. On the other hand, the harmony which 
exists amongst the several senses, is ever giving us stronger and 
stronger grounds for trusting them. Everyone knows how con- 
stantly his sense of touch or sight confirms a testimony previously 
given by his sight or his hearing; nor will any one, ivho has not 
some eccentric theory to maintain, deem it probable that our senses 
thus harmoniously conspire to lead us into one and the same 
error, since truth is one, whilst error is manifold." 326 

Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter 

The Scholastics note carefully, however, the difference between 
the primary and secondary qualities of matter — between the sub- 
jective and the objective in sensation. The cause of the sensations 
of smell, taste, color, sound, exist in the objective world, but not 
the sensations as such. "As to qualities, the direct objects of 
sensation, it is not necessary for us that they exist in bodies them- 
selves; it is enough that these bodies have something which 
produces in us, in some way or other, a corresponding impression 
.... The ordinary wants of life are not at all affected by this 
question; and man's relations with the sensible world would not 
be disturbed by the generalization of philosophical analysis. 
There is, perhaps, a kind of disenchantment of nature, since, 
despoiled of sensations, it is not nearly so beautiful; but the 
enchantment still continues with most men; and philosophy 
itself, except in brief moments of reflection, is subject to it; and 
even in these moments it experiences an enchantment of a dif- 
ferent kind, as it considers how much of the beauty attributed to 
objects, belongs to man in his own right, and that the simple 
exercise of a sensible being's harmonious faculties suffices to make 
the whole universe glow with splendor and glory." 3 - 7 

St. George Mivart does not grant that the disenchantment 
necessarily takes place. He writes: 

"Our intellect, then, seems to tell us that, through our sensa- 



"• Mivart on Truth, pp. 126, 127. Op. cit. Italics ours. 
557 Op. cit., p. 229. 



Rudolf Euckex and the Spiritual Life 127 

tions, we perceive secondary as well as primary qualities of different 
kinds and orders, which are different from the sensations them- 
selves but yet give us a practically serviceable and not mendacious 
knowledge of such qualities. And the correctness of this belief 
is, as we shall see, at least so far incontestable that the common 
belief must be nearer the truth than the negation of it can possibly 
be. Yet we are sometimes told that in the absence of organs of 
sense, silence and darkness would envelope the world. Now, 
our idea of 'light' may probably be quite inadequate to make the 
essence of light known to us as we may conceive of its being known 
by some nature much higher than ours. But, nevertheless, our 
idea of 'light' is, at any rate, more like objective light than is our 
idea of darkness. . . . For since we suppose the sun, moon, and 
stars, meteors, volcanoes, and phosphorescent organisms to exist 
in it as now they do, all the objective conditions of light, save 
sense-organs, would, by the hypothesis, be present, while the 
objective conditions of what, to our senses, is darkness, would 
not be present. Though all 'sensations' would, of course, vanish 
from an insentient universe, yet the objective qualities those 
sensations make known to us would continue to exist." 328 

"And, indeed, if our intellect has, as we know it has, the power of 
making external objects present to it, it is not wonderful that it 
should also have the power of making the qualities of objects 
present to it — i. e.,to the intellect. Nor is it a bit more wonderful 
that, not the sensations, but the apprehensions they give rise to, 
should have a certain real likeness to the objective qualities them- 
selves, than that our apprehensions of the objects which have 
the qualities should be like the objects themselves." 329 

Subjoined is the text of St. Thomas: 

"Sic patet quod videns est tamquam coloratura, inquatum 
habet similitudinem coloris. Et non solum videns est tamquam 
coloratura, et simile colorato; sed etiam actus cujuslibet sensus, 
est unus et idem subjecto cum actu sensibilis, sed ratione non est 
unus. Et dico autem sensus, sicut auditum secundum actum; 
et actum sensibilis, sicut sonum secundum actum. Non cnim 
semper sunt in actu: quia contingit habentia and it inn non audire, 
et habens sonum non semper sonare. Sed cum potens audire habet 
suam operationem, et potens sonare habet sonare, tunc simul jit 
sonus secundum actum qui vocatur sonatio, et auditus secundum 
actum, qui vocatur auditio. . . . Necesse est quod auditus 
dictus secundum actum, et sonus dictus secundum actum, simul 
salventur et corrumpantur: et similiter est de sapore et gustu, 
et aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Sed si dicantur secundum poten- 
tiam, non necesse est quod simul corrumpantur et salventur. 



328 Op. cit., pp. 115 sqq. 

328 Op. cit., p. 127. Italics ours. 



128 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Ex hac auteni ratione excludit opinionem antiquorum naturalium 
. . . dicens quod priores naturales non bene dicebant in hoc, 
quia opinabantur nihil esse album, aut nigrum, nisi quando 
videtur; neque saporem esse, nisi quando gustatur; et similiter 
de aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Et quia non credebant esse alia 
entia, nisi sensibilia, neque aliam virtutem congoscitivam, nisi 
sensum, credebant quod totum esse et Veritas rerum esset in apparere. 
Et ex hoc deducebantur ad credendum contradictoria simul esse 
vera, propter hoc quod diversi contradictoria opinantur. Dice- 
bant autem quodammodo recte, et quodammodo non. Cum 
enim dupliciter dicatur senus et sensibile; scilicet secundum poten- 
tiam et secundum actum; de sensu et sensibili secundum actum 
accidit quod ipsi dicebant, quod non est sensibile sine sensu. 
Non autem hoc verum est de sensu et sensibili secundum poten- 
tiam. Sed ipsi loquebantur simpliciter, id est sine distinctione, 
de his quae dicuntur multipliciter." 330 

"Magnitudo et figura et hujusmodi, quae dicuntur communia 
sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia 
propria, quae sunt objecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria 
primo et per se immutant sensum, cum sint qualitates alterantes; 
sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem . . . 
Quantitas autem est proximum subjectum qualitatis alterativae, 
ut superficies est subjectum coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia 
non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis quali- 
tatis, ut superficies ratione coloris. Nee tamen sunt sensibilia 
per accidens, quia hujusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem 
faciunt in immutatione sensus." 331 

Distinction between Natural and Supernatural Knowledge 

Before entering upon this point we shall cite a passage giving 
the Scholastic view of the "immediacy" in the religious sense. 

"II faut . . . qu'il y ait une autre connaissance de Dieu que 
la connaissance philosophique, une connaissance si facile a ac- 
querir et si certaine que l'ignorance et le doute a cet egard ne 
puissent s'expliquer, si ce n'est par une legerete coupable ou par 
une obstination orgueilleuse. Telle est aussi ... la doctrine 
commune des Saints Peres. lis distinguaient la connaissance de 
Dieu qu'on obtient au moyen de recherches savantes de celle qui 
nait spontanement en tout homme, au seul spectacle de la crea- 
tion." 

Let the thoughtful man compare this exposition of the "im- 
mediacy" of the supreme Spiritual Life with that offered by 
Eucken. 



330 Comm. de Animii, Lib. Ill, lectio i. 

331 Siimma, I. q. 78, a. 3, ad. 2. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 120 

"Cette derniere connaissance est appelee par eux un temoignage 
que Dieu a donne de lui-meme a l'ame en la creant, une dot de la 
nature, une connaissance infuse, inherente a tout homme sans 
instruction prealable, connaissance qui nait, en quelque sorte, 
d'elle-meme en meme temps que la raison se developpe et qui ne 
peut manquer que dans l'homme prive de l'usage de la raison ou 
livre aux vices qui ont corrumpu la nature avec laquelle Dieu l'a 
cree . . . Dieu a mis dans notre nature raisonnable tout ce 
qui est necessaire pour le connaitre et meme pour le connaitre 
avec facilite. . . . L'homme ne parvient pas a sa fin sans se servir 
des forces que Dieu lui a donnees, mais l'auteur de ces dons prdte 
encore a 1'homme son concours pour qu'il puisse s'en servir. 
Comme cette vie morale et religieuse, pour laquelle il a ete cree, 
est fondee sur la connaissance des verites dont nous parlons, 
Dieu veille sur l'homme pour que sa raison, en se developpant, 
parvienne a les connaitre avec facilite et certitude. Remarquons 
toutefois qu'il n'est pas question ici de la grace surnaturelle, mais 
de ce concours ou de cette assistance par laquelle Dieu est, m£me 
dans l'ordre de la nature, le premier et principal maitre de toutes 
les creatures raisonnables." 332 

Eucken has confused the natural and supernatural orders in 
such a manner as to render it very difficult to "see clear" in his 
system. On the one hand he denies to the natural order much, 
that belongs to it by right, on the other, he includes under the 
term "supernatural" truths which may be reached by the natural 
activity of the mind, and rejects the great body of supernatural 
truths communicated by Revelation. Furthermore he makes 
constant use of the Christian terms — Redeeming Love, Grace, 
Salvation, etc. — which, as has been already indicated, can have 
no true significance on his premises. 

That the "human spiritual," i.e., man's soul, has direct, super- 
natural relations with the Absolute Spiritual Life, i.e., God, 
Catholics not only may, but must grant, since it is an article of 
Christian Faith; but "Supernatural" in this case is used in a very 
different signification from that which Eucken attaches to it. 
This interior life of the soul does not fall into the domain of 
philosophy, but into that of ascetic theology. The Scholastic 
position is unfolded in the following passage : 

"II doit vraiment parattre etrange que certains ecrivains 
modernes, en parlant de la necessity d'une revelation, passent 
si legerement sur la distinction que Saint Thomas fait ressortir 
dans les premieres questions de ses plus celebres ouvrages, distinc- 



312 Klentgen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 438-441. 



130 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

tion que toute l'ecole admet. Pour les verites de l'ordre naturel 
... on peut, il est vrai, soutenir une certaine necessite de la 
revelation, mais on ne peut pas regarder cette necessite comme 
absolue. Car ces verites peuvent &tre connues par le spectacle de 
la nature et, par consequent, elles ne depassent pas les forces natur- 
relles de la raison humaine. Les obstacles que nous rencontrons 
dans cette connaissance viennent du dehors, et ont leur source, pour 
la plus grande partie, dans les egarements volontaires des homines. 
. . . Mais, pour connaitre les verites de l'ordre surnaturel, 
aucune raison creee ne peut suffire, quelque libre et puissant 
qu'on la suppose; ce sont des mysteres caches dans les decrets 
divins et qu'aucune oeuvre visible, mais la parole expresse de 
Dieu peut seule manifester. La revelation ne peut done etre 
regardee comme absolument necessaire que pour la connaissance 
de ces verites. Voila ce qui, avant toute autre consideration, 
montre son excellence et l'estime que nous en devons faire. Si, 
en effet, nous devons y attacher la plus grande valeur, ce n'est 
pas parce que sans elle nous ne pourrions parvenir a aucune 
connaissance du createur, mais plutot parce qu'elle el eve 1'homme 
au dessus de lui-meme et le rend capable de connaissances nou- 
velles et bien superieures a toutes celles qu'il aurait pu acquerir 
par ses propres forces . . . quoique la foi ne puisse exister sans 
quelque connaissance de la raison qui precede, la foi, devenue 
possible par cette connaissance, peut transporter l'esprit en des 
regions qu'il n'aurait pu atteindre par aucun essor de sa pensee." 333 

The text of St. Thomas is as follows : 

"Quia vero non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem, 
'disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere 
tentare, quantum natura rei permittit,' ut a Philosopho optime 
dictum est (Ethic, I, c. 2), et ut Boetius introducit (De Trin., c. 
2), necesse est prius ostendere quis modus possibilis sit ad verita- 
tem propositam manifestandam. Est autem in his, quae de Deo 
confitemur, duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt 
de Deo, quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt. ut 
Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt, ad quae etiam 
ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse 
unum, et alia hujusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative 
de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. Quod 
autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum, quae humanae 
rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet. Quod 
enim principium totius scientiae, quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, 
sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam 
Philosophi (Anal post. II, text. comm. 2), demonstrationis 
principium est quod quid est, opportet quod, secundum modum 
quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit eorum modus, quae de re ilia 



■ Loc. cit .. pp. 549, 550. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 131 

cognoscuntur. Unde, si intellectus humanus alicujus rei substan- 
tiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligi- 
bilium illius rei facultatem huuianae rationis excedet. Quod 
quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam, ad substantiam 
ipsius capiendam, intellectus humanus non potest natural] virtute 
pertingere, quum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis 
vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat. Et ideo ea quae in sensu non 
cadunt non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex 
sensibus eoruin cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc 
ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt, ut in eis divina substantia 
videatur quid sit, quum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequan- 
tes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam 
cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia hujusmodi, 
quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam 
intelligibilium divinorum, quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; 
quaedam vero, quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt . . . 
Idem manifeste apparet ex defectu, quern in rebus cognoscendis 
quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilium plurimas pro- 
prietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum, quas sensu appre- 
hendimus, rationem perfecte in pluribus invenire non possumus. 
Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae, trans- 
cendentis omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non 
sufBcit. Huic etiam consonat dictum Philosophi, qui asserit, 
quod 'intellectus noster sic se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt 
manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem' 
(Metaphys., II, text, comm. I). Huic etiam veritati sacra 
Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim: Forsitan vestigia 
Dei comprehendes, et usque ad perfectum omnipotcntem reperies? 
(Job II, 7). Et: Ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram 
(XXXVI, 26). Et: Ex parte cognoscimus (1 Cor. XIII, 9). Non 
igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non 
possit, statim quasi falsum est abjiciendum, ut Manichaei et 
plures infidelium putaverunt (S. Aug., Retr. I., 14). " 334 

Necessity of Divine Revelation 

That Eucken rejects historical revelation has been already 
indicated. Beyond the personal "immediacy," which we have 
shown to be wholly subjective in character, and the revelation of 
some distinct phase of the Spiritual Life in each age — as I ho 
"Geistesleben" advances to self-realization — man has neither the 
means nor the need of knowledge of God. Yet even this 
much is not easily obtained, according to Eucken himself, who 
insists that man must wrest a content from the age, and force the 



Summa contra Gentiles 1. c. 111. See also Sumina 1, q. I; a. I. 



132 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

age to yield up its content. St. Thomas, in the following extract, 
explains the necessity of Divine Revelation : 

"Dupliei igitur veritate divinorum intelligibilium exsistente, 
una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae 
omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter 
divinitus homini credenda proponitur. Hoc autem de ilia primo 
ostendendum est, quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest; ne 
forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id 
supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse. Sequeren- 
tur tamen tria inconvenientia, si hujusmodi Veritas solummodo 
rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. Unum est, quod paucis hom- 
inibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, 
qui est veritatis inventio, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. 
Quidam siquidem impediuntur propter complexionis indisposi- 
tionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum. 
Unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent, ut summum gradum 
humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum 
consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. 
Oportet enim esse, inter homines, aliquos qui temporalibus 
administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contem- 
plativae inquisitionis non possent expendere, ut ad summum 
fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicit Dei cogni- 
tionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem 
enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa prae- 
cognoscere oportet, quum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad 
Dei cognitionem ordinetur. Propter quod metaphysica, quae 
circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet 
addiscenda. Sic ergo nonnisi cum magno labore studii ad prae- 
dictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest: quern quidem 
laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cujus tamen 
mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inseruit appetitum. Secun- 
dum inconveniens est, quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis cogni- 
tionem vel inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus 
pertingerent, turn propter hujusmodi veritatis profunditatem, ad 
quam capiendam per viam rationis nonnisi post longum exercitium 
intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur; turn etiam propter multa 
quae praeexiguntur, ut dictum est . . . Tertium inconveniens 
est, quod investigation! rationis humanae plerumque falsitas 
admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in judicando et 
phantasmatum permixtionem. Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione 
remanerent ea, quae sunt rcrixsime etiam demonstrate/, dum vim 
demonstrationis ignorant, et praecipue quum videant a diversis, 
qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri. Inter multa etiam vera, 
quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod 
non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistics ratione 
asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit 
par viam fidei, fixa certitudine, ipsani veritatem de rebus divinis 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 133 

hominibus exhiberi. Salubriter ergo divina providit dementia, 
ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet; 
ut sic omnes de facili possent dkinae cognitionis participes esse et 
absque dubitatione et errore." 335 

We have to direct attention, in particular, to the italicised 
passages. In the first St. Thomas defends the power of the mind 
to discover and comprehend religious truths of the natural order, 
although some minds may fail to grasp the full force of the argu- 
ments and proofs brought before them. In the second he states 
the reason for which God, in His mercy, has given men a Divine 
Revelation — viz., that all his creatures may become easily par- 
takers of divine knowledge. 

In Present Estimate of Value of Human Life Eucken says, "The 
veil which conceals the destiny of man will not be lifted. But, 
after all, is this indispensable to true faith in our mission and the 
cheerful performance thereof?" 336 We hold that the veil has been 
lifted, and that without some light on man's final destiny even if 
it be only that obtained by the exercise of reason, true faith 
would be impossible. 

Which is to be held — that an Intelligent First Cause, Infinite 
Source of all Goodness and Truth, has abandoned minds, capable 
of knowing Him, to the most painful toil and anxiety, and to 
such uncertainty when truth is gained that "doubt is ever sapping 
the foundations anew," or, that He Who created men to know 
and love Him has Himself revealed to them all that is necessary 
to perfectly accomplish that purpose? 

Our citations, so far, have enunciated and supported three 
principles of Scholastic teaching: (1) that certainty exists; (2) 
that the human mind can attain to truth; (3) that, apart from 
Divine Revelation, truth is reached by the exercise of man's 
rational activity, whether immediately (i.e., by intution or intel- 
lectual instinct), or mediately (i.e., by reasoning). 

In our next chapter we shall inquire into the nature of truth in 
itself. 



336 Op. cit., I, I, c. IV. Italics ours. See also loc. cit., c. VI; De Verit., q. 
XIV, Art. 11. 

338 Forum, XXXIV, April-June, 1903, p. 61/5. 



CHAPTER II 
NATURE OF TRUTH 

With the exception of having given the Scholastic definition 
and Eucken's rejection thereof, we have not yet entered directly 
upon the question of the nature of truth. 

What is truth? 

Eucken defines truth as "an upward elevation of life to its own 
unity," and "an advance of life to its own perfection." 337 Surely 
these are cases of ignotum per ignotius. 

An examination of the section in Life's Basis and Life's Ideal 
entitled Problem of Truth and Reality will show how very closely 
he approaches the pragmatic doctrine on this point; the fact that 
he insists on an absolute truth while exposing very subjective views 
of truth does not increase the value of his philosophy. 

Eucken further informs us that "if the turning to the life-process 
puts the question, the assertion of an independent spiritual life 
gives the answer to it." 339 

We have shown 

1 the Life-Process of Eucken's system to be not only an 
impossibility but an inconceivability; 

2 the supposed "immediacy," alleged to result from the turn 
to the Life-Process, to be valueless as a philosophical solution: 

(a) in se because of the distrust (in this system) of the ordinary 



337 Life's Basis, op. cit., pp. 217. 219. 

338 Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. eit., p. 307. In the latest German 
edition this phrase does not occur but the idea is retained: "Sie [die Philos- 
ophic] erstrebt einen Aufbau namentlich durch die Yerbindung von drei 
Forderungen und Angriffspunkten. Sie verlangt ein Znrucktrchen aui den 
Lebensprozess, sie verlangt die Anerkennung einer geistigcn Welt in unserem 
Bereich, sie verlangt endlich, dass das Leben eine Tiefe gewinne und von ihr 
aus eine Wirklichkeit entwickle. Das zusammen fordert eine wesentliche 
Veranderung der vorhandenen Lage, es macht vieles unzulanglich, was bisher 
geniingend schien, aber es erotfnet auch eine Fiille neuer Aushlicke und die 
Mbglichkeit einer durchgangigen Erhohung. . . . Dass nur vom Leben aus 
wir uns liber uns selbst und unser Yerhaltnis zur Welt zu orientieren vermogen. 
das war ein leitender Gedanke unserer ganzen rntersuchung und das entspricht 
zweifellos einem Verlangen der Gegenwart. Dcnn iiberall horen wir den Huf 
nach einem Zuriichgehcn avf das Leben, nach einer Belebung ira besonderen 
der Erkenntnisarbeit von daher . . . ; wir miissen verlangen, dass das 
Leben sich in ein Ganzes fasse, als ein solches eigne Krafte und eigne Gesetze 
erweise und damit ein gestaltende.t M'irkcn an otter Manningfaltigkeit tibe. 
Daher ham es, dass wir gem von einem Lebensprozesse sprachen, urn die Uber- 
legenheit des Lebens gegen das individuelle Dasein zum Ausdruck zu bringen." 
Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 2te Auflage, Leipzig, 1913. Op. 
cit., p. 195. Italics ours. 

134 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 135 

revelations of the faculties through which the "immediacy" must 
come, 

(b) in its source which is non-existent; 

3 the Spiritual Life, 339 " such as Eucken describes it — and the 
identification of which with the Life-Process is necessitated by his 
Monism — to be worthless as standard or ground of truth. We 
have rejected the Geistesleben on the very grounds on which Eucken 
himself condemns another system, viz., that "it is fundamentally 
established on conflicting principles." 339 

It remains for us to expose the Scholastic theory which here, 
as elsewhere, is clear and direct. 

Scholastic Theory of Truth 

Truth is a correspondence of our thought with its object: it is 
Adequatio intellectus et rei. 

In the precise sense of the word it is a just judgment of the 
intellect. When the truth of an object is spoken of the presence 
in the object of its proper form, nature or quality is indicated. In 
this sense truth is the conformity of the object with the intelligence 
on which it depends. 

Everything which exists is true, in so far as its being is in con- 
formity with the Divine Intelligence. In so far as man has 
faculties capable of reaching truth he can, therefore, know both 
himself and other existing objects. 

Pere Thomas Pegues gives an excellent summary of the teaching 
of St. Thomas on this point, which we cite: 

"Pour preciser encore la doctrine, fort delicate, exposee dans 
cet article, nous pouvons nous demander, d'un mot, a son sujet, 
ce qu'est la verite. Qu'est-ce que la verite? Distinguons tout de 
suite entre la verite d'un objet, et la verite, d'une fagon absolue. 
La verite d'un objet n'est rien autre que la presence, en cet objet, 
de la forme ou de la nature ou de la qualite qu'il doit avoir. C'est 
la conformite de cet objet avec l'intelligence dont il depend. La 
verite, d'une facon absolue, c'est la qualite d'une intelligence 
disant d'une chose qu'elle est ou qu'elle est telle, quand, en effet, 
cette chose est et est telle, ou disant qu'elle n'est pas et qu'elle 
n'est pas telle, quand, en realite, elle n'est pas et n'est pas telle. 
C'est la conformite de l'intelligence qui affirme ou qui nie avec 



338a Perhaps the best description of the "Spiritual Life" of which Eucken 
strives to give us a concept is that it is a static aspect of the Life- Process. 
This suggests a contradiction, but contradiction is inevitable in Monism. 

339 Philosophy of Friedrieh Froebel by R. Eucken, Forum, Vol. XXX, Oct.. 
1900. p. 179. 



136 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

ce qu'elle nie ou affirme. Et done la verite, d'une fagon absolue, 
la verite, au sens premier de ce mot, la verite, en tant que bien 
ou perfection de l'intelligence, la verite, au sens pur et simple, la 
verite tout court ne peut-etre que dans l'intelligence qui nie ou 
qui affirme (formellement, ou eminemment, comme nous l'expli- 
querons quand il s'agira de la verite en Dieu) ; mais elle peut §tre 
et elle est (elle, ou son contraire, . . .) dans toute intelligence 
qui affirme ou qui nie. C'est une propriete, e'est la propriete de 
cette intelligence. Des la qu'une intelligence nie ou affirme, elle 
a la verite (ou son contraire); et elle Fa comme chose possedee, 
comme bien propre, comme sa perfection (ou sa degradation, s'il 
s'agissait de Ferreur); elle Fa, pour garder Fexpression de St. 
Thomas, comme chose connue. Car cette expression 'comme chose 
connue' ne doit pas s'entendre en ce sens seulement qu'on s'aperce- 
vrait que la chose est, quand on dit qu'elle est, ou qu'elle n'est 
pas quand on dit qu'elle n'est pas, ce qui ne mettrait la verite 
que dans une operation reflexe de l'intelligence. La verite se 
trouve aussi dans Foperation directe de l'intelligence, et la verite 
en tant que bien de l'intelligence possede par elle. II suffit qu'on 
dise d'une chose qu'elle est, quand elle est, ou qu'elle n'est pas 
quand elle n'est pas, pour que la verite, bien propre de l'intelli- 
gence, soit en elle a titre de bien possede, quoique non peut-etre 
de bien conscient. La verite est alors dans l'intelligence comme 
chose connue, en ce sens que la connaissance que Fon a est une 
verite, la verite consistant dans Faffirmation juste ou la negation 
exacte de l'intelligence. On prendra conscience de cette verite 
que Fon a, que Fon possede, quand on se justifiera a soi-meme 
Fexactitude de son affirmation ou de sa negation. La verite 
est done, au sens precis du mot, un jugement juste de l'intelligence. 
[C. F. le Commentaire de Cajetan sur le present article] Voila ce 
qu'est la verite prise en elle-me'me." 340 

And again: 

"Au corps de Farticle, saint Thomas commence par nous 
rappeler ce qu'est la verite, en nous disant ou elle se trouve. 
'La verite se trouve et dans l'intelligence selon qu'elle saisit la 
chose comme elle est, et dans les choses selon qu'elles ont un 
etre qui peut s'adapter a l'intelligence. Or cela, c'est en Dieu 
qu'on le trouve au souverain degre. En effet, son 6tre n'est pas 
seulement conforme a son acte d'intellection; il est cet acte meme. 
Et son acte d'intellection est la mesure et la cause de tout autre 
6tre et de tout autre acte d'intellection. Et II est Lui-me'me son 
6tre et son acte d'intellection. De telle sorte que non seulement 
la verite est en Lui, mais II est encore la Verite elle-m£me souver- 
aine et premiere." 341 



iiC R. P. Pegues, O.P. (.'ommeutaire Frangais Littoral de la Somnie Th£o- 
logique, I., Traits de Dieu, II, pp. 174-176, Toulouse, 1907. 
»« Op. cit., p. 183. 



KUDOLP ElJCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 137 

In God, then, Being not only corresponds, in a sovereign degree, 
to His act of "intellection," It is this act. And His act of "intellec- 
tion" is the cause and the measure of every other existence and of 
every other act of intelligence. 

// we start from these truths we may find Eucken's words that 
"the turn to the Life-Process puts the question" and "the spiritual 
life gives the answer" very full of meaning. In order to know, 
man must turn to what is within and without him, he must 
examine the created objects which are, as well as he himself is, 
reflections and imperfect manifestations of God Himself, Who is 
the Living Truth. Since the truth of objects depends absolutely 
on His Infinite Wisdom, which sets to each its proper being, the 
assertion of an Independent Spiritual Life does give the answer to 
the problem. How do we know objects possess truth? We know 
it through our knowledge that they are the work of an All Wise and 
All Powerful Creator — Who is the Fulness of the Uncreated 
Spiritual Life. As "Life-process" does not with us include the 
whole universe we should get a more comprehensive word which 
would comprise the inanimate : then within the conditions we have 
pointed out we would endorse Eucken's statement. 

We add another extract directed against the pragmatic doctrines 
with which Eucken has so much in common. 

"U (le P. Janssens) fait remarquer que cette immutability de 
la verite dont nous parle saint Thomas au sujet de la verite 
divine et de la verite des choses, ruine par la base la theorie chere 
a beaucoup d'esprits, meme parmi les catholiques, et qui consiste 
a supposer dans toutes les sciences, merne dans la science sacree, 
meme dans les dogmes les plus essentiels de notre foi, une sorte 
devolution indefinie. Nous avons deja signale cette tendance a 
propos de la connaissance que nous avons de Dieu et de la ma- 
niere dont nous le nommons. Et sans doute . . . l'intelligence 
humaine par elle-m£me n'est pas immuablement fixee dans la 
verite, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle ne puisse pas s'etablir 
d'une facon stable dans telles et telles verites demontrees a la 
lumiere des premiers principes; et a plus forte raison, qu'elle ne 
puisse pas 6tre fixee par Dieu d'une facon surnaturelle dans telles 
et telles verites revelees. Ces verites, une fois connues, ne chan- 
gent pas; il faudrait, pour qu'elles changent, que l'homme perde la 
raison ou la foi. Elles sont immuables a tout jamais. Elles le 
sont pour chaque individu; a plus forte raison, pour 1'universalite 
du genre humain et pour l'Eglise dans sa totalite. Rever d'une 
doctrine, soit philosophique, soit theologique, qui changerait 
sans cesse et ou il n'y aurait rien de fixe, non pas m£me les grands 



138 KlIDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

principes de la raison ou les doctrines fondamentales qui en decou- 
lent, ni les articles du Symbole ou les definitions de l'Eglise et le 
corps de doctrine qui n'est que la resultante de ces definitions ou 
de ces articles et des principes de la raison ou de ses doctrines 
fondamentales, — n'est pas seulement une chimere, c'est une folie 
et une impiete. Et il ne sert de rien, pour justifier de telles 
pretentions, d'en appeler a telle doctrine philosophique plus ou 
moins en vogue de nos jours . . . ou a l'histoire des multiples 
opinions des hommes tant par mi les theologiens que parmi les 
philosophes. Car a cela nous repondrons qu'une doctrine phil- 
osophique, meme tres en vogue, peut etre radicalement fausse; 
... La verite de Dieu est immuable; et par consequent lorsque 
Dieu a parle, ce qu'Il a dit ne changera pas. De ni§me la verite 
que refletent les choses et qui n'est encore, en un sens, que la 
verite de Dieu, sera toujours necessairement elle-meme. Et 
quand nos esprits s'y adaptent par la vue directe ou par le raisonne- 
ment sage, eux aussi participent a la meme immutabilite. Ce 
qui n'est pas a dire que nous excluions tout progres du cote de nos 
intelligences. Car pour tant que nous V Studious, nous n'arriverons 
jamais a saisir dans toute son Stendue la vSritS de la nature ni a 
scruter dans toute sa profondeur la vSritS de Dieu. Mais ce qui est 
acquis, est acquis. Et ce n'est pas a remettre toujours tout en 
question ou a douter de tout, que peut consister le vrai progres 
de la raison. L'evolution, ainsi entendue, n'est rien autre que 
l'agnosticisme, et conduit tout droit au nihilisme intellectual." 342 

Truth then is eternal and unchangeable; and for man a necessary 
truth once perceived is as changeless as for God Himself. 

Our concluding passage is from an author to whom we have 
already made abundant reference. In the summary of his treatise 
on Certainty Balmes writes : 

"Complete truth, like perfect good, exists only with harmony. 
This is a necessary law, and to it man is subject. Since we do not 
intuitively see the infinite truth in which all truths are one, and 
all good is one; and as we are in relation with a world of finite, 
and consequently multiple beings, we need different powers to 
place us in contact, so to speak, with this variety of truths and 
finite goods; but as they, in their turn, spring from one same 
principle, and are directed to one same end, they are submitted to 
harmony, which is the unity of multiplicity. With these doctrines 
we believe philosophy without skepticism to be possible. Exami- 
nation is not excluded: on the contrary, it is extended and com- 
pleted. This method has another advantage; it does not make 
philosophy extravagant and philosophers exceptional. 



342 Op. cit., pp. 198-200. Italics are ours. Those who wish to pursue the 
treatment of St. Thomas in the original may consult Quaestiones Disputatae 3; 
De Veritate, q.s, 1 5. 



EUDOLF EUCKBN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 139 

Philosophy cannot be so generalized as to become popular; 
human nature is opposed to this, but there is not on the other hand 
any necessity of condemning it to a misanthropic isolation by 
force of extravagant professions. In such a case philosophy 
degenerates into philosophism. Exposition of facts, conscientious 
examination, clear language; such we conceive sound philosophy 
to be. This does not require it to cease to be profound, unless by 
profoundness be meant darkness. The rays of the sun light up the 
remotest depths of space. I am aware that some philosophers 
of our age think otherwise, that they deem it necessary, when 
they examine the fundamental questions of philosophy, to shake 
the foundations of the world; and yet I have never been able to 
persuade myself that it was necessary to destroy in order to exam- 
ine, or that in order to become philosophers we ought to become 
madmen." 343 

If this is naivetS most thinking men will choose to be naive. 



Fundamental Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 242, 243. 



CHAPTER III 
THE ABSOLUTE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN SE 

In the preceding chapters we have dwelt mainly on the theory 
of knowledge and the nature of truth. We propose to give here a 
brief exposition of the Scholastic teaching with regard to the 
Foundation of all truth and reality — the Absolute Spiritual Life. 

(a) This Absolute Spiritual Life is "a God who is numerically 
One, who is Personal; the Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all 
things, the life of Law and Order, the Moral Governor; One who is 
Supreme and Sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself 
which all are but His creatures; distinct from, independent of them 
all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever 
been and ever will be, to whom nothing is past or future; who is 
all perfection, and the fulness and archetype of every possible 
excellence, the Truth Itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness ; One 
who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible. 
These are some of the distinctive prerogatives" to be ascribed 
"unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being . . . God," 
the Absolute Spiritual Life. 344 

This supreme Spiritual Life is immutable: St. Thomas proves 
this truth thus : 

''Prima autem, et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte 
motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in 
hoc mundo: omne autem, quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil 
enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud, ad 
quod movetur: movet autem aliquid, secundum quod est actu. 
Movere enim nihil aliud est, quam educere aliquid de potentia in 
actum. De potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, 
nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit 
lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc 
movet, et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile, ut idem sit 
simul in actu, et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum 
diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse 
calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile 
est ergo, quod secundum idem, et eodem modo aliquid sit movens, 
et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum: omne ergo, quod movetur, 
oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id, a quo movetur, moveatur, 
oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et illud ab alio: hie autem non est 

144 Newman, Grammar of Assent, op. cit., p. 101. 
140 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 141 

procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens, 
et per consequens nee aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda 
non movent nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut 
baculus non mo vet, nisi per hoc, quod est motus a manu; ergo 
necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo 
moveatur; et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum." 345 

"Ad Primum sicproceditur. Videtur, quod Deus non sit omnino 
immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo 
mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit August. 8. super Gen. ad litter. 
(cap. 20, in fin.) : Spiritus Creator movet se, nee per tempus, nee 
per locum; ergo Deus est aliquo modo mutabilis. 

2. Praeterea. Sap. 7. dicitur de Sapientia, quod est mobilior 
omnibus mobilibus. Sed Deus est ipsa Sapientia; ergo Deus est 
mobilis. 

3. Praeterea. Appropinquare et elongari, motum significant: 
hujusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura Jac. 4: Appropin- 
quate Deo; et appropinquabit vobis; ergo Deus est mutabilis. 

Sed contra est, quod dicitur Malach. 3: Ego Deus, et non mutor. 

Respondeo dicendum, quod ex praemissis (q. 2, art. 3) ostenditur : 
Deum esse omnino immutabilem. 

Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est (ibid.) esse aliquod 
primum ens, quod Deum dicimus; et quod hujusmodi primum ens 
oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicujus potentiae, 
eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem, 
quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. 
Ex quo patet, quod impossibile est, Deum aliquo modo mutari. 

Secundo, quia omne, quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, 
et quantum ad aliquid transit: sicut quod movetur de albedine in 
nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam; et sic in omni eo quod 
movetur, attenditur aliqua composito. Ostensum est autem 
supra (q. 3, art. 7), quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino 
simplex. Unde manifestum est, quod Deus moveri non potest. 
Tertio, quia omne, quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et 
pertingit ad illud, ad quod prius non pertingebat; Deus autem, cum 
sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem per- 
fectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nee extendere 
se in aliquid, ad quod prius non pertingebat. Unde, nullo modo 
sibi competit motus. Et inde est, quod quidam antiquorum, quasi 
ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immo- 
bile. Ad Primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus (loc. cit. 
in arg.) ibi loquitur secundum modum, quo Plato dicebat primum 
movens movere seipsum: omnem operationem nominans motum, 
secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere, et velle, et amare motus 
quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit, et amat seipsum, 
secundum hoc dixerunt, quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem 
secundum quod motus, et mutatio est existentis in potentia: ut 
nunc loquimur de mutatione, et motu. 



45 Sum I, q. 2, art. ?5. 



142 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse 
similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit 
usque ad ultima rerum : nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat 
a divina sapientia per quamdam imitationem, sicut a primo 
principio effectivo, et formali, prout etiam artificiata procedunt 
a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur, inquantum similitudo divinae 
sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis, quae magis participant 
de ejus similitudine, usque ad infima rerum, quae minus participant, 
dicitur esse quidam processus, et motus divinae sapientiae in res, 
sicut si dicamus solem procedere usque ad terrain, inquantum 
radius luminis ejus usque ad terram pertingit. Et hoc modo 
exponit Dionys. cap 1, Coelestis hierarch. (in princ.) dicens, quod 
omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit ad nos a Patre luminum 
moto. 

Ad Tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi dicuntur de Deo in 
Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum, 
vel exire, inquantum radius ejus pertingit ad domum: sic dicitur 
Deus appropinquare ad nos, vel recedere a nobis, inquantum 
percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus." 346 

"Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia sunt ipsae formae subsis- 
tentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse ipsarum, sicut potentia ad 
actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem hujus actus: quia 
esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur, nisi per hoc, quod 
amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse : 
et ideo hujusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles, et invariabiles 
secundum esse: et hoc est, quod dicit Dionys. 4. cap. de Div. Nom. 
(parum a princ. led. 1.) quod substantiae intellectuals creatae 
rnundae sunt a generatione, et ab omni variatione, sicut incorporates, 
et immateriales: sed tamen remanet in eis duplex mutabilitas. 
Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic est in eis 
mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut Damascen. 
(lib. 2, cap. 3. et 4.) dicit. Alia secundum locum : inquantum virtute 
sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca, quae prius non attinge- 
bant: quod de Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca 
replet, ut supra dictum est (q. 8. art. 9). . . . Unde cum Deus 
nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, proprium ejus est, omnino 
immutabilem esse." 3 ® 

Pere Pegues, following St. Thomas, gives a clear and inspiring 
exposition of this truth: 

"Saint Thomas nous previent que 'de tout ce que nous avons 
dit jusqu'ici, il resulte que Dieu est tout a fait immuable.' On le 
peut montrer a l'aide de trois raisons: premierement, parce quTl 
est le premier Etre; secondement, parce quTl est souverainement 
simple; troisiemement, parce qu'en Lui se trouve la plenitude de 
la perfection. — 'Nous avons montre plus haut (q. 2, art. 3) qu'il 



846 Sum I, q. 9, art. 1. 

™ Ibid., q. 9, art. 2. Vide loc. cit., q.s. 3, 4, 6-11; IS, 14; 18-22; 25. 26. 44. 



EUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 143 

est un premier Etre, que nous appelons Dieu, et que ce premier 
Etre doit etre acte pur, sans aucun melange de puissance, parce 
que la puissance en tant que telle suppose un certain acte qui lui 
est anterieur. Puis done qu'en tout etre qui change, quelle que 
soit d'ailleurs la nature du changement, se trouve necessairement 
quelque puissance, il s'ensuit que Dieu,' Etre premier ou acte pur, 
'ne peut changer en aucune maniere,' qu'Il est tout a fait immuable. 
— 'Dieu est souverainement simple, e'est-a-dire qu'il n'y a en 
Lui aucune composition, de quelque nature qu'on la suppose.' 
II n'est done pas possible d'imaginer en Dieu plusieurs parties 
dont 1'une demeurerait tandis que l'autre passerait. Or, 'en tout 
£tre qui change, il faut trouver cela: un quelque chose qui passe 
et un quelque chose qui demeure; e'est ainsi qu'une chose blanche 
qui devient noire demeure quant a sa substance; et done en tout 
ce qui change nous devons trouver une certaine composition. 
II s'ensuit que Dieu,' qui est souverainement simple, 'ne peut 
absolument pas etre soumis au changement.' — Enfin, 'Dieu 
est au sommet de toute perfection; II est infini, et en Lui se 
trouve la plenitude de l'etre. II s'ensuit qu'il n'y a rien,' en dehors 
de Lui, 'qu'il puisse acquerir on qu'il puisse atteindre alors qu'au- 
paravant II ne l'atteindrait pas.' II a tout deja et d'une fagon 
sureminente. Si done tout mouvement, tout changement a 
pour but d'acquerir quelque chose, une perfection, qu'on n'avait 
pas, il s'ensuit que Dieu, ayant tout de par son fond, ne peut 
aucunement changer on se mouvoir. II est done totalement 
immuable. — La splendide verite! Et comme elle fait du bien a 
lame, comme elle est consolante! Dieu est totalement immuable. 
Que nous importe, des lors, que tout change autour de nous, 
puisque au-dessus de nous se trouve quelqu'un pour qui nous 
sommes faits, et qui, Lui, ne change pas. Nous nous donnons 
beaucoup de mal, nous nous tourmentons beaucoup pour arriver 
a ces multiples fins que que nous nous proposons toujours et qui 
toujours nous echappent; et nous oublions que nous sommes les 
enfants de Celui qui possede en Lui la plenitude de tout bien, 
et qui, partant, n'a pas a, chercher en dehors de Lui. Se suffisant 
pleinement a Lui-meme, il se repose eternellement dans l'immuable 
serenite de son Etre et de ses perfections infinies. S'appuyer sur 
Lui, ne chercher que Lui, ne serait-ce pas participer en quelque 
maniere a son immuable et inalterable serenite? . . . En 
finissant son corps d'article, saint Thomas nous fait remarquer 
que la grande verite qu'il vient d'etablir est si eblouissante de 
clarte qu'elle a contraint 'plusieurs esprits,' nieme 'parmi les 
anciens philosophes' pourtant si ignorants des choses de Dieu, et 
qui, 'forces par l'evidence, avaient affirme que le premier principe 
des choses etait immuable.' . . . en un certain sens il est 
permis de dire que 'Dieu se meut, qu'il y a du mouvement en Lui. 
Mais alors on prend le mot mouvement, non pas au sens on nous 
le prenons maintenant et ou on le prend d'ordinaire, e'est-a-dire 



144 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

au sens d'un acte qui perfectionne un &tre en puissance, mais au 
sens general d'acte on d'operation. C'est ainsi que l'entendaient 
Platon et saint Augustin; et, dans ce sens,' Aristote lui-meme con- 
cede que 'Dieu se meut, c'est-a-dire qu'Il agit, qu'Il op ere, non 
d'une action et d'une operation quelconques, mais de ces opera- 
tions qui n'emportent aucune imperfection, qui sont au con- 
traire le couronnement et l'achevement de la perfection. Telles 
sont les operations intellectuelles, connattre, vouloir, aimer, et 
le reste.' " 348 

(b) The Supreme Spiritual Life being absolutely changeless 
it is impossible to conceive of it as "developing dialectically 
through self-diremption and self-return." 349 

The problem of the relation of the Absolute Spiritual Life to the 
universe admits, therefore, of only one solution: it is the relation 
of Creator to creature. This solution is eminently rational and 
is the only one which can safeguard the integrity and sanctity of 
God, and the free-will of man. A contemporary scientist writes: 
"Since we have begun by admitting God's existence, or rather 
since we have taken it as the corner-stone, we recognize in Him 
the Creator. The difficulties which now surround us come from 
the inability of our finite minds to grasp all that creation implies. 
Again the trouble is not with our reason so much as with our 
imagination. The idea that Omnipotence can make something 
out of nothing is clear enough and sound enough; but there are 
those who puzzle their minds by trying to imagine how it is done, 
and so cannot get rid of anthropomorphic conceptions." 350 



348 Commentaire Frangais Litteral, op. cit., I. I., pp. 255-257. 

349 B. Gibson, R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 154. The passage 
which expresses Eucken's views fairly is as follows: "No just conception of 
the meaning which Eucken attaches to this fundamental concept can possibly 
be gained so long as we fail to bear in mind that the spiritual life, however 
deep and divine our conception of it may be, is not an oppositionless experience, 
but shares, qua personal, the essential characteristic of all [?] personal activity 
— that, namely, of developing dialectically through self-diremption and self- 
return. It is within the spiritual life itself that all oppositions are at once 
created and overcome. The opposition between life and death, which is the 
divinest stimulus of our human existence, is in this sense indigenous to the 
spiritual life [!!] The conquest over death, though it raise the whole spiritual 
condition and profoundly modify our whole spiritual perspective, can hardly be 
held to cancel once and for all the oppositional, self-diremptive character of 
spiritual life. . . . Hence to conceive the spiritual life aright, we have not 
to abstract from its oppositional quality or conceive it as developing apart 
from the pain and the evil, the ignorance and the ugliness which it resists." 
This is truly surprising language when we recollect that Gibson has described 
Eucken's philosophy as "a restatement and development in philosophical 
form of the religious teaching of Jesus"!! Op. cit., p. 166. 

:,r, ° Thomas Dwight, M.D., LL.D. (late Professor of Anatomy at Harvard). 
Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, New York. 1911, p. 97. 



Rl'DOLF El'CKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 145 

St. Thomas writes : 

"To every effect produced by God there is either something 
pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces 
some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, 
we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we 
must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose 
anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something 
cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which 
anything is made (Bk. I, Chap. XVI) : nor can it be any other 
being, distinct from God and uncaused by God ... It is 
not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by 
movement and change : for not by movement and change is being, 
as such, made out of not-being, as such, but 'being this' is made 
out of 'not being this.' But God is the universal principle of 
being (Chap. XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only 
by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make 
anything . . . God is in actuality, not by anything inhering in 
Him, but to the whole extent of His substance (B. I., Chap. XVIII) . 
Therefore the proper mode of divine action is to produce the whole 
subsistent thing, and not a mere inherent thing, as is form in 
matter. Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, 
that, though in one and the same being, which is sometimes in 
potentiality, sometimes in actuality, potentiality is prior in time 
to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature), yet, absolutely 
speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from 
this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some 
actual being. But matter [i.e., materia prima, or primordial 
matter] is being in potentiality. Therefore God, first and pure 
actuality, must be absolutely prior to matter, and consequently 
cause thereof." 351 

"Every movement or change is the actualization of something 
that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation 
there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the subject 
of the action. The extremes of movement or change fall under 
the same order, being either of the same kind, as contraries are, 
or sharing one common potentiality of matter. But nothing of 
this can be in creation, to which no previous condition of things 
is supposed. In every change or movement there must be some- 
thing coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the 
whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be 
any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: 
because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed 
to production." 352 

"Hence appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn 
from the nature of movement or change, — as that creation must 



151 God and His Creatures, op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVI. 
' 52 Op. cit., B. II. Chap. XVII. 



146 KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

be in some subject, or that not-being must be transmuted into 
being : for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence of 
created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes 
under the category of relation: hence the subject of creation may 
very well be said to be the thing created. Nevertheless creation 
is spoken of as a 'change' according to our mode of conceiving it, 
inasmuch as our understanding takes one and the same thing to 
be now non-existent and afterwards existing. If creation (crea- 
turedom) is a relation, it is evidently some sort of reality; and this 
reality is neither uncreated, nor created by a further act of creation. 
For since the created effect really depends on the Creator, this 
relation must be a certain reality. Now every reality is brought 
into being by God; and therefore also this reality is brought into 
being by God, and yet was not created by any other creation than 
that of the first creature, because accidents and forms do not 
exist by themselves, and therefore neither are they terms of separ- 
ate creation, since creation is the production of substantial being; 
but as they are 'in another,' so are they created in the creation of 
other things." 353 

It is difficult to form a mental picture of Creation, but is it easier 
to form an image of the ultimate constituents of the universe? 

Whether we hold the atom to be indivisible with Dalton, or 
split it into electrons with Thompson, or adopt the Dynamical 
Theory of Boscovitch, or the Dynamism of Ostwald we are far 
from having a clear conception as to what matter really is in last 
analysis. 

(c) Another problem arises from that of creation : it is that of 
immanence and transcendence. How is the Infinite Creator, Who is 
"like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself," "distinct from, 
independent of them all," present to His Creatures? Eucken 
discusses the question at considerable length, 354 yet in his concep- 
tion of the Geistesleben there is absolutely no possibility of predi- 
cating transcendence of it. How can that which is of the essence 
of things, and Eucken claims this for the Geistesleben, be at the 
same time wholly distinct from them? Boyce Gibson touches 
on the subject while maintaining the oppositional character of 
the spiritual life- He writes: 

"To conceive immanence apart from transcendence is to conceive 
it metaphorically in the light of the spatial distinction between 
inclusion and exclusion, and not as a spiritual immanence which, 
qua spiritual, includes within itself the oppositions of sameness 



363 Op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVIII. 

364 See especially Geistige Stromungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., E2, Das 
Problem der Religion, p. 390. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 147 

and otherness, of self -surrender and true freedom. The Divine 
immanence implies, then, the Divine transcendence; or, to express 
the same truth in the simpler language of emotion, love implies 
reverence; intimacy, respect. And what in God must transcend 
all human appropriation is an inwardness of Divine experience, 
unapproachable save through an emotion of reverence, which is 
none other than love itself become aware of its own intrinsic 
limitation." 355 

A careful reading of this passage reveals its pantheistic tendency. 
How can "immanence" include within itself "sameness and other- 
ness?" We are confronted with the old difficulty of the presence 
of incompatible elements in the concept of the Geistesleben. Not 
only does "an inwardness of Divine experience" transcend "all 
human appropriation," but God Himself, in every respect, infinitely 
transcends such appropriation. Faith teaches us that a super- 
natural union of the soul with God is effected by Divine Grace, 
but such a union transcends the natural powers of the soul, and 
is completely outside and beyond the sphere of philosophy. As 
has already been pointed out God cannot be known, in the present 
life, as He essentially is, but only as the cause is known by the 
effect. 356 

Gibson, still interpreting Eucken, is more explicit in the fol- 
lowing : 

"Human freedom, truly interpreted, is seen to imply the Divine 
omnipresence, not as a mere postulate, a mere hope, a desire, or 
even a belief, but in the sense of the higher pantheism, as an inti- 
macy closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and 
feet." 357 

The Divine Omnipresence cannot be conceived in the light of 

pantheistic philosophy: it is just this which transcendence prohibits. 

Though Faith, as well as reason, teaches us that God is more 

intimately present to His creatures than the mind can grasp, 

yet God is, at the same time, infinitely distinct from them, for 

while being with them or in them by His essence He is not of 

their essence. The concluding words ("as an intimacy, etc.") 

of the cited passage recall the works of Catholic Theologians and 

ascetic writers — notably those of Father Faber. Indeed both 

Eucken and his interpreters have had frequent recourse, in our 



866 R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 157. 

366 See God and His Creatures, op. cit., B. Ill, Chap. XLVII. 

367 Op. cit., p. 156. Italics ours. 



148 Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 

opinion, to Catholic writings in order to "fill in" the content of the 
Geistesleben, and to strengthen their philosophy. We feel justified 
in stating that if we subtracted from Activism all that has been 
taken from Scholasticism 358 and from Catholic ascetic writings 
the barrenness of the residuum would be startling. 

The following is the Scholastic teaching with regard to immanence 
and transcendence: 

"God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor 
as an accident; but as an agent is present to anything upon which 
it works. An agent must be joined to anything wherein it acts 
immediately, and touch it by its own power; hence it is proved 
that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. 
Since God is Existence itself by His own Essence, so created exist- 
ence must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of 
fire. God causes this effect in things not only when they first 
begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in existence; as 
light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illumi- 
nated. Therefore as long as a thing exists, God must be present 
to it, according to its mode of existence. 

"The existence (esse) of anything is all the closer to it and all 
the more profoundly belongs to it as the formal idea of all that 
is in it, as was shown above (Q. VII). Hence it must be that God 
exists intimately in all things. . . . God is above all things by 
the excellence of His nature; moreover, He is in all things as the 
cause of the being of all things. . . . No action of any agent, 
however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a 
medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts 
immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, 
as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be 
distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; 
as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature. . . . 
to be in a place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by 
way of other things — i.e., when anything is said to be in other 
things, no matter how, as the accidents of a place are in the place; 
or by a way proper to place, as things placed are in the place. In 
both these in some way God is in every place; which means to exist 
everywhere. First, He is so in all things as giving them being, 
and power, and operation; for He is in every place as giving it 
existence and locative power. Also, things placed are in place, 
inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, 
like a body; for a body is said to fill place, inasmuch as it does not 
suffer the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a 
place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the 
very fact that He gives existence to everything in every place, He 



ass ^y e p i n ted out in Part II the influence of Scholastic teaching on Eucken. 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 149 

fills every place. . . . Incorporeal things are not in place by 
contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are; but by contact of 
power . . . God is in anything in two ways; in one way as its 
active cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in 
another way He is in things as the object of operation is in the 
operator; and this belongs to the operations of the soul, according 
as the thing known is in the one who knows ; and the thing desired 
in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the 
rational creature, which knows and loves Him actually or habit- 
ually. And because the rational creature possesses this preroga- 
tive by grace, as will be shown later (Q. XII), He is said to be thus 
in the Saints by grace. How He is in other things created by Him, 
must be considered from human affairs as ordinarily known. A 
king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, 
although he is not everywhere present. Anything is said to be 
present in other things subject to its inspection; as things in a 
house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not 
be in substance in every part of the house. A thing is said to be 
in a place by way of substance or essence wherever its substance 
may be . . . God is in all things by His Power. . . . There- 
fore, God is in all things by His Power, inasmuch as all things are 
subject to His Power; He is by His Presence in all things, as all 
things are bare and open to His eyes; 359 He is in all things by His 
Essence, inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things. 
. . . His Substance is to all things the cause of existence. . . . 
Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the 
one who knows; and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence 
things are more truly in God by knowledge and will than God is in 
things. . . . No other perfection, but Grace, added to substance, 
renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; 
therefore only Grace constitutes a singular mode of God's existence 
in things. There is, however, another singular mode of God's 
existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own 
place (Part III)." 360 



369 It is hardly necessary to remark that this expression does not imply 
anything anthropomorphic in St. Thomas' point of view, but is purely hgura- 
tive. 

360 Summa, Eng. translation by Fathers of Eng. Dominican Province, 
New York, 1911, I, I, q. VIII, arts. 1, 2, 3. As the mystery of the 
Incarnation is wholly beyond the sphere of philosophy, it has been 
merely referred to in the closing paragraph. The words of St. Paul, "In Him 
we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts XVII, 28), are borne out by the 
following from St. Thomas: "Although corporeal things are said to be in 
anything as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain 
those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also 
God is in things as containing them; nevertheless by a certain similitude to 
corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are 
contained by Him." (Op. cit., 1, 1, q. VIII, a. 1, obj. 2.) How wholly removed 
from the pantheistic conception is this presence the entire Scholastic doctrine 
shows. The concluding passage of Dr. Dubray's article on the Philosophy of 



150 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

From this exposition it is evident that monism of essence is not 
only an absurdity, it is a blasphemy. Monism of purpose — 
oneness in origin and destiny — such is the only unity to which all 
multiplicity is reducible. We cite again from Balmes : 

"The human mind seeks that by reason to which it is impelled 
by an intellectual instinct; how to reduce plurality to unity, to 
re-unite, as it were, all the variety of existences in a point from 
which they all proceed, and in which they are all absorbed. The 
understanding knows that the conditioned must be included in 
the unconditioned, the relative in the absolute, the finite in the 
infinite, the various in the one. In this, all religions, all schools of 
philosophy agree. The proclamation of this truth belongs to no 
one of them exclusively; it is to be met with in all countries of the 
world, in primitive times, back even to the cradle of the human 
race. Beautiful, sublime tradition! Preserved through all genera- 
tions, amid the ebb and flow of events, it offers us the idea of the 
Divinity presiding over the origin and destiny of the universe. 
Yes! The unity sought by philosophers is the Divinity itself, — 
the Divinity whose glory the firmament declares, and whose 
august face of ineffable splendor appears to us in our inmost 
consciousness. Yes! it is the Divinity which enlightens and 
guides the true philosopher, but blinds and confounds the proud 
sophist; it is what the true philosopher calls God, and venerates 
and adores in the sanctuary of his soul. . . . Considering its 
personality, its consciousness, its infinite intelligence, and its 
most perfect liberty, it is the foundation and the copestone of 
religion: distinct from the world, it produced the world from 
nothing, and preserves and governs it, and leads it by mysterious 
paths to the destiny assigned in its immutable decrees. There is 
then unity in the world; there is unity in philosophy. In this all 
agree; the difference is that some separate, with the greatest care, 
the finite from the infinite, the thing created from the creative 
power, unity from multiplicity, and maintain the necessary com- 
munication between the free will of the omnipotent agent and 



Henri Bergson applies with equal force to every pantheistic system, and may 
be directed against the "higher pantheism" (vide Boyce Gibson, op. cit., p. 
156) of Eucken. It runs as follows: "It is, therefore, in a sense different 
from that of Saint Paul that Professor Bergson applies to the absolute as 
conceived by him the words which the Apostle applies to God (Acts XVII, 28). 
No; it is not of the absolute felt vaguely in intuition, but of God as known by 
reason, 'for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood 
by the things that are made' (Rom. I, 20); it is not of the absolute conceived 
as becoming, but of God who gives to Himself the name of 'He who is' (Exod. 
Ill, 14) and who 'changeth not' (Mai. Ill, 6); it is not of the absolute who has 
nothing of the already made, but of God of whose 'greatness there is no end' 
(Ps. CXLIV, 3), that St. Paul speaks when he utters the sublime words: 'In 
Him we live, and move, and have our being.' " (Catholic University Bulletin, 
April, 1914, p. 323.) 



KUDOLF ElTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 151 

finite existences, between the wisdom of the sovereign intelligence 
and the fixed course of the universe: while others, affected with 
melancholy blindness, confound the effect with the cause, the 
finite with the infinite, the various with the one, and re-produce 
in the domain of philosophy the chaos of primeval times; but all 
scattering and in frightful confusion, without any hope of order 
or union. . . . The absurd systems invented by philosophical 
vanity explain nothing; the system of religion, which is that also 
of sound philosophy, and of all mankind, explains everything." 361 

We have concluded a brief survey of Scholastic philosophy: 
it remains to be considered whether Eucken's attack is refuted 
thereby. 



361 Balmes, op. cit., pp. 64 sqq. 



CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 

Eucken' s Attack on ScJwlasticism and Its Refutation 

Eucken's early attitude was favorable to Scholasticism rather 
than the reverse. His first four articles dealing with the subject 
were a distinct advance upon Prantl and men of similar caliber. 
This was largely due, doubtless, to the influence of Teichmiiller 
and Trendelenburg — an influence exerted in the direction of 
Aristotelianism — and was not far-reaching. In proportion as 
Eucken has developed his own irrationalistic system he has shown 
an increasingly bitter and hostile spirit to Scholastic philosophy. 
One might almost infer he realized that here, and here only, was 
the rock against which his inconsistent theory would go to pieces. 

As has already been pointed out, Eucken has struck the note of 
challenge to Scholasticism, in one form or another, in a number of 
his works: his anti-intellectualism is, in itself, a challenge. 362 

We do not propose to examine into his charges in detail; the 
main points will be briefly dealt with. Before mentioning them, 
we shall cite two statements as indicative of his general attitude. 
In Life of the Spirit he writes : 

"It demands men who are either senile or else spiritually im- 
mature: it cannot satisfy men who are grown up and conscious 
of their powers [es verlangt eine greisenhafte oder eine geistig 
noch unreife Menschheit, einer miindigen und kraftbewussten 
kann sie nicht geniigen]." 363 

In Erkennen und Leben: 

"Das ergibt dann eine Scholastik, sie ist eine Gefahr aller 
Zeiten, nicht bloss des Mittelalters." 364 

We find in the index, "Scholasticism a permanent danger," 
"Scholastik, eine bleibende Gefahr." 



362 It may be well to point out that in treating of Scholasticism we are 
dealing with the system of philosophy universally recognized under that name. 
We do not grant that Hegel was a scholastic, much less can we agree with 
Professor Stanley Hall who terms him "the greatest of modern scholastics," 
(Stanley Hall, Founders of Modern Psychology, New York, 1912, p. 455). 
The "Intellectualism" of Hegelianism is incompatible with scholastic philos- 
ophy and Christian truth. 

363 Einfuhrung in eine Philosophic des Geisteslebens, op. eit., p. SO, Life 
of the Spirit, op. eit., p. 63. 

u * Erkennen und Leben, op. eit., p. 109. 

152 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 153 

Such language is more akin to abuse than to argument and is 
wholly beneath serious criticism. In a pamphlet published eleven 
years before the work last cited, Eucken's tone is much milder and 
a fair attempt is made to prove the charges he there formulates. 
In Thomas von Aquino und Kant he writes : 

"Was uns im Thomismus geboten wird, ist eine Verbindung der 
aristotelischen Philosophic und der kirchlich-christlichen Lehre, 
eine Verbindung aber gemass der Art des Mittelalters. Ein 
solcher Versuch treibt den Draussenstehenden sofort zu Zweifeln 
und Fragen. Eignet sich die aristotelische Philosophic zur 
beharrenden Grundlage der Wahrheitsforschung? Ist sie, was 
immer ihr Wert mag, vereinbar mit der christlichen t)berzeu- 
gung? Geniigt die Weise, wie beide Welten von Thomas verbun- 
den sind, den Anspriichen, welche wir nach den Erfahrungen 
einer Reihe von Jahrhunderten und nach grossen geistigen Um- 
walzungen erheben miissen?" 365 

Boyce Gibson puts the challenge succinctly as follows : 

"Whatever claim is made in support of the abiding value of 
this synthesis must substantiate itself by showing — (1) that the 
Aristotelian philosophy is still qualified to retain the old supre- 
macy it held in the day of Thomas Aquinas as the one permanent 
foundation of the search after truth, and (2) that it is logically 
possible to unite the requirements of the old Greek philosophy 
with those of Christian conviction." 366 

Eucken answers both questions in the negative. 367 
Taking the second point first, we do not intend to enter upon a 
discussion of Eucken's arguments — with some of which we disagree 
— because the possibility, or otherwise, of such a complete union 
is not the question at stake. The same remark applies to the chief 
reason he assigns for the supposed reconciliation effected by St. 
Thomas. In the Problem of Human Life he writes : 

"Following the precedent of most of the Arabic philosophers, 
he [St. Thomas] saw Aristotle through the medium of Neo- 
Platonic ideas, and understood him in a more inward and religious 
sense than the facts really allow." 368 

It seems to us that this is a petitio principii; there is no sufficient 
evidence for the statement. Why forget that Plato was Aristotle's 

365 Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, Berlin, 1901, p. 25. 

366 Op. cit., p. 78. 

367 See Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf Zweier Welten, op. cit., 
pp. 26-39; also Geistige Strcimungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 58 sqq., 
"Die Hohe der Scholastik," etc., to "ergeben hatte." 

388 Op. cit., p. 255. Lebensanschauung der grossen Denker, p. 247. 



154 KtJDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlPE 

master? "Like master like servant" may well hold here. How 
could the great mind of Aristotle remain uninfluenced by Plato 
to the extent that his philosophy will not bear "an inward and 
religious meaning?" 369 

Even if this be the case the greatness of the Scholastics is accen- 
tuated thereby since, starting from Aristotle's principles, they were 
able to go so far beyond them. The spiritual soul, e.g., as 
conceived by Aristotle, lends itself to be the "fit" for the Christian 
idea, and the Scholastics develop on the philosophic side, inde- 
pendently of Revelation, what is really implied in Aristotle's 
teaching, though he may have failed to realize the full import of 
his own conceptions. 370 

It is not here a question of what Aristotle himself meant — not a 
question of what he with his limitations could draw out of his 
philosophic principles — but of what the more enlightened Scholas- 
tics could, and did, draw therefrom and add thereto, so as to 
formulate a comprehensive system, in broad outline unchangeable 
for all time. Is the Aristotelico-Scholastic philosophy (not merely 
the Aristotelian, read in the light of certain moderns — waiving the 
question of their correct or wrong interpretation) qualified to 
retain its "old supremacy" "as the one permanent foundation of 
the search after truth?" We are now at the first point — with ihe 
interrogation slightly modified — and we answer in scholastic 
fashion "Distinguo:" in fundamental principles and broad outline, 
"yes:" — we do not intend to defend our statement except by 
referring to our exposition of Scholasticism; it is its own proof — 
in every detail of its teaching with regard to natural science, "no." 
But this does not detract from the basal soundness of the system. 
Both St. Thomas and Albertus Magnus recognized that the 
scientific knowledge and beliefs 371 of their day might well be en- 
larged and superseded as fresh discoveries were made. The true 
formulators of Scholasticism were not slavish followers of Aristotle, 



369 B. Gibson, op. cit., p. 82. 

370 According to Eucken Aristotelianism is more akin to Judaism than it 
is to Christianity. (Vide Thomas Von Aquino, op. cit., p. 39.) This would 
bear out the position which we took up in part I, viz., that the concept of the 
spiritual in Greek philosophy was directly influenced by the Hebrew Religion: 
moreover, Aristotelianism and Judaism belong to the Old World; they deal 
with the same Great Spiritual Reality, but before the bright Sun of Spirituality 
had actually "dwelt amongst us," so that men can no longer plead ignorance. 

371 We use "scientific" here, in its restricted sense, as designating what we 
termed the natural sciences. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 155 

but took and rejected according to the dictates of reason and supe- 
rior knowledge, with perfect freedom and independence. It is as 
referring to this second aspect of Scholasticism that the words of 
the revered Right Rev. Bishop Spalding — of which Eucken seeks 
to make so much 372 — must be understood. Eucken's criticisms 
betray not only a lack of appreciation of Scholasticism, but also 
an entire lack of comprehension of the system itself and of its 
leading minds. The condescension with which he pays a rather 
dubious tribute to the master genius of St. Thomas is amusing. 373 
In a critique in the Dublin Review we read: 

"Why, . . . should Neo-Thomism be styled unhistorical? Why 
should we be told that 'while Thomas Aquinas was not a thinker 
of the first rank, he was no insignificant mind and no fanatic'? 
Such statements leave us musing." 374 

We shall close our defense by a critique of the challenger: 

"W'e find it very difficult to follow Professor Eucken when he is 
expounding his own philosophy. When we are told for instance 
that the individual 'must take possession of the infinite' and 
'assert it,' we are left wondering how it could possibly be done. 
We have indeed some conception of what he means by 'activism' 
and some vague thought of 'the spiritual life.' But the Professor 
is really not a philosopher: he is a 'seer' who uses words in strange 
meanings, and who feels himself charged with some great message 
for humanity. He is, in fact, like our Carlyle in many ways, in 
feeling that he bears within himself a message of regeneration, 
and above all, in the vehemence and perplexing obscurity of his 
utterances." 375 



372 Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., p. 40. 

373 Problem of Human Life, op. cit., p. 254. [Lebensanschauung der g. 
Denker, p. 246.] See also Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., pp. 26 sqq. 

374 Dublin Review, Vol. 155, July, 1914, p. 215. Probably Eucken intended 
the second statement to be an answer to Prantl who calls St. Thomas "einen 
Schwachkopf" (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Bd III, S. 2, u. 107). 
In the same critique the subjectivism of the Problem of Human Life is thus 
referred to: "There is no research- work to be found in the volume, and the 
personal factor looms large in all the interpretations" (p. 214). 

375 Dublin Review, op. cit., pp. 213 sqq. Italics ours. 



156 KUDOLF ElTCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

CONCLUSION 

In the foregoing inquiry into Rudolf Eucken's philosophy we 
have confined ourselves, in the main, to an examination of his 
concept of spiritual life, and to his theory of knowledge. We 
have sought to show that the one is an inconceivability, and the 
other an impossibility. In our exposition of Scholasticism we 
believe we have shown that the system is consistent in its prin- 
ciples, intelligible in its concepts, and in harmony with the uni- 
versally recognized signification of the term "spiritual" as opposed 
in toto to matter: we have shown further that, in its general 
principles and broad outline, it is the only permanent foundation 
of the search after truth. 



FINAL NOTE 

There are several other important aspects of Activism which 
call for criticism, but the task does not fall within the limits of 
this dissertation. We shall, therefore, point them out briefly, 
leaving the detailed refutation to others. 

1. Eucken confuses the relations of Art and Morality in a 
serious degree, insisting that there exists an essential relation be- 
tween them. In Geistige Stromungen he writes : 

"Das Angewiesensein von Kunst und Moral aufeinander wird 
namentlich da zu voller Anerkennung gelangen, wo unsere Welt 
nicht als eine fertig abgeschlossene, sondern als eine erst im Werden 
befindliche, ja als eine solche gilt, in der nicht nur Vorhandenes 
auszubauen, sondern eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit zu erreichen 
ist. . . . Aber zugleich bedarf es eines kraftigen und gliicklichen 
ktinstlerischen Bildens, wenn die neue Welt uns nicht in vagem 
Umriss verbleiben, und wenn sie das Ganze unserer Seele gewinnen 
soil; auch die Kunst ist eine unentbehrliche Helferin zum Aufbau 
eines neuenLebens." 377 

In Life of the Spirit, he writes : 

"Further, without the creative activity of art there can be no 
successful construction of an independent spiritual world in the 
human sphere, for this construction involves the severance of the 
subject from the confused initial situation and a creative effort in 
contradistinction to it." 378 

Various statements in the same spirit are scattered through his 
writings: the Problem of Human Life in particular, may be con- 
sulted on the point. We maintain that art may be an aid to 
morality both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form, and 
by raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual 
or the religious, but Eucken himself has shown how often art 
lowers rather than raises the moral standard; 379 it cannot then be 
indispensable to morality. Moreover to assert an essential 
connection is to ignore the peculiar character of spiritual activity 
which manifests itself in conscience. 

A study of Eucken's distinctively ethical works throws light on 
the mental attitude which causes the confusion; in Konnen wir 
noch Christen sein? he writes: 

"Die Zeit liegt hinter uns wo alle Bestreitung des Christentums 

377 Op. cit., pp. 335 sqq. Italics ours. (Main Currents, p. 400.) 

378 Pp. 264 sqq., op. cit. (Einfiihrung in cine Phil, des G., p. 126.) 

379 See Geistige Stromungen, pp. 329-342. 

157 



158 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

an der Tatsache der christlichen Moral wie an einem unerschiitter- 
lichen Felsen scheiterte, wir sahen die Neuzeit sowohl gegen die 
eigentiimliche Fassung als gegen die herrschende Stellung, welche 
die Moral im Christentum erhalt, harteste Angriffe rich ten." 380 

Eucken evidently thinks the attacks in part merited. In 
Present Day Ethics we find : 

"Owing to the closer connection between man's endeavor and 
his environment and to the accentuation of the struggle for 
existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too soft, too 
subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more virile 
kind. Religious ethics does not seem to have sufficient latitude 
to transform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the 
wide spread desire for something which can sufficiently supplement 
religious ethics." 381 

We cite again from the Dublin Review: 

"Of what religious morality can the Professor be thinking? 
Surely not of the Christian code, seeing that nothing less soft or 
more manly has ever been suggested. Was there anything soft or 
unmanly in the actions or ethical principles of St. Paul, St. Jerome, 
St. Athanasius, St. Ignatius, ... St. Thomas a Becket?" 382 

Eucken's views of morality cannot be accepted in toto by a 
Christian : as usual he is vague in matters of detail but he can hardly 
be considered a firm upholder of the Decalogue. The exponent of 
Activism and kindred spirits may lead strictly moral lives in spite 
of the vagueness of their moral code, but the danger of spreading 
such teachings among the masses is self-evident. We have little 
hesitation in saying that these latter will trouble little about a 
Spiritual Life to obtain which they should enter upon a "seemingly 
impossible struggle;" rather will they avail themselves of the 
suggested "latitude" in a somewhat wider manner than the phil- 
osopher intended. 

2. Eucken's subjectivism in treating of History and of historical 
personages is almost incredible in one who professes to believe in 
abiding truth. In the conception of an "historical fact" he 
out-pragmatises the pragmatists. 383 

380 Kbnnen wir noch Christen sein? Recht und Erneuerungs-fahigkeit des 
Christentums, 4, p. 175. 

381 Present Day Ethics, translated by M. Legdewitz [Seydewitz?], New York, 
1913, pp. 21 sqq. 

382 Op. cit. 

383 See Prolegomena zu Forsehungen iiher die Einheit des Geisteslebens — 
Darlegung des eigenen Verfahrens, especially, p. 42. Cf. R. Eucken's Phil, 
of Life, by Boyce Gibson, op. cit., pp. 41 sqq. 



Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 159 

3. His attacks on the Catholic Church are unworthy of one 
who has been described as "a profound German thinker:" indeed 
they are unworthy of any one who has the reputation of being 
enlightened or just. Dom Feuling seems to us a very lenient critic 
when he writes : 

"It is true, there occur in his works, down to the last editons, 
passages of scornful criticism on Christian and Catholic doctrines 
whose sense and importance he is far from understanding. But 
he endeavors throughout, and in most cases succeeds, to be fair 
and to abstain from methods of dispute which are as little scientific, 
as they are apt to invite to serious controversy." 384 

With this point we may take the confidence of his assertions on 
matters of which he has no real knowledge, and his perfect assur- 
ance of the necessity of adopting his particular views and philo- 
sophical methods. 385 

Indeed, he cannot claim to have followed "his own teaching" 
as set forth in the following passage from one of his early works. 
"It is especially necessary that we do not fabricate dogmatically a 
self-sufficiency in our own range of thought, or faith in the all- 
sufficiency of our own principles." 386 In this connection too we 
may notice his harsh treatment of St. Augustine. The encomiums 
he bestows on him and the admiration he professes for him cannot 
atone for his failure to recognize the fact of St. Augustine's con- 
version as an event which transformed his life, so that an analysis 
of his character after that conversion must necessarily differ from 
an appreciation preceding it. Moreover, following Luther, he 
attributes to St. Augustine doctrines the precise opposite of what 
he taught. 387 We may add here, too, that Eucken's statement 
that no thinker, today, holds the same views on religion as were 
formerly held, is so gratuitous and untrue as to be undeserving 
of attention. 



384 Dom. D. Feuling, O.S.B. R. Eucken's Philosophy, Dublin Review, 
op. cit., p. 77. 

385 See, e. g., Life of the Spirit, Problem of Truth, pp. 275-388. [Kinflihrung 
in eine Phil, des G., pp. 131-159.] Having criticised the Historical Standard, 
Protestantism, various philosophical systems, Tradition and the Catholic 
Church, he decides that none of them can solve the truth-problem. He 
forthwith unfolds his own system as the only means of reaching truth. 

386 Fundamental Concepts of Modern Phil. Thought, p. 304. New York, 
1880. [Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1878, p. 264.] 

387 See Prob. of Human Life., op. cit., 211 sqq. [Lebensanschauung der 
grossen Denker, pp. 207 sqq.] and for St. Augustine's teaching consult City 
of God. 



160 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

4. Finally Eucken cannot consistently speak of the truth of 
Christianity — even of the "Eternal" in Christianity — and avail 
himself, at will, of its ethical treasures while denying the Divinity 
of Our Saviour. Nothing was more clearly taught by Christ 
than that He was the Son of God. On this very charge the 
High-Priest condemned Him. 

"And the high-priest said to Him: I adjure thee by the living 
God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God. 

"Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said it. Nevertheless I say to 
you, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right 
hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. 
Then the high-priest rent his garments, saying: He hath blas- 
phemed, what further need have we of witnesses? Behold now 
you have heard the blasphemy: What think you? But they 
answering said: He is guilty of death." 388 

Will Eucken revere One Whose veracity he doubts? Here in 
concluding we again confront Eucken with an inevitable Entweder- 
Oder: Either acknowledge the Divinity of Christ, or renounce the 
ethical wealth which you have borrowed from Him, and which, 
alone, constitutes the worth of your system. 



Matthew, Chap. XXVI, Verses 63-67. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 

of the principal works used in preparing this dissertation. In the list of 
Eucken's works we have placed only those mainly dealt with: 

Rudolph Eucken. 

Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit. 

Leipzig, 1888. 
Prolegomena zu Forschungen iiber die Einheit des Geisteslebens. Leipzig, 

1885. 
Geistige Strbmungen der Gegenwart. 4te Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. (Trans- 
lated by Meyrick Booth, under the title "Main Currents of Modern 

Thought." London and New York, 1912). 
Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart. 5te Auflage. 

Berlin, 1912. (Translated by Lucy Judge Gibson and W. R. B. Gibson, 

under the title " Christianity and the New Idealism." 2d ed., New 

York, 1912.) 
Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion. 3tte Auflage. Leipzig, 1912. (Trans- 
lated by W. Tudor Jones, under the title "Truth of Religion." New 

York, 1911.) 
Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung. 2te Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. 

(Translated by Alban G. Widgery, under the title "Life's Basis and 

Life's Ideal." London, 1912.) 
Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens. 3tte Auflage. Leipzig, 1913. (Translated 

by Lucy Judge Gibson and W. R. B. Gibson, under the title "Meaning 

and Value of Life." London, 1909.) 
Einfiihrung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens. Leipzig, 1908. (Trans- 
lated by F. L. Pogson, under the title "Life of the Spirit." New York, 

1909.) 
Konnen Wir noch Christen Sein? Leipzig, 1911. (Translated by Lucy 

Judge Gibson under the title, "Can we still be Christians?" New York, 

1914.) 
Die Lebensanschauungen der Grossen Denker. 7te Auflage. Leipzig, 1907. 

(Translated by Williston S. Hough and W. R. B. Gibson, under the 

title "Problem of Human Life." New York, 1910.) 
Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt. 2tc Auflage. Leipzig, 1007. 
Erkennen und Leben. Leipzig, 1912. (Translated by W. T. Jones, under 

the title "Knowledge and Life." New York, 1913.) 
Ethics and Modern Thought. New York, 1913. 
Present-Day Ethics. New York, 1913. 

(The two last named arc; translations from the German manuscript l>y 

Margaret von Seydewitz.) 
Thomas von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf zweier Welten. Berlin, 1901. 
Geschichte und Kritik der Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart. 1878. (Earliest 

form of Geistige Strbmungen der Gegenwart. Translated by M. Stuart 

Phelps, under the title "Fundamental Concepts of Modern Philosophic 

Thought." New York, 1880.) 

101 



162 Rudolf Eucken and the Spiritual Life 

Religion and Life. London, 1911. 

Back to Religion. New York, 1912. 

Philosophic der Geschichte. Systematische Philosophic Berlin und Leipzig, 

1908, (5) pp. 248-281. 
Collected Essays. (Edited and translated by Meyrick Booth. New York, 

1914.) 
Problem of Immortality. Art. in Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, p. 836. 
Philosophy of Friedrich Froebel. Art in Forum, vol. XXX: October, 1900, 

p. 172. 
Present Estimate of Value of Human Life. Art. in Forum, vol. XXXIV: 

April-June, 1903, p. 608. 

Interpretations of Eucken. 

T 

G. Wunderle, Die Religionsphilosophie Rudolf Euckens. Paderborn, 1912. 
R. Siebert, Rudolf Euckens geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten. Berlin, 

1909. 
T. Kappstein, Rudolf Eucken der Erneuerer des deutschen Idealismus. 

Berlin-Schoneberg, 1909. 
P. Gabriel, Euckens Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung und sein 

Verhaltnis zu J. G. Fichte. Bunzlau, 1910. 
E. Hermann, Eucken and Bergson: their significance for Christian Thought. 

London, 1912. 
W. Tudor Jones, An Interpretation of R. Eucken's Philosophy. New 
York, 1912. 
The Philosophy of R. Eucken. London, 1914. 
W. R. Boyce Gibson, R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life. 2nd ed. London, 

1907. 
A. J. Jones, R. Eucken: A Philosophy of Life. New York. 
Meyrick Booth, R. Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence. New York, 1913. 
H. C. Sheldon, R. Eucken's Message to our Age. New York, 1913. 
Baron F. von Hugel, The Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken. Hib- 
bert Journal, April, 1912, p. 660. 
W. Yorke Fausset, The Neo-Christianity of Rudolf Eucken. Art. in 
Church Quart. Review, vol. LXXV: October, 1912, 
p. 21. 
Rev. A. Caldecott, The Religious Philosophy of R. Eucken. Ibid., vol. 

LXXVI: April, 1913, p. 47. 
Dom Daniel Feuling, O.S.B., Rudolph Eucken's Philosophy. Dublin Re- 
view, vol. 155: July, 1914, p. 62. 
R. Roberts, Rudolf Eucken and St. Paul. Contemporary Review, vol. 97: 
January, 1910, p. 71. 
Living Age, vol. 264: January-March, 1910, p. 432. 
H. N. Brown, Some Aspects of the Religious Philosophy of Rudolph 

Eucken. Harvard Theo. Review, vol. 2: 1909, p. 465. 
S. H. Mellone, The Idealism of Rudolph Eucken. International Journal 

of Ethics; October, 1910, p. 15. 
A. L. Whittaker, Rudolph Eucken: Champion of a Spiritual Reality. 
Forum: July, 1914, p. 41. 



Rudolf Euckbn-and the Spiritual Life 163 

B. Bosanquet, The Philosophy of Eucken. Quart. Review, No. 439: April, 

1914, p. 365. 
W. R. B. Gibson, The Philosophy of Eueken. Ibid., p. 379. 
W. T. Balmer, Bergson and Eucken in Mutual Relation. London Quart. 

Review, July-October, 1914, p. 84. 
Warner Fite, Eucken's Philosophy of Life. Nation, vol. 95: July 11, 1912, 

p. 29. 
H. M. Alden, Eucken Agonistes. North American, vol. 201: January, 1915, 

p. 57. 
F. Granger, R. Eucken: The Problem of Human Life. Hibbert Journal, 

vol. 8: July, 1910, p. 900. 
L. Abbot, Philosophy of the Spiritual Life. Outlook, vol. 103: March 1, 

1913, p. 482. 
T. Seltzer, Eucken, Germany's Inspired Idealistic Philosopher. Review of 

Reviews, vol. 46: December, 1912, p. 698. 
E. E. Slosson, Twelve Major Prophets of Today. Independent, vol. 74: 

February 27, 1913, p. 445. 
S. Kennedy, The Struggle for a Spiritual Content of Life (paraphrase, in 
part, of Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt). 
Princeton Contributions to Philosophy. February, 1899. 

Reviews, Etc. 

Erfolge und Aufgaben der Scholastik. Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, vol. 31: 

Miscellen, 1886, p. 223. 
Rudolph Eucken's New Gospel of "Activism." Current Literature, vol. 53: 

July-December, 1912, p. 67. 
Bergson and Eucken Under Fire. Current Opinion, vol. 54: April, 1913, p. 

307. 
Return of the Gods. Ibid., vol. 54: January, 1913, p. 46. 
Why We Not Only Can, But Must Be Christians. Ibid., vol. 55: July, 1914, 

p. 40. 
An Evangelical Warning Against "The False Note" in Eucken. Current 

Opinion, vol. 57: November, 1914, p. 339. 
A Chronicle of Some Recent Philosophical Works. Dublin Review, vol. 155: 

July, 1914, p. 208. 
John Bascom, The Long Path of Light. Dial, vol. 48: May 16, 1910, p. 352. 
Eucken and Bergson. Independent, vol. 74: February 13, 1913, p. 868. 
Eucken's Philosophy. Ibid., vol. 68: February 24, 1910, p. 417. 
Impressions of Eucken. Outlook, vol. 103: March 22, 191:!, p. 600. 
Rudolph Eucken and His Doctrine. Review of Reviews, vol. 42: December, 

1910, p. 741. 
Dial, vol. 46: January 16, 1909, p. 37. 
Homiletic Review, vol. 63: January-June, 1912. 
Nation, vol. 95: October 24, 1912, p. 388. 

Other Works. 

Aristotle, Opera. Paris, 1848-1887. 
St. Augustine, De Civitate Dei. 



164 EUDOLP EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 

J. M. Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology. New York, 
1901, 1902. 

J. Balmes, Fundamental Philosophy. Translated from the Span ish by H. 

F. Brownson. New York, 1903. 
H. Bergson, L'EvoIution Creatrice. 15e ed. Paris, 1914. 
Matiere et Memoire. 2e ed. Paris, 1900. 
J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy. 2nd ed. London, 1908. 

Greek Philosophy, London, 1914. 
Clement, Opera. Ed. Migne, 1857. 
Le Conte, Evolution and Its Relation to Religious Thought. New York, 

1894. 
Darwin, Origin of Species. 

T. Dwight, Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist. New York, 1911. 
Eisler, Philosophisches Worterbuch. Berlin, 1904. 
Erdmann, Geschichte der Philosophic 3tte Auflage. Berlin, 1878. 
Etjsebitjs, Praeparatio Evangelica. Ed. Migne, 1857. 
Fairbanks, The First Philosophers of Greece. New York, 1898. 
A. Farges, La Philosophic de Bergson. Paris, 1912. 
Fichte, Wissenschaftslehre. 

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Rudolf Euckbn and the Spiritual Life 1G5 

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BIOGRAPHY 

The author of this dissertation was born April 16, 1881, in 
Cork, Ireland. She attended the Preparatory Department, 
High School and College of the Ursuline nuns, St. Angela's, Cork. 
While there she went through the four years Intermediate Exami- 
nations for Secondary Schools, under the control of the Board 
of Education. Among the subjects elected by the candidate 
each year were French, German and Latin. She also obtained 
certificates in Science and Mathematics from South Kensington, 
England. In 1899 she passed the Matriculation examination of 
the Royal (now the National) University of Ireland, Dublin, 
taking the Honor Courses in English and French. She passed 
the First and the Second of Arts of the same University during 
the two following years, electing the Honor Courses in English, 
French and Logic. In October, 1901, she went to the convent 
of the Religious of Christian Education, Farnborough, England, 
where she remained for nearly three years teaching and continuing 
her personal work. While there she studied Latin under Professor 
C. A. Brown (BA. Cambridge), and followed courses in Pedagogy 
by the Directress of the High School, and in Sacred Scripture and 
Introductory Philosophy by Dom A. Gatard, O.S.B., Benedictine 
Abbey, Farnborough. In 1904 she obtained the certificate of 
recognized teacher for Secondary Education from the London 
Board of Education, and having been registered as postulant 
of the Order, returned to Ireland early in the same year where she 
completed the work for B.A. and studied for the MA. degree. 
She obtained her degree in Moral and Mental Science and Latin, 
at the Royal University of Ireland, Dublin, in 1905, having studied 
Latin under Professor J. Hollins, M.A., R.U.L, and Dr. Osborne 
Bergin (Prof. Nat. Univ.) ; and philosophy under Miss F. Vaughan 
MA., R.U.L, and Professor P. Malone, M.A., R.U.L She was, 
for a short time, assistant Professor of Latin at the Ursuline 
College, Cork. In January, 1906, she went again to England 
as Professor of English and History — for one term at the Pupil- 
Teachers' Centre of the "Dames de St. Maur," Wolverhampton, 
and for one term at the boarding school of the same Order, Wey- 
bridge, Surrey. While in England she prepared students for the 
Oxford Junior and Senior, and the Cambridge Higher Local 

166 



KUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LlFE 167 

Examinations. In September, 1906, she went to the Novitiate 
of the Religious of Christian Education, Tournai, Belgium. 
Being professed in 1908 she returned for a brief period to Farn- 
borough, then left for the American foundation of the Order in 
Asheville, N. C. Here she taught Latin and Mathematics in the 
Academy, and became professor of philosophy in the College of 
St. Genevieve's on its establishment. In 1912 she attended the 
Sister's Summer School of the Catholic University, Washington, 
D. C, and registered for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
September, 1913, to October, 1914, she spent in residence at the 
Sisters' College of the University. The courses she followed at 
the University are: Latin under Rev. T. McGourty; Greek under 
Rev. Hoey and Dr. J. B. O'Connor; History of Philosophy under 
Rev. Dr. W. Turner; Psychology under Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace; 
Philosophy under Rev. Dr. T. V. Moore and Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace. 
The author wishes to thank the Professors for the attentive 
interest shown in her work and, in particular, to gratefully acknowl- 
edge her indebtedness to Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace for his kindly 
encouragement and assistance in the preparation of this 
dissertation. 



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